TARKASAMGRAHA

OF

ANNAMBHATTA

with his

TARKADIPIKA.

Edited


with an Introduction, Translation and Notes

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। तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय।

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TO

the loving memory of my father

SHANKAR SHIVRAM SHASTRI SUKTHANKAR.

PREFACE.

I have attempted in the following pages to explain the Tarkasamgraha so as to bring it within an easy reach of the understanding of an average student. I leave it to the proper authorities to judge how far the attempt has succeeded. While acknowledging the valuable help I received from earlier annotators of the manual and its allied works I may point out that I have ventured to differ from them on certain topics. The supposed subjectivity of Kanada's Samanya and Vishesha, the genesis of Samavaya and the fallacy of Asatpratipaksha are some of the topics wherein I have proposed new interpretations which I take to be more convincing. Some of such discussions I have put within brackets because I thought the average student could very well do without reading them.

The deep knowledge of the subject of my brother Nyayashastri Bhawanishankar Sukthankar, Medallist in Nyaya, stood me in good stead He helped me to solve not a few problems in Nyaya. Prof P. V. Kulkarni, of the Elphinstone College, from whom I received my first lessons in Nyaya has obliged me by going through the major part of the manuscript and by making many valuable suggestions. Prof. V. A Gadgil of the Wilson College, Prof. Shembavnekar of the St, Xavier's College, Prof. Suru of the Fergussion College and Professors Adhikari and Shinde of the Rajaram College, have laid me under a debt of obligation by suggesting the lines on which the book was to be written. It was indeed my supreme privilege to be encouraged heartily by all these scholars in my first venture.

Mr. Mohite the manager of the Aryabhanu Press is to be thanked for undertaking the printing of this book even when there was heavy pressure of work and for executing it with the utmost despatch. I cannot help acknowledging the enthusiastic care and initiative that Mr. Kokate their competent printer showed in giving the book its nice get-up.

Last but not least, I have to thank Mr. Dewoolkar the Manager, Bombay Book-Depot, who undertook the publication of the edition in spite of other heavy commitments.

Kolhapur,
15th June 1930. *S. S. S.*

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INTRODUCTION.

1

Origin of the न्याय *and* वैशेषिक *systems:—*

It is interesting to see how minds of men of countries so distant as India and Greece have progressed from one sphere of thought to another, on very similar lines. If in Greece the philosophy of Plato preceded and paved, in some degree, the way for the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle, in India, the philosophy of the Upanishads was the precursor of the rationalistic metaphysics of कणाद and the logic of गोतम, both of which could be said to be, to some extent, at least, its outcome.

This coincidence is not by mere chance. The transition from philosophy to logic and reasoning is the direct outcome of the tendency of the human mind to revert back to ratiocination as a reaction from an extreme faith in intuition, presupposed by philosophy. The philosophy of the Upanishads always made an appeal to intuition. If you want to realise the truth you will do so only by intuition, was the teaching of the Upanishads. No amount of reasoning, no scepticism, no logic could reveal the truth to you. नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया, says the काठक Upanishad. याज्ञवल्क्य snubs the over–inquisitive गार्गी saying, गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीर्मा ते मूर्धा व्यपप्तदतिप्रश्न्यां वै देवतां पृच्छसि ।

All these are typical of the predominant spirit of the Upanishads. They made a consistent appeal to intuition.

Intuition and ecstasy are the privilege of a few only. They are doors that are positively shut to the majority of men. The emphasis on intuition carried too far is bound to result in a reaction against itself. Logic and metaphysics are within the reach of each and every man with some aptitude at least to think. So, it is quite natural that not long after the Upanishadic philosophy must have come into vogue the extreme materialism of the लोकायतिकs. कणाद and the गौतम came into the field to strike the golden mean between the two extremes. If the सूत्र period stands as a reaction of the orthodox faith against Buddhism, as Max Muller says, it is quite natural that the सूत्रs of कणाद and गौतम represent an attempt check the extreme materialistic tendency of the लोकायतिकs by diluting it with an admission of the authority the Vedas.

That the न्याय and the वैशेषिक systems originally attempted to bring about a harmony between the orthodox philosophy dependent upon intuition and the लोकायतिक school of thought standing for extreme materialism will be clear from certain topics discussed in the सूत्रs of गौतम and कणाद. कणाद establishes the authority of the Veda in several सूत्रs (Cp.6.1.1;

2,3,4;10.2.9.) He praises धर्म in 6, 2. 1 which he specifically describes as including यज्ञs, आश्रमs etc. But it is interesting to see how he repudiates the view of the Upanishads that our bodies are composed of three—some say five—elements and establishes, in the wise of a rationalist, not caring for tradition, that they are made of one element only (4. 2. 1.). His condemnation of a vicious Brahman (6 1. 6, 7, 8.), his conclusion that souls are many (3.2.20), in the teeth of the Upanishadic doctrine that plurality is mere Unity and that there is one self only (3. 2. 19.) are all typical of the spirit for which कणाद's system stands.

The same tendency is to be observed in गौतम's न्यायसूत्र. Like कणाद he has the highest respect for the Vedic tradition; (2.1.67.)he defends the Veda against objections like those of कौत्स in the निरुक्त (1.2.56-60); he believes in ईश्वर. But he has the honour to differ from the Vedic tradition whenever it came into conflict with reason. Thus, like कणाद, he believes, on grounds of reason, that our bodies are made of one element only, (3. 1. 28.) though here he points how reasoning (3. 1. 30) is supported by certain allusions in the श्रुति (3.1.29) That he differs from the extreme materialist is clear from his refutation of their view that the body is the self (3.1..4.) The upshot of the whole is that these systems want to differ

from the श्रुति where it conflicted with reason; and to adhere to it where its doctrines did not clash with reason-because only thus could they make their systems popular by an appeal to the orthodox sentiment.

This theory will account for the fact that while there are some who regard the न्याय-वैशेषिक systems as closely related to the लोकायतिक a subdivision of the आन्वीक्षिकी according to कौटिल्य, there are others who regard it as an आस्तिकदर्शन. As appealing to reason they were लौकायतिकs and they were आस्तिकs because they appealed to the Vedic authority also.

The above discussion will enable us to judge the relation between the न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन and the वेदान्त. Both accepted reasoning as a valuable means to knowledge but differed in the relative value they attached to it. Thus while the वेदान्त does recognize the validity of reasoning, it gives its verdict in favour of श्रुति when there is a conflict between श्रुति and तर्क. The वेदान्त attaches value to reasoning in so far as the latter is in harmony with the श्रुति. When आरुणि directs श्वेतकेतु to perform the various experiments [उदके लवणमवाधाय मा प्रातरुपसीदथाः] when he says, यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं, or when the गीता describes the ब्रह्मसूत्रपदs as हेतुमद्भिः all attach value to reasoning. But they want to assign to it

a position lower than the श्रुति when, for instance, काठक says नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया. The न्यायवैशेषिक attitude is quite the opposite. As seen above they will shelve श्रुति when it conflicts with reasoning and admit its authority when it is in harmony with the latter.

2

The वैशेषिकs:—These are the followers of कणाद the author of the वैशेषिकसूत्र. The name has been variously explained. Some say that the system got its name from the category of विशेष. But this view does not possess suffiicient force in view of the fact that विशेष was not the only category peculiar to the school, समवाय, for instance, being an equally important inn-ovation introduced by them. That this derivation has not the sanction of tradition behind it is obvious from the one suggested by the न्यायकोशकार who derives it thus

विशेषं पदार्थभेदमाधिकृत्य कृतो ग्रन्थो वैशेषिकम् ।

i.e. the work which concerns itself with the defferent-iation of categories. अभ्यंकरशास्त्रिन् in his commentary on the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह advances a similar explanation. द्रव्यगुणादिभेदेन सप्तैव पदार्था इति निश्चित्य सर्वं सुव्यवस्थितं कणादः प्रत्यपादयत्। अत ईदृशं विशेषमुद्दिश्य प्रवृत्तत्वादिदं वैशेषिकशास्त्रमिति गीयते।

—स. द. स. औलूक्यदर्शन (p. 210)

This interpretation is plainly enough based on the words साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां in the introductory सूत्र of कणाद

धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद्द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ।

Could we not base the name वैशेषिक with a greater amount of plausibility on the word विशेष in धर्मविशेष? कणाद claims for his शास्त्र the supreme privilege of having been inspired by distinctive merit (धर्मविशेष). We could hazard the explanation that the वैशेषिकशास्त्र is one which is the outcome of distinctive merit. The name that originated from this सूत्र must have come to be applied to all followers of कणाद's school.

The नैयायिकs:—These are the followers of गौतम the author of the न्यायसूत्रs. As regards the propriety of the name we are on a surer basis, in this case, than in that of the वैशेषिकs. The name is evidently derived from न्याय, reasoning. One cannot definitely say that न्याय meant the five-membered syllogism that was brought into vogue by गौतम, which bears the name to-day. For, there are indications, in वात्स्यायनs gloss* of नैयायिकs whose syllogism consisted of no less than ten members. Whether the members were five or ten, it is beyond doubt that the नैयायिकs got their name from their syllogistic reasoning. That this is not a mere conjecture but a fact becomes evident from the examination of the history of the word न्याय. न्याय is genetically a term of the पूर्वमीमांसा system and denoted the upshot of the ratiocination employed in reconciling apparently

* दशावयवानेके नैयायिका वाक्ये सञ्चक्षते ।

contradictory texts in the Vedic literature, particularly the Brahmanas. This is the import of the definition of the न्याय of the पूर्वमीमांसा.

वेदार्थनिर्णयसाधनं अधिकरणात्मकःपदार्थः—भाषापरिच्छेद.

Thus there are न्यायs in the पूर्वमीमांसा like 'सविशेषणे हि वर्तमानौ विधिनिषेधौ विशेषणमुपसङ्क्रामतः सति विशेष्यबाधे' इति न्यायः। जातेष्टिन्याय and others. How न्याय formed the very backbone of the पूर्वमीमांसा system can be judged by the nomenclature of several मीमांसा works, particularly that of Jaimini, which is called the न्यायमाला.

It is easy to understand how the term न्याय that, in the first instance, denoted reasoning, in the sphere of Vedic ritual, came to be applied to all reasoning irrespective of its having a bearing on the Vedic ritual or not. That there are लौकिकन्यायs like स्थूणानिखनन्याय and अन्धगोलाङ्गूलन्याय in vogue in Sanskrit shows how न्याय, later on, became a term of wider application. The term that primarily denoted the reasoning of the पूर्वमीमांसा came to be applied to all sorts of reasoning and was not confined to any particular school. Thus the वेदान्त speaks of अध्यारोपन्याय and अपवादन्याय and the Jain logicians speak of नयs. Needless to say, then, that the system of which गौतम is a representative, that primarily taught how to reason came to possess the name derived from the word.

3

The difference between the two schools:—

It has become difficult to distinguish between the two schools in view of the peculiar relation in which they stood soon after their inception. They started with distinct spheres for their speculations. The नैयायिक school had to deal with logic, the वैशेषिक with metaphysics. One can imagine hcw the first नैयायिक and वैशेषिक must have dealt with topics purely logical and metaphysical respectively. But the works of the first नैयायिक and वैशेषिक are lost to us and we find in कणाद's वैशेषिकसूत्र and गौतम's न्यायसूत्र respectively metaphysics with a sprinkling of logic and logic with bits of metaphysics: because, sufficient time must have elapsed since the inception of the systems which were now on their way to amalgamation. Thus when कणाद establishes अनुमान as a प्रमाण (2. 1. 8.) or when he refers to हेत्वाभास (3.1.15.) he deals with topics that come within the pale of न्याय. And when गौतम, on the other hand, deals with topics like the permanence of the soul (3. 1. 19) or when he determines that our bodies are constituted of only one element he deals with topics that fall within the sphere of metaphysics. In short, the systems that were to investigate in different spheres were already showing a tendency towards amalgamation.

And the reasons for this tendency are not far

to seek. Both the systems had appeared to temper the reaction from the tendency to place a blind faith in the authority of the scriptures. As वैदिकदर्शनs they do show deference for the Vedic tradition. But a tendency to differ from the tradition where it clashed with reason is also slightly perceptible in both the systems. When the वैशेषिक says that the body is made up of one element only, he differs, on grounds of reasoning, from the श्रुति that says that the body is made up of three elements or five. When a नैयायिक defines मोक्ष as दुःखाभाव and not as ब्रह्मात्मत्वप्रतीति, he shows a tendency to differ from the श्रुति. Thus both were rationalistic and here we can trace the common meeting-ground of both. The anecdotes that कणाद's last words were पीलवः पीलवः instead of the name of some god and that there was a clash between the वैदिक व्यास and the नैयायिक अक्षपाद* (गौतम), though not credible, are yet significant of the attitude of the two systems towards the श्रुति.

The system in कणाद's सूत्रs is to be distinguished from that in those of गौतम on the following points:—

1. कणाद is metaphysical and deals with six categories that are supposed to exhaust the Universe.

* गौतमो हि स्वमतदूषकस्य व्यासस्य मुखदर्शनं चक्षुषा न कर्तव्यमिति प्रतिज्ञाय पश्चाद् व्यासेन प्रसादितः etc.

—अभ्यंकरशास्त्रिन् on अक्षपाददर्शन in स. द. सं.

गौतम is dialectical and deals with sixteen heads that have a bearing on dialectics and reasoning.

2. कणाद admits two प्रमाणs प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान. गौतम admits two more, उपमान and शब्द.

After कणाद and गौतम the systems came nearer and nearer. The writers who came in the field brought about a syncretism between the two schools and to-day the distinction between them is no more than theoretical.

Now, one is said to belong to the नैयायिक or the वैशेषिक according as he adheres or not to the theories summarised in the following stanza cited in the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह:—

> द्वित्वे च पाकजोत्पत्तौ विभागे च विभागजे।
> यस्य न स्खलिता बुद्धिस्तं वै वैशेषिकं विदुः॥

1. The वैशेषिकs hold that द्वित्व is produced (जन्य) by अपेक्षाबुद्धि; the नैयायिकs hold that it is only made known (ज्ञाप्य) by अपेक्षाबुद्धि. अन्नंभट्ट holds the fromer view,[1] (see notes on संख्या.)

2. The नैयायिकs hold that when a jar is baked, the change of colour is due to the atoms in the jar (पीलु) being baked individually. The नैयायिकs hold that the jar as a whole (पिठर) is baked and not the individual atoms. The former are called पीलुपाकवादिन्s and the latter पिठरपाकवादिन्s. अन्नंभट्ट holds the former view.[2]

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1 द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव। —तर्कसंग्रह

2 अत्र परमाणुष्वेव पाको न द्व्यणुकादौ। —तर्कदीपिका

3. The वैशेषिकs hold that विभाग can be कर्मज as well as विभागज while the नैयायिकs hold that it can be कर्मज only. अन्नंभट्ट admits विभागजविभाग like the वैशेषिकs.[1]

We can extend the list by adding the following:—

4. समवाय is अनुमानविषय according to the वैशेषिकs. It is प्रत्यक्षविषय according to the नैयायिकs. अन्नंभट्ट holds that it is inferrible only.[2]

5. जीवात्मन् is inferrible only according to the वैशेषिकs. It is perceived directly by the mind according to the नैयायिकs अन्नंभट्ट holds the former view.

Thus अन्नंभट्ट shows a tendency towards the वैशेषिक system.

4

Are कणाद's and गौतम's systems atheistic ?

The न्याय and the वैशेषिक systems have been included by tradition in the list of वैदिकदर्शनs (दर्शन= philosophy) also styled आस्तिकदर्शनs as distinct from the अवैदिकदर्शनs like those of the जैनs and the बौद्धs. Tradition says,[3]

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1 विभागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्च। —तर्कदीपिका.

2 प्रत्यक्षः समवाय इति नैयायिका आहुः।
समवायोऽतीन्द्रियोऽनुमेय एवेति वैशेषिकाः। —न्यायकोश.
नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया। विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः। —तर्कदीपिका.

3 न्यायकोश-दर्शन.

द्वौ योगौ (सांख्य and पातञ्जल) द्वे च मीमांसे (पूर्व and उत्तर) द्वौ तर्कौ (न्याय and वैशेषिक) इति षड् बुधाः— (एतानि आस्तिकशास्त्राण्याहुः ।)

Nobody questions the fact that the न्याय and the वैशेषिक systems as they developed *after* गौतम and कणाद were वैदिक and theistic. For, the later तार्किकs included ईश्वर in the list of द्रव्यs, and to Him they attributed the creation and destruction of the world.[1] All are agreed on this point. But the suggestion by some that ईश्वर does not find a place in the सूत्रs of गौतम and कणाद is as much bold as misleading. Of these some[2] hold that the absence of mention is due to an atheistic tendency on the part of कणाद and गौतम, while others[3] believe that it is due to the idea that " God is beyond and above the phenomenal world with which their systems were chiefly concerned." But they are agreed on the point that both कणाद and गौतम did not admit ईश्वर. Some[4] have gone to the extent of saying that प्रशस्तपाद says nothing about God which is a clear mistake in view of the fact that as seen

1 संसारखिन्नानां सर्वप्राणिनां निशि विश्रामार्थं सकलभुवनपतेर्महेश्वरस्य संजिहीर्षासमकालं ततः पुनः प्राणिनां भोगभूतये महेश्वरसिसृक्षानन्तर etc.

—प्रशस्तपादभाष्य (p. 48)

ईश्वरस्य चिकीर्षावशात् परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । —तर्कदीपिका.

2 Banerjea, Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, ref. by Athalye & Bodas.

3 Athalye and Bodas pp. 136--137.

4 Athalye and Bodas p. 137.

in the quotation in the note above he ascribes creation and destruction to ईश्वर as explicitly as any other later logician. Keith also seems to hold the view that कणाद and गौतम are both silent about God. For, he says,[1] "can we therefore assert that the silence of कणाद and गौतम ....means that the authors of the वैशेषिक and the न्यायसूत्रs were not believers in God? .... It may be the the early criticisms of the system in the period between कणाद and प्रशस्तपाद resulted in the recognition of this defect and that the Creator was assumed to fill the lacuna".[2]

But as has been said above, this is an erroneous view about the सूत्रs of कणाद and गौतम. In कणाद we find the following सूत्रs which according to the commentators, hint at the assumption of God and Yogins by him. संज्ञा कर्म त्वस्मद्विशिष्टानां लिङ्गम् । 2. 1. 18.

प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तत्वात्संज्ञाकर्मणः । 2. 1. 19.

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1 Keith Atomism 264--266.
Keith elsewhere does take note of गौतम's reference to ईश्वर (p 22) How to reconcile the two?

2 It is not unlikely that this theory of the न्याय—वैशेषिक atheism was due to their bearing some resemblance to the Epicureans so far as the atomic theory was concerned. It the Epicureans denied God, well, so might the न्याय--वैशेषिकs: seems to be the idea.

Cp. Webb's History of Philosophy "Its attraction (that of the atomic theory) to the Epicurean School, however, was not its scientific utility so much as its apparent inconsistency with the doctrine of the divine government of the world which they regarded as the source of the worst evil that affects mankind, namely the fear of death, and what may come after it." (p. 66)

If we suppose that it is commentator's[1] ingeuity that is behind this assumption, no such supposition is possible in the case of the last सूत्र, तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम् where तत् evidently stands for ईश्वर. Again कणाद, now and then, shows the highest respect for the श्रुति which is one more evidence to show that he was not an atheist.[2] His eulogy of धर्म which he specifically describes in the सूत्र अभिषेचनोपवासब्रह्मचर्यगुरुकुलवासवानप्रस्थयज्ञदान etc. is one more instance in point.

That कणाद's system was not atheistic at its inception is further proved by the tradition of the origin of the system, which howsoever mythical and fanciful, is yet typical of the spirit in which the system has been looked upon. Tradition[3] says that शिव in the form of an owl revealed the दर्शन to कणाद being pleased with the latter's austerity. This tradition dating as far back as प्रशस्तपाद[4] is illustrative

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1 संज्ञा नाम, कर्म कार्यं क्षित्यादि तदुभयमस्मद्विशिष्टानामीश्वरमहर्षीणां सत्त्वेऽपि लिङ्गम्। —उपस्कार, on the वै. सू. 2. 1. 18 जयनारायण's विवृति follows suit.

2 बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे। 6. 1. 1. तस्मादागमिकम् 2. 1. 17. तद्वचना etc. repeated twice.

3 तपस्विने कणादमुनये स्वयमीश्वर उलूकरूपधारी प्रत्यक्षीभूय पदार्थषट्कमुपदिदेशेत्यप्यैतिह्यं श्रुयते।
—अभ्यंकरशास्त्रिन् on औलूक्यदर्शन in the स. द. सं

4 योगाचारविभूत्या यस्तोषयित्वा महेश्वरम्। चक्रे वैशेषिक शास्त्रं तस्मै कणभुजे नमः। —प्र. भा. p. 329.

of the fact that कणाद's system ever enjoyed a place in the list of the आस्तिकदर्शनs. How else could we explain this attitude towards the सूत्रs of कणाद if not on the assumption that from the very beginning they were looked upon as consonant with the Vedic tradition and as such far from atheistic,—a conclusion that ought to have a foundation in the सूत्रs themselves ?

As regards गौतम again, there is a सूत्र which explicitly states that ईश्वर had a place in his system. Cp.

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् । 4 1. 19.

वात्स्यायनः—पुरुषोऽयं समीहमानो नावश्यं समीहाफलमाप्नोति तेनानुमीयते पराधीनं पुरुषकर्मफलाराधनमिति यदधीनं स ईश्वरः तस्मादीश्वरः कारणम् ।

In the presence of this सूत्र how can we say, as some have said, that गौतम is silent on the question of ईश्वर ? गौतम again evinces a deep regard for the Vedic tradition. Cp. his सूत्र

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात् । 2. 1. 67.

वात्स्यायनः—आयुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवद्वेदप्रामाण्यमनुमातव्यम् p. 92.

In the face of this evidence any attempt to show that कणाद's and गौतम's सूत्रs are atheistic or even silent on ईश्वर seems unwarranted. The truth is that the सूत्रs do refer to ईश्वर, but do not discuss him, at any great length, as they do other topics, because of his transcendental nature. The systems as evolved by कणाद and गौतम were rationalistic,

no doubt, but their reasonings never landed them into atheism.

5

कणाद *and* गोतम.

The earliest extant work of the वैशेषिक system is the वैशेषिकसूत्र of कणाद, also styled the वैशेषिकदर्शन. The system as it is developed in the सूत्रs gives ground to the belief that the सूत्रs must have been preceded by other works on the subject, which the सूत्रs like the सूत्रs of बादरायण and जैमिनि supplanted by their systematic form and comprehensive treatment; and the view of some[1] that the वैशेषिक thought must have existed prior to the rise of Buddhism seems to be well founded The सूत्रs of कणाद are held by some[2] to be later than the सूत्रs of गोतम while others[3] hold the opposite view which seems to be more reasonable than the former.

The author of the सूत्रs is styled कणाद or कणभुक् or कणभक्ष all meaning 'Atom-eater.' Some associate the name with the theory of atoms for which कणाद is held responsible. Others[4] say that he got the name

1 Radhakrishnan, History of Indian Philosophy Vol. 2 p. 177

2 Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-Samgraha, कणाद's सूत्रs (after 4th cent. B. C.) गोतमs सूत्रs (end of 5th oent. B.C.)--Intrcduction, p. xxxiii.

3 Keith, Atomism p. 92.

4 अयं च कणभक्षणेन तपश्चरणादुञ्छेन वर्तनाच्च कणाद इति प्रसिध्यति। --न्यायकोश. कणाद इति तस्य कापोतीं वृत्तिमनुतिष्ठतो रथ्यानिपतितांस्तण्डुलानादाय प्रत्यहं कृताहारनिमित्ता संज्ञा। --न्यायकन्दली p. 2.

because he lived on corn that he gleaned from the road like a pigeon. (कपोत) He belonged to the काश्यपगोत्र[1] His system is sometimes called the औलूक्यदर्शन the name being explained in two ways. Some say कणाद's other name was उलूक which must have been the source of the name of the system, while others say that शिव being pleased with the penance of कणाद revealed to him the system in the form of an owl (उलूक), the second explanation being too fancied to be believable.[2] Sugiura[3] says that he was called 'rice-eater' because he lived on rice collected from women while his name उलूक is due to his residence on mountain combined with an ugly form. It is said that कणाद was so materialistic that his last words on his death-bed were पीलव:। पीलव:। Atoms ! Atoms !

गौतम the author of the न्यायसूत्रs is also styled अक्षपाद. The latter name is explained away as being due to an incident between गौतम and व्यास whom the former saw with an eye set in his foot, because he did not condescend to look with the ordinary eyes at व्यास who held the opposite views[4]. It has been proved that this गौतम cannot be identified with the धर्मसूत्रकार and not in the least with his name-sake who

1 प्रशस्तपाद p. 200........काश्यपोऽब्रवीत्

2 न्यायकोश p. 2.

3 Cited in Athalye and Bodas Introd. XXX.

4 See quotation page IX.

was the founder of Buddhism.[1] Similarly the view that identifies him with प्रशस्तपाद्[2] and also another[3] that makes him the brother of कणाद् are untenable.

His सूत्रs are the earliest extant literary work on the system, but must have been preceded by similar other works in the same field. His system is dialectical and logical; कणाद्'s is primarily metaphysical. गौतम has once for all given the final form to the Indian syllogism with its five अवयवs.

Among the theories of the metaphysics of कणाद् those of परमाणु, विशेष and समवाय are important.

6

Is the Atomic Theory of the वैशेषिकs *borrowed from others ?*

Keith[4] is inclined to believe against the view of Max Muller[5] that the atomic theory of the वैशेषिकs

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1 Athalye & Bodas T.S. XXXIII.

2. अन्ये तु नैयायिकः अक्षपादः अक्षचरणः प्रशस्तपादः प्रशस्तचरणश्च इति महर्षेर्गौतमस्यैव नामाभिधाः सन्तीति मन्यन्ते । —न्यायकोश p. 2.

3 वायुपुराण cited in the praface to the प्रशस्तपादभाष्य p. 10

4 Keith's Atomism p. 17.

5 Six Systems

" It is no doubt very tempting to ascribe a Greek origin to कणाद्'s theoryof atoms. But suppose the atomic theory had really been borrowed from a Greek source, would it not be strange that कणाद्'s atoms are supposed never to assume visible dimensions till there is a combination of three double atoms(त्र्यणुक)? ...... I do not remember anything like this in the Epicurean authors and it seems to me to give quite an independent character to कणाद्s' view of the nature of an atom."

was borrowed from the Greeks. 'The Epicureans raised it into a widespread belief, and it would be irrational to deny that it might easily have been conveyed to India, says he. Radhakrishnan* categorically repudiates the view of Keith showing how the theory of atoms of the वैशेषिकs essentially differs from that of Democritus, who first developed the theory in Greece which was later adopted by the Epicureans, on the following points:—

1. According to Democritus atoms differ in quantity or size, and not in quality. According to the वैशेषिक the qualities of an atom of the earth are different from those of an atom of water and light and air, which in their turn differ mutually. But their sizes are the same.

2. Democritus and Epicurus hold the atoms to be in motion by nature, while the वैशेषिक believes that they are at rest until moved into action by अदृष्ट or परमेश्वर.

3. Greek atomism dispensed with the agency of God in creation: The वैशेषिक did admit the agency of God in a more or less definite shape.

Prof. Radhakrishnan says in conclusion, 'There are thus distinctive features of the वैशेषिक atomism

* History of Indian Philosophy II. pp. 202-3.

which cannot be due to Greek influence and it is easy to find anticipations of the atomic theory in the early Indian thought.

Jain Atomism vs. वैशेषिक *Atomism:—*

The atoms of Jainism are so different in their nature from those of the वैशेषिक system that no theory can be tenable which regards one as the borrower of the other. In Jainism all atoms possess the qualities of रूप, रस, गन्ध, संयोग and a potential power to produce शब्द though they themselves are शब्दरहित. In the वैशेषिक system the atoms of the different substances possess different qualities and have got nothing to do with शब्द which is the exclusive quality of आकाश which is विभु and has no atoms. This sets aside the claim that the वैशेषिक is an off-shoot of Jainism.

7

अन्नंभट्ट's *personal history* (probably 1625 to 1700 A. D.):‡

अन्नंभट्ट the son of तिरुमलाचार्य was born in a family

‡ Athalye and Bodas; T. S. Introduction LXIII He must have lived later than गदाधर (1600 A. D.) whose work गदाधरी he taught to his students and earlier than the author of the commentary तर्कचन्द्रिका by वैद्यनाथ गाडगीळ the earlist known commentary on the तर्कसंग्रह (earlier than 1722 A. D.) The oldest known ms. of the तर्कसंग्रह also corroborate this conclusion for it is dated शके १६३४ i, e. 1712 A. D.

known as राघवसोमयाजिन्s.[1] All are agreed that he was a Brahmin of fhe South, though opinions differ about the exact region. Some place him in the Karnataka; others state that he was an inhabitant of the Tailangana.[2] The Madras edition of the तर्कसंग्रह places him in केशवपुर on the banks of the Krishna, where there are Rigvedin Brahmins styled अन्नंभट्टs living to this date. Godbole[3] in his Dictionary of the History of India places him in a village named Garikpada in the Tailangana, his place of study being कौण्डिनपुर.

अन्नंभट्ट had the privilege of being born in a family that had literary traditions behind it. His father was, it seems, well versed in the अद्वैत for he is styled अद्वैतविद्याचार्य. His elder brother रामकृष्ण[4] was a great grammarian who is reputed to be the author सिद्धान्तरत्नाकर a gloss on the सिद्धान्तकौमुदी.

अन्नंभट्ट himself wrote the तर्कसंग्रह, the तर्कसंग्रह दीपिका, मिताक्षरा and भाष्यप्रदीपोद्योतन, both works on grammar,

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1 यतोऽनेनैव महापण्डितेन विरचिते कैयटव्याख्याने इति महामहोपाध्याया। द्वैतविद्याचार्यराघवसोमयाजिकुलावतंसश्रीतिरुमलाचार्यवर्यस्य सूनोरन्नंभट्टस्य इति वर्णावलिरवलोक्यते —त. सं. Madras Edition.

2 अन्नंभट्टश्च कर्णाटकदेशीयः (तैलंगदेशीयो वा ?)--न्यायकोश p. 9.

3 Referred to by Athalye and Bodas, T. S.

4 अस्य च अग्रजो महापण्डितो रामकृष्णभट्टः येन सिद्धान्तकौमुद्याः सिद्धान्तरत्नाकरं नाम व्याख्यानमाविष्कुर्वता etc. Madras Edition T. S.

ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति and two or three works more, showing his versatility.

The तर्कसंग्रह which अन्नंभट्ट must have composed to initiate his students in तर्क has had the rare distinction of being one of the most popular manuals on Sanskrit Logic. When अन्नभट्ट describes the purpose of its compilation to be बालानां सुखबोध he is not wide of the mark. It is simple, brief and as lucid as the subject would permit it to be. A comparison of the definitions and the general treatment of topics, in the तर्कसंग्रह, with any other typical work on Sanskrit Logic will bear out the above estimate of the manual. The long list of commentaries on the तर्कसंग्रह is a strong testimony to the popularity the manual has enjoyed from the beginning. अन्नंभट्ट, though of the syncretist school, was essentially a वैशेषिक. (Cp. the section on the difference between the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs.) That he belonged to the conservative school of the तार्किकs and not to the new one is clear from his definition of करण, his view that वायु is inferrible only, his admission of विशेषs, not to add several other indications.

In the course of his tuitions अन्नभट्ट must have felt that in being brief in his तर्कसंग्रह he was becoming obscure. So the तर्कदीपिका must have been written to supplement the manual. The तर्कसंग्रह and

the तर्कदीपिका form one organic whole. The तर्कसंग्रह is simple, no doubt, but it could not hope to be comprehensive while aiming at brevity. The तर्कदीपिका fills in the gap It is not the तर्कसंग्रह but the दीपिका that sheds light on such important theories as the परमाणुवाद, the अनन्यथासिद्धि of कारण, the अनुमेयत्व of वायु, the question of उपाधि, the propriety of चित्ररूप. So it is no exaggeration to say that the तर्कदीपिका supplies some of the most vital topics on Sanskrit Logic.

In brief, the तर्कसंग्रह and the दीपिका give in nutshell the system of तर्क. There was very little scope for originality after कणाद and, above all, after प्रशस्तपाद had given final shape to the system. That is why all works on तर्क after प्रशस्तपाद are written on lines closely similar and treat of topics almost identical.

8

A general estimate of the न्याय-वैशेषिक system:—

When our horizon of knowledge is ever widening it is not unlikely that we may fail to look at the accomplishments of the system with any deep regard. Some of their theories like those of समवाय and अभाव may not appeal to the scientific mind of our centuries. Our faces may be lit up with smile not unmixed with sarcasm when a तार्किक of the calibre of शंकरमिश्र explains away the नीलवर्ण of आकाश with the remarks,

कथं तर्हि नीलं नभ इति प्रतीतिरिति चेन्न। सुमेरोर्दक्षिणदिशमाक्रम्य स्थितस्ये-न्द्रनीलमयशिखरस्य प्रभामालोकयतां तथाभिमानात्।

(उपस्कार on the वैशेषिक सूत्र II. 1. 5)

We might question the logic behind the argument advanced to prove that gold is तैजस. To us the view of कणाद that the ऊर्ध्वज्वलन of fire and the तिर्यक्पवन of wind are the workings of the Unseen might sound a little superstitious. But these are negligible before the solid contributions the system has made to human thought. The परमाणुवाद of the वैशेषिकs, their theory of causation, the न्याय of गौतम, the treatment of logical fallacies and the classification into categories are all entitled to a high place in the history of thought. And even where the न्यायवैशेषिक-दर्शन fails we have to make allowance for the limitations, particularly, in the field of the experimental sciences, under which it had to labour in those early days. The argument to prove the तैजसत्व of gold like several others suffers from this drawback.

"Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it," asks Bertrand Russel in opening his Problems of Philosophy and none need be sorry if the न्यायवैशेषिकs have indulged in certain vagaries of thought. It may be true as Radhakrishnan says that theirs is not a harmonious system like the

वेदान्त or सांख्य but a mere catalogue of items. It is not so much in their achievements as in their bold attempts at speculation that the तार्किकs are entitled to an eminent place. We must approach and appraise such schools of thought bearing in mind the remarks made by the same great philosopher (Russel) about the capacity of philosophy.

" However slight may be the hope of discovering an answer it is part of the business of Philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge ".




॥ श्रीशान्ता विजयतेतराम् ॥

अथ

तर्कसंग्रहः

तर्कदीपिकया सहितः



[१]

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् ।
बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

अथ तर्कदीपिका

विश्वेश्वरं साम्बमूर्तिं प्रणिपत्य गिरां गुरुम् ।
टीकां शिशुहितां कुर्वे **तर्कसंग्रहदीपिकाम** ॥

चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थं शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतिबोधितकर्तव्यताकमिष्टदेवतानमस्कारलक्षणं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थं निबध्नंश्चिकीर्षितं ग्रन्थादौ प्रतिजानीते—**निधायेति** ।

Propriety and Significance of मङ्गल

ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वं नास्ति । मङ्गले कृतेऽपि किरणावल्यादौ समाप्त्यदर्शनात् मङ्गलाभावेऽपि कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनादन्वयव्यतिरेकव्यभिचारादिति चेन्न । किरणावल्यादौ विघ्नबाहुल्यात्समाप्त्यभावः। कादम्बर्यादौ तु ग्रन्थाद्बहिरेव मङ्गलं कृतमतो न व्यभिचारः ।

ननु मङ्गलस्य कर्तव्यत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतेरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथाहि—मङ्गलं वेदबोधितकर्तव्यताकं, अलौकिकाविगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वात् दर्शादिवत् । भोजनादौ व्यभिचारवारणायाल**लौकिके**ति । रात्रिश्राद्धादौ व्यभिचारवारणाया**विगीते**ति । **शिष्ट**पदं स्पष्टार्थम् । "न कुर्यान्निष्फलं कर्म" इति जलताडनादेरपि निषिद्धत्वादिति ॥

तर्कसंग्रह इति । **तर्क्यन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्त इति तर्का द्रव्यादिसप्तपदार्थास्तेषां संग्रहः संक्षेपेण स्वरूपकथनं** क्रियत **इत्यर्थः** । कस्मै प्रयोजनायेत्यत आह—**सुखबोधाये**ति । सुखेनानायासेन बोधः पदार्थज्ञानं तस्मा इत्यर्थः ॥ ननु बहुषु तर्कग्रन्थेषु सत्सु किमर्थमपूर्वग्रन्थः क्रियत इत्यत आह—**बालाना**मिति । तेषामतिविस्तृतत्वाद्बालानां बोधो न भवतीत्यर्थः । ग्रहणधारणपटुर्बालः, न तु स्तनन्धयः । किं कृत्वा क्रियत इत्यत आह—**निधाये**ति । विश्वेशं जगन्नियन्तारं शिवं हृदि निधाय नितरां स्थापयित्वा, सर्वदा तद्ध्यानपरो भूत्वेत्यर्थः । गुरूणां विद्यागुरूणां वन्दनं नमस्कारं **विधाय** कृत्वेत्यर्थः ॥

[२]

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः सप्त पदार्थाः ॥

त. दी.—पदार्थान्विभजते—**द्रव्ये**ति । **पदस्यार्थः पदार्थ इति व्युत्पत्त्याभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम्** ॥ नन्वत्र विभागादेव सप्तत्वे सिद्धे सप्तग्रहणं व्यर्थमिति चेत् । न । अधिकसंख्याव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ॥ नन्वतिरिक्तः पदार्थः प्रमितो न वा । नाद्यः प्रमितस्य निषेधायोगात्,

नान्यः प्रतियोगिप्रमितिं विना निषेधानुपपत्तेरिति चेत् । न । पदार्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्यमिति व्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ॥ ननु सप्तान्यतमत्वं सप्तभिन्नभिन्नत्वमिति वक्तव्यम् । एवं च सप्तभिन्नस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्सप्तान्यतमत्वं कथमिति चेन्न द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वं द्रव्यादिभेदसप्तकाभाववत्त्वमित्युक्तत्वात् । एवमग्रेऽपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

[३]

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ॥

त. दी.—द्रव्यं विभजते—**तत्रेति** । तत्र द्रव्यादिमध्ये द्रव्याणि नवैवेत्यन्वयः । कानि तानीत्यत आह—**पृथिवीत्यादि** ॥

ननु तमसो दशमद्रव्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात्कथं नवैव द्रव्याणि । अन्धकार तथाहि नीलं तमश्चलतीत्यबाधितप्रतीतिबलान्नीलरूपा- अभाव. धारतया क्रियाधारतया च द्रव्यत्वं तावत्सिद्धम् । तत्र तमसो नाकाशादिपञ्चकेऽन्तर्भावो रूपवत्त्वात् । अत एव न वायौ, स्पर्शाभावात्सदागतिमत्त्वाभावाच्च । नापि तेजसि, भास्वररूपाभावादुष्णस्पर्शाभावाच्च । नापि जले, शीतस्पर्शाभावान्नीलरूपाश्रयत्वाच्च । नापि पृथिव्यां, गन्धवत्त्वाभावात्स्पर्शरहितत्वाच्च । तस्मात्तमो दशमद्रव्यमिति चेन्न । तमसस्तेजोऽभावरूपत्वात् । तथाहि—तमो हि न रूपवद्द्रव्यमालोकासहकृतचक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वादालोकाभाववत् । रूपिद्रव्यचाक्षुषप्रमायामालोकस्य कारणत्वात् । तस्मात्प्रौढप्रकाशकतेजःसामान्याभावस्तमः । तत्र नीलं तमश्चलतीति प्रत्ययो भ्रमः । अतो नव द्रव्याणीति सिद्धम् ॥

द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ लक्ष्यैकदेशावृत्तित्वमव्याप्तिः, यथा गोः कपिलत्वम् । अलक्ष्यवृत्तित्वमतिव्याप्तिः, यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वम् । लक्ष्यमात्रावर्तनमसंभवः यथा गोरेकशफत्वम् । एतद्दूषणत्रयरहितो धर्मो लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमनियतत्वमसाधारणत्वम् । व्यावर्तकस्यैव लक्षणत्वे व्यावृत्तावभिधेयत्वादौ चातिव्याप्तिवारणाय तद्भिन्नत्वं धर्मविशेषणं देयम् । व्यवहारस्यापि लक्षणप्रयोजनत्वे तु न देयम्, व्यावृत्तेरपि व्यवहारसाधनत्वात् ॥ ननु गुणवत्त्वं न द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् । आद्यक्षणे उत्पन्नविनष्टद्रव्ये चाव्याप्तेरिति चेन्न । गुणसमानाधिकरणसत्ताभिन्नजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ॥ नन्वेवमप्येकं रूपं रसात्पृथगिति व्यवहाराद्रूपादावतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । एकार्थसमवायादेव तादृशव्यवहारोपपत्तौ गुणे गुणानङ्गीकरणात् ॥

Definition and its three faults.

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रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्काराश्चतुर्विंशतिगुणाः ॥

द. दी.—गुणं विभजते—**रूपे**ति (द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्यवान्गुणः)। गुणत्वजातिमान्वा ॥

ननु लघुत्वमृदुत्वकठिनत्वादीनां विद्यमानत्वात्कथं चतुर्विंशतिगुणा इति चेन्न लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वात् मृदुत्वकठिनत्वयोरवयवसंयोगविशेषरूपत्वात् ॥

Some questionable गुणs

[५]

उत्क्षेपणावक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्च कर्माणि ॥

त. दी.—कर्म विभजते-**उत्क्षेपणे**ति । संयोगाभिन्नत्वे सति संयोगासमवायिकारणं कर्म । कर्मत्वजातिमद्वा ॥

ननु भ्रमणादेरप्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मणः सत्त्वात् पञ्चेत्यनुपपन्नमिति-चेन्न । भ्रमणादीनामपि गमनेऽन्तर्भावान्न पञ्चविधत्वविरोधः ॥

All other actions includ-ed in गमन.

[६]

परमपरं चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ॥

त. दी.—सामान्यं विभजते-**पर**मिति । परमधिकदेशवृत्ति ।

[७]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव ॥

त. दी.---विशेषं विभजते---**नित्ये**ति । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य परमाणव आकाशादिपञ्चकं च नित्यद्रव्याणि ॥

[८]

समवायस्त्वेक एव ॥

त. दी.---समवायस्य भेदो नास्तीत्याह-**समवायस्त्वे**ति ॥

[९]

अभावश्चतुर्विधः । प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति ॥

त. दी.—अभावं विभजते–**अभावे**ति ॥

[१०]

गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा द्विविधा नित्यानित्या च । नित्या परमाणुरूपा । आनित्या कार्यरूपा । पुनस्त्रिविधा । शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमस्मदादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणं नासाग्रवर्ति । विषयो मृत्पाषाणादिः ॥

त. दी.—तत्रोद्देशादिक्रमानुसारात्पृथिव्या लक्षणमाह--**गन्धवती**ति । नाम्ना पदार्थसंकीर्तनमुद्देशः । उद्देशक्रमे च सर्वत्रेच्छैव नियामिका ॥

Four objections against the definition and their refutation.

ननु सुरभ्यसुरभ्यवयवारब्धे द्रव्ये परस्परविरोधेन गन्धानुत्पादादव्याप्तिः । न च तत्र गन्धप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अवयवगन्धस्यैव तत्र प्रतीतिसंभवेन चित्रगन्धानङ्गीकारात् ॥ किं चोत्पन्नविनष्टघटादावव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् ॥ ननु जलादावपि गन्धप्रतीतेरतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पृथिवीगन्धस्यैव तत्र भानाङ्गीकारात् ॥ ननु तथापि कालस्य सर्वाधारतया सर्वेषां लक्षणानां कालेऽतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न सर्वाधारताप्रयोजकसंबन्धभिन्नसंबन्धेन लक्षणस्याभिमतत्वात् ॥

पृथिवीं विभजते–**सा द्विविधे**ति । नित्यत्वं ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् । ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमनित्यत्वम् ॥ प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते---**पुन**रिति ।

1. v. l. सा पुन. etc.

आत्मनो भोगायतनं शरीरम् ॥ यदवच्छिन्नात्मनि भोगो जायते तद्भोगायतनम् । सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारो भोगः ॥ शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नो विषयः ॥ एवं च गन्धवच्छरीरं पार्थिवशरीरम् गन्धवदिन्द्रियं पार्थिवेन्द्रियम् गन्धवान्विषयः पार्थिवविषय इति तत्तल्लक्षणं बोध्यम् ॥ पार्थिवशरीरं दर्शयति – **शरीरमिति** । पार्थिवेन्द्रियं दर्शयति—**इन्द्रियमिति** । **गन्धग्राहकमि**ति प्रयोजनकथनम् । **घ्राणमि**ति संज्ञा । **नासाग्र**त्याश्रयोक्तिः । एवमुत्तरत्रापि ज्ञेयम् । पार्थिवविषयं दर्शयति—**विषये**ति ॥

[११]

शीतस्पर्शवत्य आपः । ता द्विविधाःनित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्याः परमाणुरूपाः । अनित्याः कार्यरूपाः । पुनस्त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वाग्रवर्ति । विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिः ॥

त. दी.—अपां लक्षणमाह—**शीते**ति ।

उत्पन्नविनष्टजलेऽव्याप्तिवारणाय शीतस्पर्शसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वं तात्पर्यम् ॥ शीतं शिलातलमित्यादौ जलसंबन्धादेव शीतस्पर्शभानमिति नातिव्याप्तिः । अन्यत्सर्वं पूर्वरीत्या व्याख्येयम् ॥

Two possible objections and their refutation

[१२]

उष्णस्पर्शवत्तेजः । तद्द्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणुरूपम् । अनित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनस्त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रिय-

विषयभेदात् । शरीरमादित्यलोके । इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति । विषयश्चतुर्विधः । भौमदिव्योदर्याकरजभेदात् । भौमं वह्न्यादिकम् । अबिन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्तस्य परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आकरजं सुवर्णादि ॥

त. दी.—तेजसो लक्षणमाह—**उष्णस्पर्श**वदिति । उष्णं जलमिति प्रतीतेस्तेजःसंबन्धानुविधायित्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । विषयं विभजते—**भौमे**ति ॥

सुवर्ण *and similar bright metals are of the nature of light.*

ननु सुवर्णं पार्थिवं पीतत्वाद्गुरुत्वाद्धरिद्रादिवदिति चेन्न । अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सति घृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशदर्शनेन, जलमध्यस्थघृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशादर्शनेन, अस्ति प्रतिबन्धके पार्थिवद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशाग्निसंयोगयोः कार्यकारणभावावधारणात् । सुवर्णस्यात्यन्तानलसंयोगे सत्यनुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकरणत्वेन पार्थिवत्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पीतद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवद्रव्यान्तरसिद्धौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणतया जलत्वानुपपत्तेः, रूपवत्तया वाय्वादिष्वनन्तर्भावात्, तैजसत्वसिद्धिः । तत्रोष्णस्पर्शभास्वररूपयोरुपष्टम्भकपार्थिवरूपस्पर्शाभ्यां प्रतिबन्धादनुपलब्धिः । तस्मात्सुवर्णं तैजसमिति सिद्धम् ॥

[१२]

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्वायुः । स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुरूपः । अनित्यः कार्यरूपः । पुनस्त्रिविधः ।

शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं त्वक्सर्वशरीरवर्ति । विषयो वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः ॥

शरीरान्तःसंचारी वायुः प्राणः । स चैकोऽप्युपाधिभेदात्प्राणापानादिसंज्ञां लभते ॥

द. दी.–वायुं लक्षयति–**रूपरहितेति** । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **स्पर्शवानिति** । पृथिव्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **रूपरहितेति** । ननु प्राणस्य कुत्रान्तर्भाव इत्यत आह–**शरीरेति** । **स चेति** । एक एव प्राणः स्थानभेदात्प्राणापानादिशब्दैर्व्यवह्रियत इत्यर्थः ।

the proof for वायु.

स्पर्शानुमेयो वायुः । तथाहि–योऽयं वायौ वाति सत्यनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शो भासते स स्पर्शः क्वचिदाश्रितो गुणत्वाद्रूपवत् । न चास्य पृथिव्याश्रयः उद्भूतस्पर्शवतः पार्थिवस्योद्भूतरूपवत्त्वनियमात् । न जलतेजसी, अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वात् । न विभुचतुष्टयं, सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मनः, परमाणुस्पर्शस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । तस्माद्यः प्रतीयमानस्पर्शाश्रयः स वायुः ॥

Is वायु प्रत्यक्षविषय *or* अनुमानविषय?

ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वाद्घटवदिति चेन्न । उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्योपाधित्वात् । यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति घटादौ साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं नास्तीति पक्षे साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । न चैवं तप्तवारिस्थतेजसोऽप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः । इष्टत्वात् । तस्माद्रूपरहितत्वाद्वायुरप्रत्यक्षः ॥

इदानीं कार्यरूपपृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्योत्पत्तिविनाशक्रमः कथ्यते । ईश्वरस्य चिकीर्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । ततः परमाणुद्वयसंयोगे सति द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्यते । त्रिभिर्द्व्यणुकैस्त्र्यणुकम् । एवं चतुरणुकादिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी महत्य आपो महत्तेजो महान्वायुरुत्पद्यते । एवमुत्पन्नस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य संजिहीर्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया । क्रियया परमाणुद्वयविभागे सति द्व्यणुकनाशः । ततस्त्र्यणुकनाशः । ततश्चतुरणुकस्येत्येवं महापृथिव्यादिनाशः ॥

उत्पत्ति *and* प्रलय.

असमवायिकारणनाशाद्द्व्यणुकनाशः, समवायिकारणनाशात्त्र्यणुकनाश इति संप्रदायः । सर्वत्रासमवायिकारणनाशाद्द्रव्यनाश इति नवीनाः ॥

2 *Views re.* प्रलय.

किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं सूक्ष्मतमं यद्रज उपलभ्यते तत्सावयवम्, चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वात्पटवत् । त्र्यणुकावयवोऽपि सावयवो महदारम्भकत्वात्तन्तुवत् । यो द्व्यणुकावयवः स परमाणुः । स च नित्यः । तस्यापि कार्यत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । सृष्टिप्रलयसद्भावे "धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयत्" इत्यादिश्रुतिः प्रमाणम् । सर्वकार्यद्रव्यध्वंसोऽवान्तरप्रलयः सर्वभावकार्यध्वंसो महाप्रलय इति विवेकः ॥

परमाणुवाद

[१४]

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । तच्चैकं विभु नित्यं च ॥

त. दी.—आकाशं लक्षयति **शब्दगुणमिति** । नन्वाकाशमपि

किं पृथिव्यादिवन्नाना । नेत्याह—**तच्चैकमिति** । भेदे प्रमाणाभावा-दित्यर्थः ।

एकत्वादेव सर्वत्रोपलब्धेर्विभुत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमित्याह—**विभ्विति** ।

विभुत्व and मूर्तत्व. सर्वमूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् । मूर्तत्वं परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणवत्त्वं क्रियावत्त्वं वा । विभुत्वादेवात्मवन्नित्यमित्याह—**नित्यं चेति** ॥

[१५]

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः । स चैको विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥

त. दी.—कालं लक्षयति–**अतीतेति** । सर्वाधारः कालः सर्वकार्यनिमित्तकारणं च ॥

[१६]

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक् । सा चैका विभ्वी नित्या च ॥

त. दी.—दिशो लक्षणमाह—**प्राचीति** । दिगपि कार्यमात्रे निमित्तकारणम् ॥ दिक् is also a कारण for all कार्य.

[१७]

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविधः परमात्मा जीवात्मा च । तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मैक एव । जीवात्मा प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नो विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥

त. दी.—आत्मनो लक्षणमाह–**ज्ञानेति** ॥ आत्मानं विभजते–**स द्विविध** इति । परमात्मनो लक्षणमाह–**तत्रेति** । नित्यज्ञानाधिकरणत्वमीश्वरत्वम् ॥

नन्वीश्वरस्य सद्भावे किं प्रमाणम् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्धि बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं वा ॥ नाद्यमरूपिद्रव्यत्वात् । नान्त्यमात्मसुखादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानं लिङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वाद्घटवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वं कर्तृत्वम् । उपादानं समवायिकारणम् । सकलपरमाण्वादिसूक्ष्मदर्शित्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वम् । "यः सर्वज्ञः स सर्ववित्" इत्याद्यागमोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणम् ॥

God's existence questioned and proved.

जीवस्य लक्षणमाह — **जीव** इति । सुखाद्याश्रयत्वं जीवलक्षणम् । ननु "मनुष्योऽहं ब्राह्मणोऽहम्" इत्यादौ सर्वत्राहंप्रत्यये शरीरस्यैव विषयत्वाच्छरीरमेवात्मेति चेन्न । शरीरस्यात्मत्वे करपादादिनाशे सति शरीरनाशादात्मनोऽपि नाशप्रसङ्गात् ।

शरीर *is not* आत्मन्

नापीन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वम् । तथात्वे "योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीं त्वचा स्पृशामि" इत्यनुसंधानाभावप्रसङ्गादन्यानुभूतेऽन्यस्यानुसंधानायोगात् । तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो जीवः । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात्प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नः ॥

इन्द्रियs *are not* आत्मन्

स च न परमाणुः शरीरव्यापिसुखाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मध्यमपरिमाणः । तथा सत्यनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्नित्यो विभुर्जीवः ।

जीव *is* विभु

[१८]

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः तच्च प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वादनन्तं परमाणुरूपं नित्यं च ॥

त. दी.—मनसो लक्षणमाह—**सुखेति** । स्पर्शरहितत्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वं मनसो लक्षणम् । मनो विभजते—**तच्चेति** । एकैकस्यात्मन एकैकं मन इत्यात्मनामनेकत्वान्मनसोऽप्यनेकत्वमित्यर्थः । **परमाणुरूपमिति** । मध्यमपरिमाणत्वेऽनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः ॥

Mind is atomic.

ननु मनो नाणु किन्तु विभु, स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदिति चेन्न । मनसो विभुत्वे आत्ममनःसंयोगस्यासमवायिकारणस्याभावाज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न च विभुद्वयसंयोगोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम् । तत्संयोगस्य नित्यत्वेन सुषुप्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । पुरितत्यतिरिक्तप्रदेश आत्ममनःसंयोगस्य सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात् । अणुत्वे तु यदा मनः पुरीतति नाड्यां प्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तिः । यदा निःसरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरित्यणुत्वसिद्धिः ॥

[१९]

चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तहरितकपिशचित्रभेदात्सप्तविधं पृथिवीजलतेजोवृत्ति । तत्र पृथिव्यां सप्तविधम् । अभास्वरशुक्लं जले । भास्वरशुक्लं तेजसि ॥

त. दी.—रूपं लक्षयति—**चक्षुरिति** । संख्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **मात्र**पदम् । रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **गुण**पदम् । प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वं वाच्यम् । रूपं विभजते—**तच्चेति** ॥

चित्ररूप and its propriety

नन्वव्याप्यवृत्तिनीलादिसमुदाय एव चित्ररूपमिति चेन्न । रूपस्य व्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमात् । ननु चित्रपटेऽवयवरूपस्य प्रतीतिरस्त्विति चेन्न । रूपरहितत्वेन पटस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च रूपवत्समवेतत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रयोजकं

गौरवात् । तस्मात्पटस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वानुपपत्त्या चित्ररूपसिद्धिः ॥
रूपस्याश्रयमाह— **पृथिवी**ति । आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति–**तत्रे**ति ॥

[२०]

रसनग्राह्यो गुणो रसः । स च मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषाय-तिक्तभेदात्षड्विधः । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । पृथिव्यां षड्विधः । जले मधुर एव ॥

त. दी.—रसं लक्षयति–**रसने**ति । रसत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिपरिहाराय गुणपदम् । रसस्याश्रयमाह—**पृथिवी**ति ॥ आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति **पृथिव्या**मिति ॥

[२१]

घ्राणग्राह्यो गुणो गन्धः । स च द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.–गन्धं लक्षयति—**घ्राणे**ति । गन्धत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **गुण**पदम् ॥

[२२]

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यो गुणः स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः । शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवृत्तिः । तत्र शीतो जले । उष्णस्तेजसि । अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः ॥

त. दी.—स्पर्शं लक्षयति--**त्वगि**ति । स्पर्शत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **गुण**पदम् । संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **मात्र**पदम् ॥

[२३]

रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च । अन्यत्रापाकजं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ॥

त. दी.--**पाकजमिति** । पाकस्तेजःसंयोगः । तेन पूर्वरूपं नश्यति रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

अत्र परमाणुष्वेव पाको न द्व्यणुकादौ । आमपाकनिक्षिप्त घटे परमाणुषु रूपान्तरोत्पत्तौ श्यामघटनाशे पुनर्द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण रक्तघटोत्पत्तिः । तत्र परमाणवः समवायिकारणम् । तेजः-संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । अदृष्टादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । द्व्यणुकादिरूपे कारणरूपमसमवायिकारणम् इति पीलुपाकवादिनो वैशेषिकाः । पूर्वघटस्य नाशं विनैवावयवेषु परमाणुपर्यन्तेषु च युगपद्रूपान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति पिठरपाकवादिनो नैयायिकाः । अत एव पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादिकमनित्य मित्यर्थः ॥ **अन्यत्रेति** । जलादावित्यर्थः । **नित्यगतमिति** । परमाणुगतमित्यर्थः ॥ **अनित्यगतमिति** । द्व्यणुकादिनिष्ठमित्यर्थः । रूपादिचतुष्टयमुद्भूतं प्रत्यक्षमनुद्भूतमप्रत्यक्षम् । उद्भूतत्वं प्रत्यक्षप्रयोजको धर्मः । तदभावोऽनुद्भूतत्वम् ॥

Two views re. पाकः-पीलुपाकवादिन् & पिटरपाकवादिन्

[२४]

एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः संख्या । नवद्रव्यवृत्तिरेकत्वादिपरार्धपर्यन्ता । एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतमनित्यम् । द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव ॥

त. दी.–संख्यां लक्षयति–**एकत्वेति** ॥

[२५]

मानव्यवहारकारणं परिमाणं । नवद्रव्यवृत्ति । तच्चतुर्विधम् । अणुमहद्दीर्घं ह्रस्वं चेति ॥

त. दी.— परिमाणं लक्षयति— **माने**ति । परिमाणं विभजते— **तदि**ति । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । अणुत्वं महत्त्वं दीर्घत्वं ह्रस्वत्वं चेत्यर्थः ॥

[२६]

पृथग्व्यवहारकारणं पृथक्त्वं । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्ति ॥

त. दी.—पृथक्त्वं लक्षयति **पृथगि**ति । इदमस्मात्पृथगिति व्यवहारकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

[२७]

संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—संयोगं लक्षयति—**संयुक्ते**ति । इमौ संयुक्ताविति व्यवहारहेतुरित्यर्थः । संख्यादिलक्षणेषु सर्वत्र दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायासाधारणेति पदं देयम् ॥

Two kinds of संयोग.

संयोगो द्विविधः कर्मजः संयोगजश्च । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगात्कायपुस्तकसंयोगः ॥

अव्याप्यवृत्तिः संयोगः । स्वात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणत्वमव्याप्यवृत्तित्वम् ॥

[२८]

संयोगनाशको गुणो विभागः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—विभागं लक्षयति—**संयोग**ेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **गुण** इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **संयोगनाशक** इति ।

Two kinds of विभाग.

विभागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्च । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तकविभागः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकविभागात्कायपुस्तकविभागः ॥

[२९]

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे परत्वापरत्वे । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिनी । ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृते च । दूरस्थे दिक्कृतं परत्वम् । समीपस्थे दिक्कृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे कालकृतं परत्वम् । कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ॥

त. दी.—परत्वापरत्वयोर्लक्षणमाह—**पर**ेति । परव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं परत्वम् । अपरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणमपरत्वमित्यर्थः । परापरत्वे विभजते—**ते द्विविधे** इति । दिक्कृतयोरुदाहरणमाह—**दूरस्थ** इति ॥ कालकृते उदाहरति—**ज्येष्ठ** इति ॥

[३०]

आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं । पृथिवीजलवृत्ति ॥

त. दी.—गुरुत्वं लक्षयति—**आद्य**ेति । द्वितीयादिपतनस्य वेगासमवायिकारणत्वाद्वेगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणायाद्येति ॥

[३१]

आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवृत्ति । ाद्‌द्विविधं सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च । सांसिद्धिकं जले नैमि- त्तिकं पृथिवीतेजसोः। पृथिव्यां घृतादावग्निसंयोगजन्यं द्रवत्वम्। तेजसि सुवर्णादौ ॥

त. दी.—द्रवत्वं लक्षयति—**आद्यस्यन्दने**ति । स्यंदनं स्रवणम् । ेजःसंयोगजन्यं नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वमुदाहरति – **घृतादा**विति । तेजसि ादाह— **सुवर्णादा**विति ॥

[३२]

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुर्गुणः स्नेहः । जलमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—स्नेहं लक्षयति—**चूर्णे**ति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **गुण** इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **चूर्णादी**ति ॥

[३३]

श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः स द्विविधो ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति । ध्वन्यात्मको भेर्यादौ । वर्णा- ःमकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ॥

त. दी.—शब्दं लक्षयति—**श्रोत्रे**ति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवार- गाय **गुण** इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **श्रोत्रे**ति ॥ शब्द- स्त्रिविधः । संयोगजो विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । तत्राद्यो भेरीदण्ड-

संयोगजन्यः। द्वितीयो वंश उत्पाट्यमाने दलद्वयविभागजन्यश्चटचटाशब्दः। भेर्यादिदेशमारभ्य श्रोत्रपर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः॥

[३४]

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम्। सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च। संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः। तद्भिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवः॥

त. दी.—बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह—**सर्वे**ति। जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानत्वमेव लक्षणमित्यर्थः। बुद्धिं विभजते—**से**ति॥ स्मृतेर्लक्षणमाह—**संस्कारे**ति। भावनाख्यः संस्कारः। संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **ज्ञानमि**ति। घटादिप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **संस्कारजन्यमि**ति। प्रत्यभिज्ञायामातिव्याप्तिवारणाय **मात्रे**ति॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति—**तद्भिन्नमि**ति। स्मृतिभिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभव इत्यर्थः॥

[३५]

स द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च। तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः यथा रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्। स एव प्रमेत्युच्यते। तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः। यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्॥

त. दी.—अनुभवं विभजते—**स द्विविध** इति। यथार्थानुभवस्य लक्षणमाह—**तद्वती**ति। ननु घटे घटत्वमिति प्रमायामव्याप्तिः घटत्वे घटाभावादिति चेन्न। यत्र यत्संबंधोऽस्ति तत्र तत्संबंधानुभव इत्यर्थाद्घटत्वेऽपि घटसंबन्धोऽस्तीति नाव्याप्तिः। स इति यथार्थानुभव एव

शास्त्रे प्रमेत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः । अयथार्थं लक्षयति—**तदभाववतीति** नन्विदं संयोगीति प्रमायामतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । यदवच्छेदेन यत्संबन्धाभावस्तदवच्छेदेन तत्संबंधज्ञानस्य विवक्षितत्वात् संयोगाभावावच्छेदेन संयोगज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्, संयोगावच्छेदेन संयोगसंबन्धस्य सत्त्वात्, नातिव्याप्तिः ॥

[३६]

यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात्। तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ॥

त. दी.—यथार्थानुभवं विभजते—**यथार्थेति** । प्रसङ्गात्प्रमाकरणं विभजते—**तत्करणमिति** । प्रमाकरणमित्यर्थः प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

[३७]

असाधारणं कारणं करणम् ।

त. दी.—करणलक्षणमाह—**असाधारणेति** । साधारणकारणे दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायासाधारणेति ॥

[३८]

कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम् ॥

त. दी.—कारणलक्षणमाह—**कार्येति** । पूर्ववृत्ति कारणमित्युक्ते रासभादावतिव्याप्तिः स्यादतो **नियतेति** । तावन्मात्रे कृते कार्येऽतिव्याप्तिरतः **पूर्ववृत्तीति** ॥

ननु तन्तुरूपमपि पटं प्रति कारणं स्यादिति चेन्न । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वमन्यथासिद्धिविरहः । अन्यथासिद्धिश्च त्रिविधा । येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा तन्तुना तन्तुरूपं तन्तुत्वं च पटं प्रति । अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव घटं प्रत्याकाशस्य । अन्यत्र क्लृप्तनियतपूर्ववर्तिनैव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहभूतमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाकजस्थले गन्धं प्रति रूपप्रागभावस्य । एवं चानन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् ॥

Three kinds of अन्यथासिद्धि

[३९]

कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ॥

त. दी.--कार्यलक्षणमाह—कार्यमिति ॥

[४०]

कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः । कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीवेमादिकं पटस्य ॥

त. दी.--कारणं विभजते—कारणमिति । समवायिकारणस्य

लक्षणमाह--**यत्समवेतमि**ति । यस्मिन्समवेतमित्यर्थः । असमवायिकारणं लक्षयति—कार्येणेति । **कार्येणे**त्येतदुदाहरति—**तन्तुसंयोग** इति ॥

कार्येण पटेनैकस्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । **कारणेन सहे**त्येतदुदाहरति--**तन्तुरूप**मिति । कारणेन पटेन सहैकस्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः ।

Two kinds of असमवायिकारण

निमित्तकारणं लक्षयति-**तदुभये**ति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

[४१]

तदेतत्त्रिविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम् ॥

त. दी.—करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति–**तदेतदि**ति ॥

[४२]

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति । तत्र निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं यथेदं किंचित् । सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सविकल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं श्यामोऽयमिति॥

त. दी.--प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह—**तत्रे**ति । प्रमाणचतुष्टयमध्य इत्यर्थः। प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य लक्षणमाह-**इन्द्रिये**ति । इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम्। अर्थो घटादिः । तयोः संनिकर्षः संयोगादिः, तज्जन्यं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः॥ तद्विभजते–**तद्द्विविधमि**ति ।

निर्विकल्पकस्य लक्षणमाह—**निष्प्रकारकमिति** विशेषणविशेष्य-संबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ ननु निर्विकल्पके किं प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वाद्दण्डीति ज्ञानवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशेषणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गान्निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः॥ सविकल्पकं लक्षयति—**सप्रकारकमिति**। नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धावगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः सविकल्पकमुदाहरति—**यथेति**

निर्विकल्पक *and* सविकल्पक

[४३]

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः षड्विधः । संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायो, विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति । चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्षजनने संयोगः संनिकर्षः । घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजनने संयुक्तसमवायः संनिकर्षः, चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायात् । रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः, चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात् । श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः संनिकर्षः, कर्णविवरवृत्त्याकाशस्य श्रोत्रत्वात्, शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात्, गुणगुणिनोश्च समवायात्। शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः, श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् । अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावः संनिकर्षो, घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् । एवं संनिकर्षषट्कजन्यं

ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्करणमिन्द्रियम् । तस्मादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥

त. दी.—इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षं विभजते-**प्रत्येक्षति** । संयोगसंनिकर्षमुदाहरति--**चक्षुषेति** । द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे सर्वत्र संयोगः संनिकर्ष इत्यर्थः आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियमर्थेन, ततःप्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । संयुक्तसमवायमुदाहरति—**घटरूपेति** । तत्र युक्तिमाह—**चक्षुःसंयुक्त** इति । संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायमुदाहरति—**रूपत्वेति** । समवायमुदाहरति—**श्रोत्रेणेति** । तदुपपादयति--**कर्णेति** ।

Process of प्रत्यक्ष.

ननु दूरस्थशब्दस्य कथं श्रोत्रसंबन्ध इति चेन्न वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा शब्दाच्छब्दान्तरोत्पत्तिक्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशे जातस्य शब्दस्य श्रोत्रसंबन्धात्प्रत्यक्षत्वसंभवात् । समवेतसमवायमुदाहरति--**शब्दत्वेति** । विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुदाहरति--**अभावेति** । तदुपपादयति--**घटाभाववदिति** । भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यत्र घटाभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । एतेनानुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वं निरस्तम् । यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत् । दर्शनाभावान्नास्तीति तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धिसहकृतेन्द्रियेणैवाभावज्ञानोपपत्तौ अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वासंभवात् । अधिकरणज्ञानार्थमपेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करणत्वोपपत्तावनुपलब्धेः करणत्वस्यायुक्तत्वात् । विशेषणविशेष्यभावो विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपमेव, नातिरिक्तः संबन्धः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुपसंहरंस्तस्य करणमाह--**एवमिति** । असाधारणकारणत्वादिन्द्रियं प्रत्य-

Two theories re. the transmission of Sound.

क्षज्ञानकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षमुपसंहरति--**तस्मादि**ति ॥

[४४] uncertain

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः । तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः । यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः । व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता ॥

त. दी.—अनुमानं लक्षयति--**अनुमितिकरणमि**ति । अनुमितेर्लक्षणमाह—**परामर्शे**ति । ननु संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः, स्थाणुपुरुषसंशयानन्तरं, पुरुषत्वव्याप्यकरादिमानयमिति परामर्शे सति, पुरुष एवेति प्रत्यक्षजननात् । न च तत्रानुमितिरेवेति वाच्यम् । "पुरुषं साक्षात्करोमि" इत्यनुव्यवसायविरोधादिति चेन्न । पक्षतासहकृतपरामर्शजन्यत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । **सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता** । साध्यसिद्धिरनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका । सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमिनुयामितीच्छायामनुमितिदर्शनात् सिषाधयिषोत्तेजिका । ततश्चोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दाहकारणत्ववत् सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारणत्वम् ॥ परामर्शं लक्षयति—**व्याप्ती**ति । **व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं स परामर्श** इत्यर्थः । परामर्शमभिनीय दर्शयति—**यथे**ति । अनुमितिमभिनयति--**तज्जन्यमि**ति । परामर्शजन्यमित्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्तेर्लक्षण-

माह-**यत्रे**ति । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तेरभिनयः । साहचर्यनियम इति लक्षणम् । साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरण्यं, तस्य नियमः । हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । पक्षधर्मतास्वरूपमाह—**व्याप्यस्ये**ति ॥

[४५]

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च । तत्र स्वार्थं स्वानुमितिहेतुः । तथा हि स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाग्नौ संदिहानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन्व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । तदनन्तरं वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते । तस्मात्पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिरुत्पद्यते । तदेतत्स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम् । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमवत्त्वात् । यो यो धूमवान्स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादिताल्लिङ्गात्परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

त. दी.—अनुमानं विभजते—**अनुमानमिति** । स्वार्थानुमितिं दर्शयति—**स्वयमेवे**ति । **भूयोदर्शनेने**ति । धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिग्रहे साध्यसाधनयोर्भूयः सहचारदर्शनेनेत्यर्थः ।

नन्व पार्थिवत्वलोहलेख्यत्वादौ शतशः सहचारदर्शनेऽपि वज्रादौ व्यभिचारोपलब्धेर्भूयोदर्शनेन कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न। व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञानस्य व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वात् । व्यभिचारज्ञानं द्विविधम् निश्चयः शङ्का च । तद्विरहः क्वचित्तर्कात्क्वचित्स्वतःसिद्ध एव । धूमाग्निव्याप्तिग्रहे कार्यकारणभावभङ्गप्रसङ्गलक्षणस्तर्को व्यभिचारशङ्कानिवर्तकः ॥ ननु सकलवह्निधूमयोरसंनिकर्षात्कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न । धूमत्ववह्नित्वरूपसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या सकलधूमवह्निज्ञानसंभवात् ॥ **तस्मादि**ति लिङ्गपरामर्शादित्यर्थः । परार्थानुमानमाह—**यत्त्वि**ति ॥ यच्छब्दस्य तत्परार्थानुमानमिति तच्छब्देनान्वयः ॥ पञ्चावयववाक्यमुदाहरति—**यथे**ति ॥

How to know that the व्याप्ति is valid?

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प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः । पर्वतो वह्निमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवान्स सोऽग्निमान्यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम् । तथा चायमित्युपनयः । तस्मात्तथेति निगमनम् ॥

त. दी.—अवयवस्वरूपमाह—**प्रतिज्ञे**ति । उदाहृतवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञादिविभागमाह—**पर्वतो वह्निमा**निति । साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ॥ पञ्चम्यन्तं लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः । व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकमुदाहरणम् । पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनयः । अबाधितत्वादिकं निगमनप्रयोजनम् ॥

[४७]

स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमित्योर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एव करणम् । तस्माल्लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् ॥ —

त. दी.— अनुमितिकरणमाह—**स्वार्थेति** ॥ ननु व्याप्तिस्मृतिपक्षधर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेवानुमितिसंभवे व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गपरामर्शः किमर्थमङ्गीकर्तव्य इति चेन्न । वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति शाब्दपरामर्शस्थले विशिष्टपरामर्शस्यावश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात् । लिङ्गं न करणम् । अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात् ।

व्यापारवत्कारणं करणमिति मते परामर्शद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानं अनुमान *acc. to* करणम् । तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः॥ *2nd view re.* करण

अनुमानमुपसंहरति—**तस्मादिति** ॥

[४८]

लिङ्गं त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि केवलव्यतिरेकि चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि । यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवत्त्वम् । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाह्रद इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात्पटवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयोर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्यापि प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयत्वाच्च । व्यतिरेकमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि

पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलम्, न चेयं तथा, तस्मान्न तथेति । यद्गन्धवत्तदितरभिन्नमित्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रस्य पक्षत्वात् ॥

त. दी.—लिङ्गं विभजते—**लिङ्गमि**ति ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेकि लक्षयति--**अन्वयेने**ति । हेतुसाध्ययोर्व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । तदभावयोर्व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ॥ केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह—**अन्वये**ति । केवलान्वयिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयि । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । केवलान्वयिनमुदाहरति यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वादिति । ईश्वरप्रमाविषयत्वं सर्वपदाभिधेयत्वं च सर्वत्रास्तीति व्यतिरेकाभावः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह—**व्यतिरेके**ति । केवलव्यतिरेकिणमुदाहरति — **पृथिवी**ति । नन्वितरभेदःप्रसिद्धो वा न वा । आद्ये यत्र प्रसिद्धस्तत्र हेतुसत्त्वेऽन्वयित्वम् असत्त्वेऽसाधारण्यम् । द्वितीये साध्यज्ञानाभावात्कथं तद्विशिष्टानुमितिः । विशेषणज्ञानाभावे विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयात् । प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावाद्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमपि न स्यादिति चेन्न । जलादित्रयोदशान्योन्याभावानां त्रयोदशसु प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्धानां मेलनं पृथिव्यां साध्यते तत्र त्रयोदशत्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभावान्नान्वयित्वासाधारण्ये । प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्ध्या साध्यविशिष्टानुमितिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणं चेति ॥

[४९]

संदिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः । यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः ॥

त. दी.—पक्षलक्षणमाह—संदिग्धेति । ननु श्रवणानन्तरभाविमननस्थलेऽव्याप्तिः । तत्र वेदवाक्यैरात्मनो निश्चितत्वेन संदेहाभावात्किं च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि वह्नौ यत्रेच्छयानुमितिस्तत्राप्यव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । उक्तपक्षताश्रयत्वस्य पक्षलक्षणत्वात् ॥

[५०]

निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महानसः ॥

त. दी.—सपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितेति ॥

[५१]

निश्चितसाध्याभाववान्विपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महाह्रदः ॥

त. दी.—विपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितेति ॥

[५२]

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धबाधिताः पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः ॥

त. दी.—एवं सद्धेतुं निरूप्यासद्धेतुं निरूपयितुं विभजते—सव्यभिचारेति । अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वं हेत्वाभासत्वम् ।

[५३]

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स त्रिविधः । साधारणासाधारणानुपसंहारिभेदात् । तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणोऽ

नैकान्तिकः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्न्यभाववति ह्रदे विद्यमानत्वात् । सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तोऽसाधारणः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति । शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्रवृत्ति । अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारी । यथा सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यापि पक्षत्वाद्दृष्टान्तो नास्ति ॥

त. दी.—सव्यभिचारं विभजते—**स त्रिविध** इति । असाधारणं लक्षयति—**तत्रे**ति । उदाहरति—**यथे**ति । असाधारणं लक्षयति—**सर्वे**ति । अनुपसंहारिणो लक्षणमाह—**अन्वये**ति ॥

[५४]

साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वादिति । कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम् ॥

त. दी.—विरुद्धं लक्षयति—**साध्ये**ति ॥

[५५]

यस्य साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वाच्छब्दत्ववदिति । शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वाद्घटवदिति ॥

त. दी.—सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति—**यस्ये**ति ॥

[५६]

असिद्धस्त्रिविधः । आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति । आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्दत्वात्सरोजारविन्दवत् । अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्त्येव । स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुणश्चाक्षुषत्वात् । अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् । सोपाधिको व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः । साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । पर्वतो धूमवान्वह्निमत्त्वादित्यत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि । यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगो नास्त्ययोगोलक आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावादिति साधनाव्यापकता । एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । सोपाधिकत्वाद्वह्निमत्त्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धम् ॥

त. दी.— असिद्धं विभजते—**असिद्ध** इति ॥ आश्रयासिद्धमुदाहरति—**गगने**ति ॥ स्वरूपासिद्धमुदाहरति—**शब्दे**ति ॥ व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह—**सोपाधिक** इति । उपाधिलक्षणमाह—**साध्ये**ति । उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः । केवलसाध्यव्यापकः पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकश्चेति । आद्य आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । द्वितीयो यथा —वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वादित्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्ष-

त्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम् । तृतीयो यथा—प्रध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथा—प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् ॥

[५७]

यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधितः । यथा वह्निरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वादिति । अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति बाधितत्वम् ॥

त. दी.—बाधितस्य लक्षणमाह—**यस्येति** । अत्र बाधस्य ग्राह्याभावनिश्चयत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य विरोधिज्ञानसामग्रीत्वेन साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । इतरेषां तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । तत्रापि साधारणस्याव्यभिचाराभावतया विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्याभावतया व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्य विशिष्टव्याप्त्यभावतयाऽसाधारणानुपसंहारिणोर्व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वेन च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्ध्योः पक्षधर्मताज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । उपाधिस्तु व्यभिचारज्ञानद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकः । सिद्धसाधनं तु पक्षताविघटिततया आश्रयासिद्धेऽन्तर्भवतीति प्राञ्चः । निग्रहस्थानान्तरमिति नवीनाः ।

[५८]

उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तर-

व्यापारः। तथाहि कश्चिद्गवयशब्दार्थमजानन्कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाद्गोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा, वनं गतो, वाक्यार्थं स्मरन्गोसदृशं पिण्डं पश्यति। तदनन्तरमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते ॥

त. दी.—उपमानं लक्षयति—उपमितीति ॥

[५९]

आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः। आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता। वाक्यं पदसमूहः। यथा गामानयेति। शक्तं पदम्। अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसंकेतः शक्तिः ॥

त. दी.—शब्दं लक्षयति--आप्तेति। पदलक्षणमाह—शक्तमिति। अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलः पदपदार्थसंबन्धःशक्तिः।

सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति मीमांसकाः। तन्निरासार्थमाह—अस्मादिति।

The nature of शक्ति or अभिधा of the word

डित्थादीनामिव घटादीनामपि संकेत एव शक्तिः, न तु पदार्थान्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ गवादिशब्दानां जातावेव शक्तिर्विशेषणतया जातेः प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात् व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वाक्षेपादिना इति केचित्। तन्न, गामानयेत्यादौ वृद्धव्यवहारात्सर्वत्रानयनादेर्व्यक्तावेव संभवेन जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात्। शक्तिग्रहश्च वृद्धव्यवहारेण। व्युत्पित्सुर्बालो गामानयेत्युत्तमवृद्ध-

The process of understanding शक्ति.

वाक्यश्रवणान्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य गवानयनं च दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्याश्वमानय गां बधान

इति वाक्यांतर आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरश्वशब्दस्याश्वत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यते। ननु सर्वत्र कार्यपरत्वाद्व्यवहारस्य कार्यवाक्य एव व्युत्पत्तिर्न सिद्धपर इति चेन्न। काश्यां त्रिभुवनतिलको भूपतिरित्यादौ सिद्धेऽपि व्यवहारात्, विकसितपद्मे मधुकर इत्यादौ प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्यवहारात्सिद्धेऽपि मधुकरादिपदे व्युत्पत्तिदर्शनाच्च ॥

The nature of लक्षणा *and its three varieties*

लक्षणापि शब्दवृत्तिः। शक्यसंबंधो लक्षणा। गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गापदवाच्यप्रवाहसंबन्धादेव तीरोपस्थितौ तीरेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्प्यते। सैन्धवादौ लवणाश्वयोः परस्परसंबन्धाभावान्नानाशक्तिकल्पनम् ॥ लक्षणा त्रिविधा। जहल्लक्षणाऽजहल्लक्षणा जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेति। यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयाभावस्तत्र जहती, यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति। यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयस्तत्राजहती, यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीति। यत्र वाच्यैकदेशत्यागेनैकदेशान्वयस्तत्र जहदजहती यथा तत्त्वमसीति। गौण्यपि लक्षणैव लक्ष्यमाणगुणसंबन्धरूपा। अग्निर्माणवक इति ॥

व्यञ्जना *included in* लक्षणा and अभिधा

व्यञ्जनापि शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता शब्दशक्तिमूला अर्थशक्तिमूला च अनुमानादिनान्यथासिद्धा ॥

तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजम्। तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वं तात्पर्यम्। तात्पर्यज्ञानं च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः। नानार्थानुरोधात्तु प्रकरणादिकं तात्पर्यग्राहकम्। द्वारमित्यादौ पिधेहीति शब्दाध्याहारः। नन्वर्थज्ञानार्थत्वाच्छब्दस्यार्थमविज्ञाय शब्दाध्याहारासंभवादर्थाध्याहार एव युक्त इति चेन्न, पदविशेषजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेः शाब्दज्ञाने हेतुत्वात्।

अन्यथा घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यत्रापि शाब्दज्ञानप्रसङ्गात् ॥

पङ्कजादिपदेषु योगरूढिः । अवयवशक्तिर्योगः समुदायशक्ती रूढिः । नियतपद्मत्वज्ञानार्थं समुदायशक्तिः । अन्यथा कुमुदेऽपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः । इतरान्विते शक्तिरिति प्राभाकराः । अन्वयस्य वाक्यार्थतया भानसंभवादन्वयांशेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्पनीयेति गौतमीयाः ॥

[६०]

आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता संनिधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः । पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा । अर्थाबाधो योग्यता । पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं संनिधिः ॥

त. दी.—आकाङ्क्षेति । आकाङ्क्षादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः । अन्यथाकाङ्क्षादिभ्रमाच्छाब्दभ्रमो न स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षां लक्षयति—**पदस्येति** ॥ योग्यतालक्षणमाह—**अर्थेति** ॥ संनिधिलक्षणमाह—**पदानामिति** । अविलम्बेन पदार्थोपस्थितिः संनिधिः उच्चारणं तु तदुपयोगितया युक्तम् ॥

[६१]

आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीति न प्रमाणमाकाङ्क्षाविरहात् । अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चारितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सांनिध्याभावात् ॥

त. दी.—**गौरश्व** इति । घटः कर्मत्वमित्यनाकाङ्क्षोदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

[६२]

वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वाप्तोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् ॥

त. दी.—वाक्यं विभजते—**वाक्यमि**ति । वैदिकस्य विशेषमाह—**वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वादि**ति ।

वेदs are not नित्य

ननु वेदस्यानादित्वात्कथमीश्वरोक्तत्वमिति चेन्न । वेदः पौरुषेयो वाक्यसमूहत्वाद्भारतादिवत् । न च स्मर्यमाणकर्तृत्वमुपाधिः । गौतमादिभिः शिष्यपरंपरया वेदेऽपि कर्तृस्मरणेन साधनव्यापकत्वात् । "तस्मात्तेपानात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त" इति श्रुतेश्च ॥ ननु वर्णा नित्याः 'स एवायं गकार' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् । तथा च कथं वेदस्यानित्यत्वमिति चेन्न, उत्पन्नो गकारो नष्टो गकार इति प्रतीत्या वर्णानामनित्यत्वात् 'सोऽयं गकार' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः सेयं दीपज्वालेतिवत्साजात्यावलम्बनत्वात्, वर्णानां नित्यत्वेऽप्यानुपूर्वीविशिष्टवाक्यस्यानित्यत्वाच्च । **तस्मादीश्वरोक्तो वेदः** ॥ मन्वादिस्मृतीनामाचाराणां च वेदमूलकतया प्रामाण्यम् ।

स्मृतिमूलवाक्यानामिदानीमनध्ययनात्तन्मूलभूता काचिच्छाखोच्छिन्नेति

Question of स्मृति *texts having no corresponding* श्रुति वर्णानुपूर्वीज्ञानाभावेन

कल्प्यते । ननु पठ्यमानवेदवाक्योत्सादस्य कल्पयितुमशक्यतया विप्रकीर्णत्वादस्यायुक्तत्वान्नित्यानुमेयो वेदो मूलमिति चेन्न । तथापि बोधकत्वासंभवात् ॥

[६३]

वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं शब्दः ॥

त. दी.—नन्वेतानि पदानि स्वस्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति आकाङ्क्षादिमत्पदकदम्बकत्वात्, सद्वाक्यवदित्यनुमानादेव संसर्गज्ञानसंभवाच्छब्दो न प्रमाणांतरमिति चेन्न ।

शाब्दज्ञान *is not* अनुमिति

अनुमित्यपेक्षया शाब्दज्ञानस्य विलक्षणस्य शब्दात्प्रत्येमीत्यनुव्यवसायसाक्षिकस्य सर्वसंमतत्वात् ॥

अर्थापत्ति, संभव, ऐतिह्य, चेष्टा *included* अनुमान.

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति 'पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते' इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या रात्रिभोजनमर्थापत्त्या कल्प्यत इति चेन्न । देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वादित्यनुमानेनैव रात्रिभोजनस्य सिद्धत्वात् । शते पञ्चाशदिति संभवोऽप्यनुमानमेव । इह वटे यक्षस्तिष्ठतीत्यैतिह्यमज्ञातमूलवक्तृकः शब्द एव । चेष्टापि शब्दानुमानद्वारा व्यवहारहेतुरिति न मानान्तरम् । **तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाश्चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि ॥**

सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वं स्वतो ग्राह्यं परतो वेति

ज्ञान *is* परत:
प्रामाण्यवत्

विचार्यते । तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिः । ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकयावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यं न वा । अत्र विधिकोटिः स्वतस्त्वम् । निषेधकोटिः परतस्त्वम् ॥ अनुमानग्राह्यत्वेन सिद्धसाधनतावारणाय यावदिति । 'इदं ज्ञानमप्रमेति' ज्ञानेन प्रामाण्यग्रहाद्बाधवारणायाप्रामाण्याग्राहकेति । इदं ज्ञानमप्रमेत्यनुव्यवसायनिष्ठप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्रामाण्याग्राहकत्वाभावात्स्वतस्त्वं न स्यादतस्तदिति । तस्मिन्प्रामाण्याश्रयेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहक इत्यर्थः । उदाहृतस्थले व्यवसायेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्यनुव्यवसाये तदग्राहकत्वात्स्वतस्त्वासिद्धिः । ननु स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते, घटमहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायेन घटघटत्वयोरिव तत्संबन्धस्यापि विषयीकरणात्, व्यवसायरूपप्रत्यासत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात्, पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारसंबन्धस्यैव प्रमात्वपदार्थत्वादिति चेन्न । स्वतःप्रामाण्यग्रहे जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वेत्यनभ्यासदशायां प्रमात्वसंशयो न स्यात् । अनुव्यवसायेन प्रामाण्यस्य निश्चितत्वात् । **तस्मात्स्वतोग्राह्यत्वाभावात्परतो ग्राह्यत्वम्** । तथाहि । प्रथमं जलज्ञानानन्तरं प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां, जललाभे सति पूर्वोत्पन्नं जलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात्, यन्नैवं तन्नैवम्, यथा प्रमा; इति व्यतिरेकिणा प्रमात्वं निश्चीयते । द्वितीयादिज्ञानेषु पूर्वज्ञानदृष्टान्तेन तत्सजातीयत्वलिङ्गेनान्वयव्यतिरेकिणाऽपि गृह्यते ॥ प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वमुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् । प्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं गुणः ।

प्रमा *produced by* गुण

अप्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं दोषः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षे विशेषणवद्विशेष्यसंनिकर्षो गुणः, अनुमितौ व्यापकवति

व्याप्यज्ञानं, उपमितौ यथार्थसादृश्यज्ञानं, शाब्दज्ञाने यथार्थयोग्यताज्ञानम् इत्याद्यूहनीयम् । पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकाराभावस्य व्यवसायेनानुपस्थितत्वादप्रमात्वं परत एव गृह्यते । पित्तादिदोषजन्यत्वादुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् ॥

ननु सर्वज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वादयथार्थज्ञानमेव नास्ति । न च 'शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति' ज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । रजतस्मृतिपुरोवर्तिज्ञानाभ्यामेव प्रवृत्तिसंभवात् उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव सर्वत्र प्रवर्तकत्वेन नेदं रजतमित्यादावतिप्रसङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । सत्यरजतस्थले पुरोवर्तिविशेष्यकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य लाघवेन प्रवृत्तिजनकतया शुक्तावपि रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानस्यैव कल्पनात् ॥

अयथार्थज्ञान *proved against* मीमांसक *view.*

[६४]

अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात् । एकस्मिन्धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति । व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः । यथा यदि वह्निर्न स्यात्तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति ॥

त. दी.—अयथार्थानुभवं विभजते–**अयथार्थे**ति । स्वप्नस्य मानसविपर्ययरूपत्वान्न त्रैविध्यविरोधः ॥ संशयलक्षणमाह–**एकस्मि**न्निति । घटपटाविति समूहालम्बनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । घटो द्रव्यमित्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय—**विरुद्धे**ति ।

पटत्वविरुद्धघटत्ववानित्यत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय नानेति ॥ विपर्यय-लक्षणमाह—**मिथ्येति**। तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकनिश्चय इत्यर्थः ॥ तर्कं लक्षयति—**व्याप्येति** । यद्यपि तर्को विपर्ययेऽन्तर्भवति तथापि प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वाद्भेदेन कीर्तनम् ॥

[६५]

स्मृतिरपि द्विविधा । यथार्थाऽयथार्था च । प्रमाजन्या यथार्था । अप्रमाजन्याऽयथार्था ॥

त. दी.— स्मृतिं विभजते—**स्मृतिरिति** ॥

[६६]

सर्वेषामनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखम् ॥

त. दी.— सुखं लक्षयति—**सर्वेषामिति** । सुख्यहमित्याद्यनुव्यवसायगम्यं सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम् । यथाश्रुतं तु स्वरूपकथनमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

[६७]

सर्वेषां प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं दुःखम् ॥

[६८]

इच्छा कामः ॥

[६९]

क्रोधो द्वेषः ॥

[७०]

कृतिः प्रयत्नः ॥

[७१]

विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः ॥

[७२]

निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वधर्मः ॥

न्या. बो.—धर्माधर्मौ निरूपयति—विहितेति । वेदविहितेत्यर्थः । निषिद्धेति । वेदनिषिद्धेत्यर्थः ॥

[७३]

बुद्ध्यादयोऽष्टावात्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः ॥

[७४]

बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना द्विविधाः । नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्या ईश्वरस्य । अनित्या जीवस्य ॥

[७५]

संस्कारस्त्रिविधः । वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति । वेगः पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः । अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतु-

भावनाऽऽत्ममात्रवृत्तिः । अन्यथा कृतस्य पुनस्तदवस्थापादकः स्थितिस्थापकः कटादिपृथिवीवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—संस्कारं विभजते—**संस्कार** इति । संस्कारत्वजातिमान्संस्कारः । वेगस्याश्रयमाह—**वेग** इति । वेगत्वजातिमान्वेगः । भावनां लक्षयति- **अनुभ**वेति । आत्मादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाया**नुभ**वेति । अनुभवध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **स्मृती**ति । स्मृतेरपि संस्कारजनकत्वं नवीनैरुक्तम् ॥ स्थितिस्थापकं लक्षयति—**अन्यथे**ति ॥

सामान्यगुण *and* विशेषगुण

संख्यादयोऽष्टौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववेगस्थितिस्थापकाः सामान्यगुणाः । अन्ये रूपादयो विशेषगुणाः । द्रव्यविभाजकोपाधिद्वयसमानाधिकरणावृत्ति-द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति—जातिमत्त्वं विशेषगुणत्वम् ॥

[७६]

चलनात्मकं कर्म । ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणम् । अधोदेशसंयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम् । शरीरसंनिकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनम् । विप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वं गमनम् । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोमात्रवृत्ति ॥

त. दी.—कर्मणो लक्षणमाह—**चलने**ति । उत्क्षेपणादीनां कार्यभेदमाह—**ऊर्ध्वे**ति । **शरीरे**ति । वक्रत्वसंपादकमाकुञ्चनम् । ऋजुतासंपादकं प्रसारणमित्यर्थः ॥

[७७]

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यं । द्रव्यगुणकर्मवृत्ति । तद्-द्विविधं परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि ॥

त. दी.—सामान्यं लक्षयति—**नित्यमि**ति । संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **नित्यमि**ति । परमाणुपरिमाणादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय-**अनेके**ति । अनुगतत्वं समवेतत्वम् । तेन नाभावादावतिव्याप्तिः ॥

[७८]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्तका विशेषाः ॥

त. दी.—विशेषं लक्षयति—**नित्ये**ति ॥

[७९]

नित्यसंबन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमविनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । यथावयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति ॥

त. दी.—समवायं लक्षयति—**नित्ये**ति । संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **नित्ये**ति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **संबन्ध** इति । अयुतसिद्धलक्षणमाह—**ययो**रिति । **नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः** । **अवयवावयविना**विति । द्रव्यसमवायिकारणमवयवः । तज्जन्यद्रव्यमवयवि ॥

[८०]

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्यसंबंधावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोन्योन्याभावः यथा घटः पटो न भवतीति ॥

त. दी.—प्रागभावं लक्षयति—**अनादिरि**ति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **सान्त** इति । घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय–**अनादिरि**ति प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिः प्रतियोगिजनको भविष्यतीति व्यवहारहेतुः प्रागभावः ॥ प्रध्वंसं लक्षयति—**सादिरि**ति । घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय–**अनन्त** इति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय–**सादिरि**ति ॥ प्रतियोगिजन्यः प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिर्ध्वस्तव्यवहारहेतुर्ध्वंसः ॥ अत्यन्ताभावं लक्षयति **त्रैकालिके**ति ॥ अन्योन्याभावेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **संसर्गावच्छिन्ने**ति । ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **त्रैकालिके**ति ॥ अन्योन्याभावं लक्षयति **तादात्म्ये**ति । प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्यसंसर्गभेदादेकप्रतियोगिकयोरप्यत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोर्भेदहुत्वम् । केवलदेवदत्ताभावो दण्डाभाव इति प्रतीत्या विशिष्टाभावः । एकसत्त्वे द्वौ न स्त इति प्रतीत्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नोऽभावः । संयोगसंबन्धेन घटवति समवायसंबन्धेन घटाभावः । तत्तद्घटाभावाद्घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकसामान्याभावश्चातिरिक्तः ॥ एवमन्योन्याभावोऽपि । घटत्वावच्छिन्नः पटो नास्तीति

व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावो नाङ्गीक्रियते । पटे घटत्वं नास्तीति तस्यार्थः । अतिरिक्तत्वे स केवलान्वयी ।

सामयिकाभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव एव समयविशेषे प्रतीयमानः । घटा-भाववति घटानयनेऽत्यन्ताभावस्यान्यत्र गमनाभावेऽप्यप्रतीतेर्घटापसरणे सति प्रतीतेः । भूतले घटसंयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरत्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामकत्वं कल्प्यते । घटवति तत्संयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरसत्त्वादत्यन्ताभावस्याप्रतीतिः । घटापसरणे च संयोगध्वंससत्त्वात्प्रतीतिरिति ।

सामयिकाभाव is अत्यन्ताभाव

केवलाधिकरणादेव नास्तीति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभावो न पदार्थान्तर-मिति गुरवः । तन्न । अभावानङ्गीकारे कैवल्यस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अभावाभावो भाव एव नाति-रिक्तः अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । ध्वंसप्रागभावः प्रागभावध्वंसश्च प्रतियो-ग्येव । अभावाभावोतिरिक्त एव, तृतीयाभावस्य प्रथमाभावरूप-त्वान्नानवस्थेति नवीनाः ॥

Why अभाव is पदार्थ

[८१]

सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात्सप्तैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम् ॥

त. दी.—ननु प्रमाण-प्रमेय-संशय-प्रयोजन-दृष्टान्त-सिद्धान्ता-वयव-तर्क-निर्णय--वाद-जल्प--वितण्डा--हेत्वा-भास-च्छल-जाति-निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञाना-न्निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायशास्त्रे षोडशपदा-

गौतम's so-called 16 पदार्थs can come under the सप्तपदार्थs

र्थानामुक्तत्वात्कथं सप्तैवेत्यत आह-सर्वेषामिति । सर्वेषां सप्तस्वेवान्तर्भाव इत्यर्थः । 'आत्मशरीरेन्द्रीयार्थमनोबुद्धिप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयमि'ति द्वादशविधं प्रमेयम् । प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्मौ । रागद्वेषमोहा दोषाः । राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः । मोहः शरीरादावात्मभ्रमः । प्रेत्यभावो मरणम् । फलं भोगः । अपवर्गो मोक्षः । स च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीनदुःखध्वंसः । प्रयोजनं सुखं दुःखहानिश्च । दृष्टान्तो महानसादिः । प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । निर्णयो निश्चयः । स च प्रमाणफलम् । तत्त्वबुभुत्सोः कथा वादः । उभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनहीना वितण्डा । कथा नाम नानावक्तृकः पूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसंदर्भः । अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य[illegible]न्तरं प्रकल्प्य दूषणं छलम् । असदुत्तरं जातिः । साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्याकार्यसमा जातयः । वादिनोऽपजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, प्रतिज्ञान्तरं, प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, प्रतिज्ञासन्यासो, हेत्वन्तरम्, अर्थान्तरं, निरर्थकं, अविज्ञातार्थकं, अपार्थकं, अप्राप्तकालं, न्यूनं, अधिकं, पुनरुक्तं, अननुभाषणं, अज्ञानं, अप्रतिभाविक्षेपः, मतानुज्ञा, पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं, निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः, अपसिद्धान्तः, हेत्वाभासश्च, निग्रहस्थानानि । शेषं सुगमम्॥

ननु करतलानलसंयोगे सत्यपि प्रतिबंधके सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः पदार्थान्तरमिति चेन्न । प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य कार्यमात्रे कारणत्वेन शक्तेरनुपयोगात् कारण-

शक्ति is not a separate पदार्थ.

स्यैव शक्तिपदार्थत्वात् । ननु भस्मादिना कांस्यादौ शुद्धिदर्शनादाधेयशक्तिरङ्गीकार्येति चेन्न । भस्मादिसंयोगसमानकालिनास्पृश्यस्पर्शप्रतियोगिकयावदभावसहितभस्मादिसंयोगध्वंसस्य शुद्धिपदार्थत्वात् ॥

स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् । यथेष्टविनियोगयोग्यत्वस्य स्वत्वरूपत्वात् । तदवच्छेदकं च प्रतिग्रहादिलब्धत्वमेवेति ॥

अथ विधिर्निरूप्यते । प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयो विधिः । तत्प्रतिपादको लिङादिर्वा । कृत्यसाध्ये प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम् । न च विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः इष्टसाधनतालिङ्गककृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य काम्यस्थले नित्यनैमित्तिकस्थले च विहितकालजीवित्वनिमित्तकज्ञानजन्यस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वात् । न चाननुगमः स्वविशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसंधानजन्यत्वस्यानुगतत्वादिति गुरवः । तन्न । लाघवेन कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यैव चिकीर्षाद्वारा प्रयत्नजनकत्वात् । न च नित्ये इष्टसाधनत्वाभावादप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गस्तत्रापि प्रत्यवायपरिहारस्य पापक्षयस्य च फलत्वकल्पनात् । तस्मात्कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः । ननु "ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इत्यत्र लिङा स्वर्गसाधनकार्यं प्रतीयते । यागस्याशुविनाशिनः कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वायोगात्तद्योग्यं स्थायिकार्यमपूर्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः ॥ कार्यं कृतिसाध्यं । कृतेः सविषयत्वात् । विषयाकाङ्क्षायां यागो विषयत्वेनान्वेति । कस्य कार्यमिति नियोज्याकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गकामपदं नियोज्यपरतयान्वेति । कार्यबोद्धा नियोज्यः । तेन ज्योतिष्टोमनामकयागविषयकं स्वर्गकामस्यकार्यमिति वाक्यार्थः संपद्यते । वैदिकलिङ्त्वात "यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्" इति नित्यवाक्येऽप्यपूर्वमेव वाच्यं

Nature of विधि.

कल्प्यते । "आरोग्यकामो भेषजपानं कुर्यात्" इत्यादौ लौकिक-लिङः क्रियाकार्ये लक्षणेति चेन्न । यागस्याप्ययोग्यतानिश्चयाभावेन साधनतया प्रतीत्यनन्तरं तन्निर्वाहार्थमवान्तरव्यापारतया अपूर्वकल्पनात् । कीर्तनादिनाऽनाशश्रुतेर्न यागध्वंसो व्यापारः । लोकव्युत्पत्तिबलात्क्रियायामेव कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वं लिङा बोध्यत इति लिङ्त्वेन रूपेण विध्यर्थत्वम् । आख्यातत्वेन प्रयत्नार्थकत्वम् । पचति पाकं करोतीति विवरणदर्शनात् किं करोतीति प्रश्ने पचतीत्युत्तराच्चाख्यातस्य प्रयत्नार्थकत्वनिश्चयात् । रथो गच्छतीत्यादावनुकूलव्यापारो लक्षणा "देवदत्तः पचति तण्डुलान्देवदत्तेन पच्यते तण्डुलः" इत्यत्र कर्तृकर्मणोर्नाख्यातार्थत्वम् किंतु तद्गतैकत्वादीनामेव । तयोराक्षेपादेव लाभः । प्रजयतीत्यादौ धातोरेव प्रकर्षे शक्तिः । उपसर्गाणां द्योतकत्वमेव । न तत्र शक्तिरस्ति ॥

the goal of तर्क

पदार्थज्ञानस्य परमं प्रयोजनं मोक्षः । तथाहि । "आत्मावाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः" इति श्रुत्या श्रवणादीनामात्मसाक्षात्कारहेतुत्वबोधनात् ।

श्रुत्या देहादिविलक्षणात्मज्ञाने सत्यप्यसंभावनाऽनिवृत्तेर्युक्त्यनुसन्धानरूपमननसाध्यत्वात् मननोपयोगिपदार्थनिरूपणद्वारा शास्त्रस्यापि मोक्षोपयोगः । तदनन्तरं श्रुत्युपदिष्टयोगविधिना निदिध्यासने कृते तदनन्तरं देहादिविलक्षणात्मसाक्षात्कारे सति देहादावहमभिमानरूपमिथ्याज्ञाननाशे सति दोषाभावात्प्रवृत्त्यभावे धर्माधर्मयोरभावाज्जन्माभावे पूर्वधर्माधर्मयोरनुभवेन नाशे चरमदुःखध्वंसलक्षणो मोक्षो जायते । ज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनं मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तेर्ज्ञानमात्र-

साध्यत्वात् "तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽय-नाय" इति साधनान्तरनिषेधाच्च । ननु "तत्प्राप्तिहेतुर्विज्ञानं कर्म चोक्तं महामुने" इति कर्मणोऽपि मोक्षसाधनत्वस्मरणाज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इति चेन्न । "नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुर्वाणो दुरितक्षयम् । ज्ञानं च विमलीकुर्वन्नभ्यासेन च पाचयेत् । अभ्यासात्पक्वविज्ञानं कैवल्यं लभते नरः" इत्यादिना कर्मणो ज्ञानसाधनत्वप्रतिपादनात् । **ज्ञानद्वारैव कर्म मोक्षसाधनं न साक्षात्** । तस्मात्पदार्थज्ञानस्य मोक्षः परमं प्रयोजनमिति सर्वं रमणीयम् ॥

इति श्रीमदद्वैतविद्याचार्य--श्रीमद्राघवसोमयाजिकुलावतंस--श्रीमत्ति-**रुमला**चार्यवर्यस्य सूनुनाऽ**न्नंभट्टेन** कृता स्वकृततर्कसंग्रहस्य **दीपिका** संपूर्णा ॥

काणादन्यायमतयोर्बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।
अन्नंभट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्याया**न्नंभट्ट**विरचितः स्वकृतदीपिकया समे-**तस्तर्कसंग्रहः** समाप्तः ॥



TRANSLATION

AND

NOTES.

Tr.—Having placed the Lord of the Universe in heart and having saluted the spiritual preceptor a compendium of Categories is being composed for the easy understanding of youngsters.

The author enters upon a discussion as regards the propriety of a मङ्गल, in his दीपिका, which is a running commentary on the तर्कसंग्रह. Therein he establishes that it has been an invariable practice with the शिष्ट or those who admit the ultimate authority of the Vedas (वेदप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृs)to begin their works with a मङ्गल which ensures their completion without anything untoward coming in the way (निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थं.)

विश्वेश is शिव, the साम्बमूर्ति of the दीपिका. Cp. अक्षपादमते [नैयायिकमते] देवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिवः—षड्दर्शनसमुच्चयः

विधाय गुरुवन्दनम्

Cp. यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथा गुरौ
तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः॥

—श्वेताश्वतर 6. 23

बालानाम्

Cp. शिशुहितां टीकां in the दीपिका. अन्नंभट्ट explains बाल as ग्रहणधारणपटुर्बालः न तु स्तनन्धयः i. e. a youngster sufficiently advanced in age to be able to grasp and grip things taught, and not a suckling who is not capable of ग्रहण, much less धारण.

The explanation by another commentator अधीतव्याकरणकाव्यकोशत्वे सति अनधीतन्यायशास्त्रत्वं बालत्वम् though unwarranted in view of the interpretation of the दीपिका is yet suggestive.

सुखबोधः

Because other treatises on तर्क or Logic, whether by their extent or subtlety, become incomprehensible.

Cp. तेषां (बहूनां ग्रन्थानां) अतिविस्तृतत्वाद्बालानां बोधो न जायेत
—दीपिका.

अन्नंभट्ट's expectations have turned true and his तर्कसङ्ग्रह has always been a stepping-stone to those who want to command a knowledge of तर्क. The popularity of the treatise in its field is evinced by the number of commentaries thereon. The treatise is sufficiently simple and does not share the cumbrous style of other तर्क works.

तर्कसंग्रह

'तर्क' is here used as a synonym for पदार्थ 'category' (तर्क्यन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्ते इति तर्काः द्रव्यादिपदार्थाः) So तर्कसंग्रह means पदार्थसंग्रह, a compendium (संग्रहः=संक्षेपेण स्वरूपकथनं) of the categories. The word तर्क has been used in the same sense in the nomenclature of some other treatises on Sanskrit Logic, like तर्कभाषा, तर्ककौमुदी. The primary significance of the word तर्क which means 'Reasoning' must have been an incentive to its constant use in naming treatises on Sanskrit Logic, because 'Reasoning' forms the very back--bone of Logic.

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२ पदार्थs

Tr.—Seven are the nameable things viz. Substance, (2) Quality (3) Action (4) Generality (5) Particularity (6) *Intimate Relation and* (7) *Negation.*

पदार्थ is a nameable thing.

Why are seven पदार्थs admitted.

The तार्किकs state the प्रयोजन of तर्कशास्त्र to be the cessation of दुःख consequent upon the removal of मिथ्याज्ञान or erroneous knowledge of things in the Universe. It follows, therefore, that for दुःखाभाव we must possess तत्त्वज्ञान of things in the Universe.

But how are we to get the तत्त्वज्ञान of the *infinite* things in the Universe? With the limitations imposed upon humanity it is impossible for man to rightly comprehened things *individually.* Is it then impossible to get rid of मिथ्याज्ञान ? Are we destined to rot in the perpetual thraldom of ignorance?

It is exactly in overcoming this difficulty that science is most helpful. By analysis and synthesis science makes the infinite finite. Cows may be infinite. But do I not *correctly* picture to myself *essentially* the cows that दुर्योधन lifted in the past, from विराट's cowpens ? Can I not project my imagination in future and visualise *essentially* the cows that are yet to appear in the world? So the *individually* infinite cows cease to be beyond the grasp of my finite knowledge. What has helped me is analysis and synthesis, or, in other words, *classification.*

Any science worth the name forges or at least attempts to forge some instrument based on classi-

fication to overcome this infinitude of Universe. When आरुणि, in the छान्दोग्य, asks his son श्वेतकेतु,

उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यः येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति अमतं मतं................

he precisely wants the latter to grasp a principle that would enable him to overcome infinity: the principle in the instance being reality of causes is based on a classification of causes and effects.

The tendency to classify, on the part of the तार्किक्s, the infinite things in the world, resulted in the assumption of the seven पदार्थs. Take anything in the world and it must needs be capable of being subsumed under some one of the seven पदार्थs. To put it otherwise, the seven पदार्थs exhaust between them the whole universe. Eventually, if the seven पदार्थs are known the whole universe is known and मिथ्याज्ञान is radically removed..

A very close parallel to the पदार्थs of the तार्किक्s is to be found in the ten Categories of Aristotle a Greek thinker (384—322 B. C.).

The etymological meaning of the word पदार्थ is ' a thing that is nameable.'


पद्यते गम्यते अनेनेति पदं—a word.

ऋच्छन्ति इन्द्रियाणि यं स: अर्थः—an object (to which senses have access)

So पदार्थ means ' an object of sense with a name. ' (पदस्य अर्थ:)

As every object in the world is nameable पदार्थ designates the most comprehensive class of things to which each and every object in the world belongs.

The following table will explain the development of the theory of पदार्थs.



विशेष and समवाय have been admitted by the वैशेषिकs to account for their परमाणुवाद and theory of permanent connexion respectively, for which see below.

The number of पदार्थs:—

It is worth noting that कणाद, the founder or rather the systematizer of the वैशेषिक school mentions only six पदार्थs omitting अभाव.[1] Even प्रशस्तपाद, (5th Cent. A. D.) who in other respects, gives the final shape to the वैशेषिक tenets does not include अभाव in the list.[2] माधव in his सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह[3] and हरिभद्र in his षड्दर्शनसमुच्चय[4] adhere to the theory of

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1 वै. सूत्रs I. 1. 4.

2 द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां षण्णां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः　　—पदार्थधर्मसंग्रह.

3 द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवाया इति षडेव ते पदार्था इत्युद्देशः।

4 द्रव्यं गुणस्तथा कर्म सामान्यं च चतुर्थकम्।
विशेषसमवायौ हि तत्त्वषट्कं हि तन्मते ॥　　—60

six पदार्थs. The admission of अभाव as a पदार्थ is due to the scholastic ingenuity of the later commentators. उदयन (किरणावली) and later शिवादित्य (सप्तपदार्थी) admit अभाव as a category. It might be noted that the प्राभाकर school of the मीमांसकs did not admit अभाव as a separate पदार्थ. But finally the number of the पदार्थs is fixed at 7.

The वैशेषिकs refuse to admit सादृश्य, संख्या, शक्ति, and ज्ञातता as independent पदार्थs as some systematists like the प्राभाकरs do. The वैशेषिकs say that they can be brought under some of the 7 पदार्थs. Thus सादृश्य can be brought under समवायसम्बन्ध, संख्या is a गुण, शक्ति is the स्वरूप of a thing, ज्ञातता is merely संयोग of the ज्ञान with the ज्ञेय.

Some say that गौतम has enumerated sixteen पदार्थs. But to call the 16 topics of discussion enumerated by गौतम as पदार्थ is a misnomer. गौतम never implies that the 16 heads exhaust the things in the universe and as this is the basic conception of पदार्थ, the sixteen heads of गौतम can never be styled as पदार्थs. As a dialectician गौतम् wants to induce his students to closely study the 16 heads which are so useful in dialectics. A पदार्थ is metaphysical and not dialectical. The चित् and अचित् of the वेदान्तिन्s or the प्रकृति and पुरुषs of the सांख्यs may be पदार्थs, in their way; but the जल्प, वितण्डा or छल of गौतम can hardly be the classes meant to subsume the things in the world.

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३ द्रव्यs

Tr.—Then the substances are nine only; earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, self and mind.

Having enumerated the 7 पदार्थs अन्नंभट्ट proceeds to enumerate the sub—varieties of the first पदार्थ viz. द्रव्य. In the case of द्रव्यs the number has not fluctuated, at least so far as the तार्किकs are concerned, since the time of कणाद.[1] गौतम does admit these द्रव्यs, though not so systematically or explicitly as कणाद.[2]

द्रव्य is a पदार्थ in which qualities or actions can abide.

Is अन्धकार a द्रव्य ?

The मीमांसकs of the school of कुमारिलभट्ट say that अन्धकार is द्रव्य in addition to the nine stated.

They argue that तमस् is a द्रव्य because it is the substratum of गुण and क्रिया, and nothing but a द्रव्य can be, as a rule, the substratum of these. When we say नीलं तम: we attribute नीलगुण to तमस् ; when we enter a dark room with a lamp and when we find तमस् receding we say तमश्चलति thus ascribing क्रिया to तम:. Thus being an आश्रय of गुण and क्रिया, तम:, say the भाट्टमीमांसकs, must be a द्रव्य.

Then they show how तम: cannot come under any of the nine द्रव्यs enumerated. It cannot be पृथ्वी, because it has no touch and smell. Can it be अप् then ? No. It has not the cool touch, white colour and taste that are peculiar to अप्. It cannot be तेज: because neither has it the hot touch nor the bright white colour peculiar to तेज: It

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1 पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि । वै.सू. 1.1.5.

2 पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशमिति भूतानि । न्या. सू. 1-1-13.
नात्ममनसो: सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः । न्या सू. 1-2-21.
दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसंगः । *ibid.* 1-2-22.

cannot be वायु which has touch but no colour whereas तमः is without touch and possesses blue colour. Lastly, it cannot be either आकाश or काल or दिक् or आत्मा or मनः because all of these are *without* colour.

The भाट्टमीमांसकs, therefore, hold तमः to be an additional द्रव्य.

The तार्किकs refuse to admit तमः as a द्रव्य at all. They say that तमः is no more than an अभाव of तेजः and hence is to be subsumed under अभाव.

The मीमांसक based his contention on the presence of गुण and क्रिया in तमस्. The तार्किक summarily rejects both as being illusory. It तमस् were *really* नील how is it that we apprehend its so-called नीलरूप even in the absence of light (आलोक)? Because, the rule is that for perceiving a thing with colour light is necessary. So the नीलरूप in darkness is an illusion. Similarly the attribution of क्रिया is erroneous. When we see darkness moving with the appearance of a lamp the movement really belongs to the lamp[1] and not to the darkness. So that तमः is not a द्रव्य but mere अभाव of तेजः and it has been so recognised by the प्राभाकरमीमांसकs who, with slight modification, say it तेजोज्ञानाभाव.[2]

It might be added श्रीधर, a तार्किक, author of the न्यायकन्दली a gloss on प्रशस्तपाद's भाष्य regards तमः as something positive which he includes under रूप.[3]

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
1 दीपापसरणक्रियाया एव तत्र भानात्। —न्यायबोधिनी.

2 तस्माद्रूपविशेषोऽयं अत्यन्तं तेजोऽभावे सति सर्वतः समारोपितस्तम इति प्रतीयते। आरोपितं नीलरूपं तमः इति कन्दलीकारमतम्। —दिनकरी.

3 Cp. the अनुमान, तमो द्रव्यं रूपवत्त्वात् (क्रियावत्त्वाच्च)। —दिनकरी on सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली.

Are gold and similar bright metals to be regarded as an additional substance ? The तार्किकs hold them to be तेजः and nothing else. See below under तेजः

The nine द्रव्यs can be divided into two broad divisions, मूर्त corporeal, those that are capable of action and अमूर्त or विभु all--pervading, which are not capable of action.



The word द्रव्य is explained as द्रुरिव which is an आश्रय for गुणs and क्रियाs like a tree.

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४ गुणs

Tr.—Qualities are twenty-four; colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension, individuality or separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, sound, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, and impression.

परत्व and अपरत्व can be translated better by 'remoteness' and 'nearness' than by 'priority' and 'posteriority' because they are both temporal and spatial.

गुण is that पदार्थ that abides in द्रव्यs without changing their locations.

It is noteworthy that कणाद mentions only seventeen गुणs omitting to include in his list गुरुत्व, द्रवत्व, स्नेह, संस्कार, धर्म, अधर्म and शब्द.[1] In प्रशस्तपाद, for the first time, we find the number raised to twenty-four.[2] Neither गौतम in his न्यायसूत्रs nor वात्स्यायन in his भाष्य explicitly or impliedly notes the qualities-palpably because they are out of the range of dialectics.

The दीपिका repudiates the admission by some (?) of लघुत्व, कठिनत्व, मृदुत्व—the commentator नृसिंह adds वक्रत्व—as additional qualities by sh(wing how लघुत्व is mere गुरुत्वाभाव,—It must be admitted that लघुत्व or lightness is not mere negation, लघुत्व and गुरुत्व being different degrees of heaviness—and how कठिनत्व and मृदुत्व are no more than अवयवसंयोगविशेष. वक्रत्व, नृसिंह says, is also अवयवसंयोगविशेष.

Of the twenty-four qualities some belong to the मूर्तद्रव्यs exclusively, some to अमूर्त or विभुद्रव्यs exclusively, while others belong to both.

Thus we get the following scheme:—[3]

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1 रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः संख्या परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः। —वै. सू. 1 1.6.

2 चशब्दसमुच्चिताश्च गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कारादृष्ट (धर्म & अधर्म) शब्दाः सप्तैवेत्येवं चतुर्विंशतिगुणाः। —प्र. भा.

Cp. again एते गुणाश्चतुर्विंशतिसङ्ख्याकाः कणादेन कण्ठतश्चशब्देन दर्शिताः। —मुक्तावली

3 रूपं रसः स्पर्शगन्धौ परत्वमपरत्वकम्।
द्रवत्वं स्नेहवेगाश्च मता मूर्तगुणा अमी॥ (वेगेन स्थितिस्थापकोऽप्युपलक्षणीयः)
धर्माधर्मौ भावना च शब्दा बुध्यादयोऽपि च
एतेऽमूर्तगुणाः सर्वे विद्वद्भिः परिकीर्तिताः॥
संख्यादयो विभागान्ता उभयेषां गुणा मताः॥ —सि. मुक्तावली

गुणs

मूर्तगुणs.		अमूर्तगुणs		मूर्तामूर्तगुणs
1 रूप	7 गुरुत्व	1 बुद्धि	6 प्रयत्न	1 पृथक्त्व
2 रस	8 द्रवत्व	2 सुख	7 धर्म	2 संयोग
3 गन्ध	9 स्नेह	3 दुःख	8 अधर्म	3 विभाग
4 परत्व	10 वेग (संस्कार)	4 इच्छा	9 भावना(संस्कार)	4 संख्या
5 अपरत्व	11 स्थितिस्थापक (संस्कार)	5 द्वेष	10 शब्द	5 परिमाण
6 स्पर्श				

Again, some of the qualities can abide in individual द्रव्यs while others can abide in combinations of them. The former are called विशेषगुणs, the latter सामान्यगुणs.

गुणs

विशेषगुण.		सामान्यगुण.	
1 बुद्धि	9 भावना	1 संख्या	9 गुरुत्व
2 सुख	10 रूप	2 परिमाण	10 वेग
3 दुःख	11 रस	3 पृथक्त्व	
4 इच्छा	12 गन्ध	4 संयोग	
5 द्वेष	13 स्पर्श	5 विभाग	
6 प्रयत्न	14 स्नेह	6 परत्व	
7 धर्म	15 सांसिद्धिक द्रवत्व i. e.	7 अपरत्व	
8 अधर्म	(natural fluidity)	8 नैमित्तिकद्रवत्व	
	16 शब्द	(artificial fluidity)	

The enumeration of the गुणs represents a very bold step on the part of the तार्किकs to enlist in the most comprehensive way all possible qualities. To say that the list is final is arbitrary when sciences are becoming more accurate and new properties are being discovered. But considering the times

when the गुणs were enlisted certainly it was a very comprehensive list of qualities.

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५ कर्मन्s

Tr.—Actions are five, throwing upwards, dropping downwards, contraction, expansion and motion in general.

कर्मन्s while abiding in their substrata bring about a change in their locations.

From the time of कणाद the number of कर्मन्s has remained steady. गौतम, of course, has no place for their discussion in his सूत्रs. Motion may be vertically either upwards (उत्क्षेपण) or downwards (अपक्षेपण), and horizontally towards oneself (आकुञ्चन) or farther from oneself (प्रसारण). All action that cannot come under either of these is relegated to the broad class of गमन. The very presence of the head of गमन shows that the systematizers could not catch hold of some sound principle of division to exhaust all cases of action.

गुण and कर्मः--

गुणs are stationary; कर्मs transitory. What is meant is that गुणs while abiding in their substrata do not make them change their locations while कर्मs when abiding in objects bring about the change of location.

The lotus by possessing the गुण of नीलरूप does not change its place. But the ball when it possesses उत्क्षेपणकर्म does change its place, say, from the hand upwards.

In view of this difference we can hardly

accept the suggestion of some[1] that 'they are, as it were, two different phases of the same phenomenon. गुण in the process of change is action while कर्मन् when made fixed and permanent becomes a गुण.' It is not permanence or otherwise that distingiushes the two. For do we not see the lotus fading and the chameleon changing its colour and do we not, in these cases, persist in calling their गुणs गुणs, from the start to the finish? No तार्किक will ever say that the motion of earth is its गुण. For he is very positive in his distinction between गुण and कर्मन्. कर्मन् presupposes change of location; गुण does not.

६ सामान्य.

Tr.—Generality is of two kinds, higher and lower.

सामान्य is constituted by the common characteristic which enables us to group several individuals, in which it abides in common, as belonging to one class. Thus गोत्व is the सामान्य forming the bovine class; सत्ता or existence is another सामान्य which persists in all existing things.

[Some[2] say:—कणाद's notion of सामान्य is materially different from that of the later तार्किकs. While the former holds it to be a subjective characteristic, the latter regard it as objective. According to कणाद, the same characteristic may be सामान्य or विशेष according to the way in which we view it. If we look upon गोत्व as something *persisting* in many cows, it is सामान्य; if, on the other hand, गोत्व were viewed as distinguis-

1 तर्कसंग्रह by Athalye and Bodas.

2 „ „ and Keith's Atomism pp. 192—193.

hing a cow from a horse, say, it becomes विशेष. According to the later तार्किकs, सामान्य always remains a सामान्य, because it is an objective quality running through the members of a class, not changing with our view point.

This view in based on an inaccurate interpretation of the सूत्र, सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्[1]. कणाद wants to make a distinction between two kinds of सामान्यs and two kinds of विशेषs.

There are three सामान्यs which can be विशेषs and *vice versa viz.* द्रव्यत्व; गुणत्व, कर्मत्व. [द्रव्यत्वं गुणत्वं कर्मत्वं च सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च[2])

There is one सामान्य *viz.* सत्ता which can never be विशेष (भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव[3])

There are some विशेषs (अन्त्य विशेषs) residing in eternal things which can never be सामान्यs (अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो: विशेषेभ्यः)

One might naturally ask how is it that some सामान्यs and विशेषs can be विशेषs and सामान्यs respectively, while others cannot. A reply to the question is given in the words बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्. It depends, says कणाद, upon their giving अनुवृत्तबुद्धि (cognition of persistence) and व्यावृत्तबुद्धि. (cognition of exclusion). द्रव्यत्व, for example, can give both the notions. सत्ता cannot give व्यावृत्तबुद्धि because there is nothing that cannot come under सत्त'. The नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति विशेष cannot give अनुवृत्तबुद्धि. By their very nature they are distinct. प्रशस्तपाद[5] does not at all distort the sense of the सूत्र as Keith[6] wants

1 कणादs वैशेषिक सूत्र १ २. ३. 2 वै सू. १. २. ५. 3 वै. सू. १. २. ४. 4 वै. सू. १. २. ६. 5 सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं चानुवृत्ति-प्रत्ययकारणम् ।....तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद्विशेषाख्यामपि लभते । —प्र. भा. 6 Atomism—p. 193.

us to believe. Even शंकरमिश्र § in his उपस्कार holds the same view. Thus, beyond doubt, कणाद's सामान्य is as much objective as that of any later तार्किक.]

सामान्य is divided into two divisions, पर सामान्य, the higher generality and अपरसामान्य, the lower generality. Others, like शिवादित्य (सप्तपदार्थी), give three divisions. पर, अपर and परापर.

पर and अपरसामान्य:— If we consider the सामान्यs पृथिवीत्व (व्यापक), and घटत्व, (घट manufactured from पृथिवी) पृथिवीत्व is परसामान्य being the more comprehensive of the two, घटत्व the अपरसामान्य, being less comprehensive (व्याप्य). But पृथिवीत्व becomes an अपरसामान्य with regard to द्रव्यत्व which is a wider class. Thus according to this division, परत्व or अपरत्व is only relative, determined by the more or less comprehensive nature of one class in relation to the other.

पर, अपर, परापर or व्यापक, व्याप्य, व्यापकव्याप्य सामान्य:— According to this division सत्ता is the व्यापकसामान्य and is always so, no other more comprehensive class being found. अपरसामान्य belongs to that class, which is the least comprehensive and cannot have any other sub—class. Thus घटत्व is अपरसामान्य, and is always so because no *class* less comprehensive than it is found. All classes between these two extremes are परापर, for they can be relatively पर and अपर. Thus पृथिवीत्व is पर with regard to घटत्व but अपर with regard to द्रव्यत्व. Thus according to this division पर, अपर and परापर are absolutely so and not relatively.

§ अनुवृत्तबुद्धेः सामान्यस्य (लक्षणं) व्यावृत्तबुद्धिर्विशेषस्य। नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोऽनन्ता विशेषाः। ते खल्वत्यन्तं व्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वाद्विशेषा एव। उपस्कार on वै. सू १. २. ३.

What is परसामान्य will always be so, and similar is the case with regard to अपरसामान्य and परापरसामान्य.

Which of the two divisions is better? Though it is difficult to answer the question offhand, it will be found, on close scrutiny, that the first division is more scientific than the second. Because, पर and अपर are relative terms and presuppose comparison between two. If I describe a thing as पर the hearer would not be satisfied until I state the अपर thing with regard to which it is पर. This relative nature of the two terms is retained in the first division while it is sacrificed in the second. When I say सत्ता is परसामान्य naturally one would like to know the अपरसामान्द with regard to which it is पर, and his expectancy will be satisfied when both परसामान्य and अपरसामान्य are stated. The तार्किक who adheres to the first division will always state the other सामान्य whenever he calls one पर or अपर. This relative aspect of पर and अपर is lost in the second division. When a तार्किक of this school refers to परसामान्य, he refers to सत्ता; he does not think it necessary to state अपरसामान्य; and when he refers to अपरसामान्य, he refers to घटत्व etc. and thinks it needless to refer to the परसामान्य. Again, the second school does surreptitiously admit the principle of relativity in its variety of परापर i. e. पर with regard to one, अपर with regard to another. Then why not admit the principle wholesale?

It should be noted that सामान्य and जाति are used almost synonymously.

सामान्य resides in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्, but not in any other category. The reasons that come in the

way of an assumption of generality, have been given by उदयनाचार्य in his किरणावली, in the stanza

व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्करोऽथानवस्थितिः ।
रूपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधकसङ्ग्रहः ॥

There cannot be any सामान्य or जाति if (1) the object is one only like आकाश, (2) the things mentioned with different names are identical e. g घटत्व cannot be a जाति different from कलशत्व; or बुद्धित्व from ज्ञानत्व, घट being the same as कलश, बुद्धि the same as ज्ञान (3) there results cross-division; thus भूतत्व and मूर्तत्व cannot form जाति for आकाश is a भूतद्रव्य but still not मूर्त; (4) there is want of finality (अनवस्था Accordingly there cannot be a जाति, जातित्व. For if we once admit a जाति of जाति that जाति will again have another जाति and so on *ad infinitum*; (5) there is loss of the very nature of a thing. Thus there cannot be a जाति of विशेषs because विशेषs, by their very nature, are mutually distinct while जाति presupposes similarity; (6) there is want of connexion. Thus there cannot be a जाति like समवायत्व because समवायत्व being जाति with regard to समवाय will reside in the latter by another समवाय; and this समवाय will require the help of a third समवाय to reside in its substratum and so on *ad infinitum*. To avoid this fault we have to deny any connexion between समवाय and समवायत्व; hence no जाति like समवायत्व. Nor can there be any जाति like अभावत्व because अभावत्व will have to reside in अभाव by समवाय But अभाव being negative cannot enter into any connection with anything[1] positive Thus अभावत्व

1 अभावत्वादिजात्यभ्युपगमे वा बाधकमेतत्।
—शंकर's उपस्कार on वै. सू. 1.-2.-3

in connection with अभाव is impossible. Thus the last three circumstances have been introduced to anticipate जातिs of सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव.

Whatever जाति is vitiated by any of these circumstances is called सखण्ड सामान्य or उपाधि to be distinguished from अखण्ड सामान्य or जाति proper which is not vitiated by either of the circumstances.

It should be seen that of the six circumstances that of सङ्कर is the most important. The first two are too obvious and none would be inclined to formulate a जाति when they are present. The last three merely explain the technical assumption of the तार्किकs that there cannot be जातिs of सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव. It is the third, सङ्कर, which is at the basis of many faulty classifications and cross—divisions which one must be very careful in avoiding. What is meant by cross--division will be clear from the following instance. If कृष्णत्व were considered a जाति then in that जाति will be included all things animate and inanimate that are black and from that जाति will be excluded all things that do not happen to be black. Thus black men may get into one class with black sheep and black cows. This classification based on cross--division is most unreasonable because it sets at naught the established class which is more reasonable *viz.* humanity etc.

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७ विशेषs

Tr.—Whereas (तु) *the particularities are nothing short of* (एव) *infinite.*

विशेषs distinguish eternal objects like अणुs, आकाश etc.

[As said in the section on सामान्य, कणाद refers to two kinds of विशेषs, अन्त्य and those that are not अन्त्य. When he definitely states that these विशेषs can never be सामान्य[1] he refers to their being mutually distinct Again, he has definitely assigned them a place in the list of पदार्थs. He has thus given this category as much prominence as सामान्य अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः is not merely incidental as is seen from the interpretation we put upon the सूत्र in the previous section. Thus there is hardly any evidence to support the view of those[2] who say that कणाद does not give much prominence to this category. The invention of the category of विशेष is a sequel to that of सामान्य. If there are some qualities in common there must be others that are uncommon.]

मुक्तावली gives the propriety of this category in nutshell in the following words:—घटादीनां द्यणुकपर्यन्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदात्परस्परं भेदः परमाणूनां परस्परं भेदको विशेष एव स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तस्तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्ति ।

The significance of the theory.

What is meant is this:—whenever we distinguish between substances we do so on the basis of their constituent parts. When घट is distinguished from पट, it is because the constituent parts of the one are different from those of the other. This leads to the principle अवयवभेदादवयविभेदः.

But, as we know, no नित्यद्रव्य is constituted of parts. The अणुs of the elements पृथ्वी, अप्, तेजः, वायु,

1 अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः 1. 2. 6.

2 तर्कसंग्रह by Athalye & Bodas p. 94-95; Keith inplies the same-thing in his Atomism p. 195.

for instance, do not consist of parts. The विभु द्रव्यs viz आकाश, काल, दिक् and आत्मा do not consist of parts. The minds being atomic also do not consist of parts. How, then, are we to distinguish between one atom and another or one विभुद्रव्य and another, in other words, how are we to distinguish between नित्यद्रव्यs ?

It is to solve this difficulty that the category of विशेष has been invented by the वैशेषिकs. They say that eternal substances are distinguished one from the other by the विशेषs abiding in them. Each eternal substance has one विशेष which is distinct from other विशेषs.

It should be clearly seen that every atom of पृथ्वी, अप्, तेजः वायु, will have one विशेष in it. Therefore, we can distinguish not only an atom of one substance from that of another, say, पृथ्वी, but also between two atoms of the same substance. Again, each of the four substances आकाश, काल, दिक्, आत्मन् has one विशेष distinguishing it from all others.

Every mind again has one विशेष distinguishing it from all other minds as also from all other substances.

We can thus distinguish between eternal things, no doubt. But what is it that distinguishes one विशेष from another? If you admit a second विशेष as residing in the first to ride over the difficulty the fault of अनवस्था will arise. So the वैशेषिक replies by saying that the विशेषs perform a double function. First, they distinguish the eternal objects in which they abide and, secondly, they distinguish themselves mutually (स्वतो व्यावर्तक).

It may be added that the theory of विशेषs is a lame theory. If you admit that the विशेष can also distinguish itself from others why not admit straightway that the नित्यद्रव्य *by its very nature* can distinguish itself from another? The one alternative is as much hypothetical as the other, while the second has the advantage of being free from गौरव or being complex. That is why the later तार्किकs abstained from subscribing to this theory of विशेष[1].

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८ समवाय.

Tr.—Intimate Relation is one only

समवाय is intimate relation or inherence (सम् + अव- + अय √ इ to go[2]) which subsists between things of which one cannot exist in the absence of the other. Thus there is समवाय between घट and कपालs; for the घट cannot exist without the कपालs. There is समवाय similarly between the नीलरूप and उत्पल because नीलरूप in the case cannot exist apart from उत्पल.

The समवाय is supposed to abide between five pairs. [१] अवयव–अवयविन् [२] गुण–गुणिन् [३] क्रिया–क्रियावान [४] जाति-व्यक्ति [५] विशेष-नित्यद्रव्य.

To illustrate these pairs in order, there is समवाय between [१] कपाल–घट, [२] नीलरूप–उत्पल, [३] उत्क्षे-

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1 नव्यनैयायिकाः, भट्ट कुमारिलः, प्राभाकराः, मध्वमतानुयायिवेदान्तिनश्च एतादृशं विशेषं पदार्थं नाङ्गीचक्रुः। यथैव विशेषाणां स्ववृत्तिधर्मं विना व्यावृत्तत्वं तथैव नित्यद्रव्याणामपि।
—न्यायकोश.

2 The forms समवेत, समवयात्, समवैति point to this etymology.

पण- उत्क्षिप्तकन्दुक, [४] गोत्व- बलीवर्द, [५] विशेष- पार्थिव परमाणु.

The five pairs, गुण–गुणिन् etc. are described as अयुतसिद्ध i. e. which are not proved to have been युत:यु means (1) To separate or (2) to join. So युत means— (1) separated or (2) joined. Whatever are not known to have been separated are अयुतसिद्ध according to the first derivation. The same sense is *implied* by the second derivation according to which अयुतसिद्ध means which are not proved to have been joined and which hence were never separated because joining presupposes separation. So, either way, अयुतसिद्ध means proved as inseparable

Genesis of समवाय.

[Looking to the five pairs we can make a plausible conjecture as regards the genesis of the theory of समवाय. The categories of द्रव्य, गुण, कर्म, सामान्य and विशेष were thought out. The next question was the connection of the most important of these *viz.* द्रव्य with each of the rest and also with itself.

द्रव्य—द्रव्य=अवयवावयविनौ
,, – गुण=गुणगुणिनौ
,, — कर्म=क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ
,, —सामान्य=जातिव्यक्ती
,, — विशेष=विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये

Though संयोग was already assumed under the गुणs, it was not serviceable in the present case. While संयोग is कर्मजन्य, the connections under consideration could not be कर्मजन्य because गुण and कर्म are not capable of being कर्माश्रय, only द्रव्य being so capable. Again, संयोग is impermanent whereas the connection that was needed to explain the prese-

nce of गुण etc. in द्रव्य must be such as possessed permanence—as much permanence as the connected things enjoyed, because the pairs are inseparably connected. The case of अवयव and अवयाविन was similar and no संयोग could be postulated because the connection was relatively permanent. None can separate the blue colour from the lotus nor the jar from the potsherds. So the category of समवाय was invented by the वैशेषिकs[1].

कणाद does not specifically make a list of the five pairs. But the suggestion, that the definition that it is a connection between things that cannot exist separately begins with प्रशस्तपाद, made by some,[2] is untenable. For कणाद does refer to अयुतसिद्धि in two सूत्रs[3] which collectively give us three of the five pairs, *viz* अवयवावयविनौ, गुणगुणिनौ and क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ. प्रशस्तपाद might have been at best responsible for the extension of अयुतसिद्धि connection to जाति-व्यक्ति and विशेष-नित्यद्रव्य.

In view of the above genesis, the suggestion by some[4] that समवाय has been admitted by the तार्किक to account for the duality of cause and effect appears inaccurate. समवाय was not admitted exclusively for this purpose. It was admitted to account for the relatively permanent आश्रयाश्रयिभाव between the five pairs which could not be accoun-

1 तत्र प्रमाणं तु गुणक्रियादिविशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया विशिष्टबुद्धित्वाद्दण्डी पुरुष इति विशिष्टबुद्धिवदित्यनुमानम्। एतेन संयोगादिबाधात्समवायसिद्धिः। — मुक्तावली.

2 Atomism pp. 196-197.

3 युतसिद्ध्यभावात्कार्यकारणयोः संयोगविभागौ न विद्येते। वै.सू. ७-२-१३

4 Ghate सप्तपदार्थी notes p. 6.

ted for on the hypothesis of संयोग. And it only incidentally supports the असत्कार्यवाद; because it embraces the pair of अवयव-अवयविन्, अवयव being the cause, अवयविन् the effect. If समवाय were admitted for the sake of असत्कार्यवाद, why is it postulated to abide between विशेष—नित्यद्रव्य and जाति--व्यक्ति which are not related as cause and effect ? When कणाद defines समवाय as इहेदमिति यत: कार्यकारणयो:स समवाय:, (7. 2—29)[1] he only touches on one aspect of समवाय to illustrate आश्रयाश्रयिभाव (इहेदमिति). of समवाय, as is clear from his assumption of अयुतसिद्धि in the case of the three pairs in the सूत्रs quoted above. If समवाय were intended for असत्कार्यवाद, its assumption was unnecessary for गुण-गुणिन्, क्रिया-क्रियावत् which are कार्य-कारणs only as a matter of theory. When शंकराचार्य repudiates the समवाय doctrine he repudiates it not so much because it supports असत्कार्यवाद as because of inherent defects in it. शंकराचार्य thinks that the assumption of समवाय over and above संयोग is superfluous. Again, he believes that the assumption that समवाय is one and eternal is too technical and is manipulated to suit the convenience of the system.]

संयोग and समवाय

संयोग is कर्मजन्य and hence अनित्य while समवाय is नित्य.[2] Again संयोग comes under the पदार्थ गुण; समवाय is an altogether independent पदार्थ. संयोग resides in the संयोगिद्रव्यs by समवाय relation (गुण-गुणिनौ) while समवाय does not require another समवाय to be present in the समवायिन्.

1 Cp. शंकरमिश्र's उपस्कार:—कार्यकारणयोरित्युपलक्षणम्। अकार्यकारणयोरित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्। on 7-2-26.

2 न चासौ संयोग: सम्बन्धिनामयुतसिद्धत्वात् अन्यतरकर्मादिनिमित्तासंभवात्। —प्रशस्तपाद's भाष्य p. 326.

If a second समवाय were admitted as having been *produced* to account for the presence of one, in the समवायिन् a third will have to be admitted to account for the presence of the second on the first and so on *ad infinitum.* To avoid this contingency the तार्किकs have admitted समवाय to be नित्य .To prevent गौरव, they have admitted it to be one. The neo-तार्किकs and प्राभाकरs admitted समवायs to be अनित्य and many[1]. When we call समवाय permanent, it should be borne in mind, that the permanence is relative only, i. e. समवाय lasts only so long as both the समवायिन्s last. As soon as one समवायिन् is destroyed, the समवाय will be also destroyed. Thus the समवाय between घट and कपाल will last only so long as the घट lasts. As soon as the घट is destroyed the समवाय will also disappear.

The नैयायिकs hold that समवाय is प्रत्यक्षविषय or observed by direct perception. The वैशेषिकs hold that it is अनुमेय, inferrible only. Because, they argue, if समवाय were admitted to be प्रत्यक्षविषय, it will not comprehend cases of समवाय between perceptible and imperceptible things like शब्द and आकाश, because, one of the two things being imperceptible the connection between them also will be imperceptible. अन्नंभट्ट holds the second view[2].

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९ अभाव.

Tr.—Non-existence is of four kinds: Antecedent non-existence, Consequent non-existence, Absolute non-existence and Reciprocal non-existence.

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1 समवायो नाना अनित्यश्च इति प्राभाकरा नव्याश्चाहुः —न्यायकोश.

2 नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया । विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः । —त. दी.

As we have seen before, अभाव as an independent category was not admitted by कणाद, though he recognizes the four अभावs[1]. कणाद's attitude seems to be the only reasonable attitude. It is anomalous to class अभाव, which is essentially *negative*, side by side with the *positive* categories. Even प्रशस्तपाद[2] and later writers of manuals like माधव[3], हरिभद्र[4] and केशवमिश्र[5] (1200-1400. A. D.) are unwilling to admit अभाव in the fold of positive categories. Being negative by nature the concept of अभाव has got no distinctive positive characteristic. If अभाव had some characteristic, पटाभाववत् भूतल ought to have been different from घटाभाववत् भूतल, but we know from experience that they are not different, in both cases the upshot of the whole being mere भूतल.

The तार्किकs who are responsible for the ingenuity of the assumption of the अभाव as an independent category hold that to be अभाववत् is as much a positive attribute (विशेषण) of the substratum (विशेष्य) as any other like नीलत्व and शुक्लत्व. The weakness of their argument is made clear by the fact shown above *viz.* that घटाभाव is in no way different from पटाभाव as नीलरूप is different from शुक्लरूप.[6] The प्राभाकरs and the वेदान्तिन्s are more logical in their attitude towards अभाव when say that it is mere अधिकरण, घटाभाववद्भूतल amounting to भूतल only. Keith traces the germs of the idea of not-being as something knowable and existent in the न्यायसूत्रs of गौतम and वात्स्यायन's भाष्य thereon.[7]

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1 वै. सू. ९-१-१,३,४,५.

2-3-4 See quotations on p. 5

5 अर्थाः षट् पदार्थाः । द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः।—तर्कभाषा.

6 केवलाधिकरणादेव नास्ति इति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभाव इति न पदार्थान्तरं किन्तु अधिकारणात्मक एवेति प्राभाकराः । —न्या. को.

7 Atomism p. 204

Knowledge of अभाव, say the तार्किकs, is dependent upon the knowledge of its counterentity (प्रतियोगिन्) i. e. the thing of which अभाव is predicated. Thus to know घटाभाव we must know what a घट is.

अभाव is प्रत्यक्षविषय according to the तार्किकs. Because, they say, we see with our इन्द्रियs, अभाव like घटाभाव, पटाभाव. According to the भाट्ट मीमांसकs अभाव is the object of an independent प्रमाण called अनुपलब्धि.

अभाव §

- संसर्गाभाव negation of contact.
  - प्रागभाव — अभाव of घट before it is produced
  - प्रध्वंसाभाव — अभाव of घट after it is destroyed.
  - अत्यन्ताभाव — अभाव of घट on the भूतल.
- तादात्म्याभाव-अन्योन्याभाव. negation of Identity. देवदत्त is not यज्ञदत्त.

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१० पृथिवी.

Tr. Earth is the substance that possesses odour. It is of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal. The eternal earth is of the form of atoms, the non-eternal, of the form of product.

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§ It should be seen that अन्योन्याभाव can be reduced to अत्यन्ताभाव though the contrary is not always possible.

घटः पटो न = अन्योन्याभाव.

घटे पटत्वं न = अत्यन्ताभाव

But we cannot say भूतलं घटो न is equal to भूतले घटो न.

अन्नंभट्ट here proceeds to define the several things enumerated before.

A work on तर्क is theoretically required to consist of four parts. 1 उद्देश[1] statement. 2 विभाग, classification. 3 लक्षण[2] definition and 4 परीक्षा, an examination of the definitions. But there is a divergence between theory and practice in that परीक्षा of the definitions is generally conspicuous by its absence in manuals on Sanskrit Logic. It is perhaps in कणाद alone that we find any space devoted to परीक्षा[3]. अन्नंभट्ट has got no separate section on परीक्षा, unless we gave the name to the discussion of the definitions in the दीपिका. उद्देश and विभाग are not sharply distinguished and in the उद्देश portion we do find something of विभाग[4] Cp. समवायस्त्वेक एव etc. Again, it is not unusual to come across the विभाग portions in those for लक्षणs cp. गन्धवती पृथिवी सा द्विविधा. That is why some do not admit विभाग as a separate division.

It is the portions comprising of लक्षणs or definitions that constitute the most important parts of manuals on Sanskrit Logic.

The definitions in Sanskrit Logic are framed with a double purpose: first (1) to enable us to carry on our worldly dealings by a correct knowledge (व्यवहारसाधन) and secondly, (2) to distinguish the thing defined from all others

लक्षण

1 नाम्ना पदार्थसंकीर्तनमुद्देशः—तर्कदीपिका.

2 स एवासाधारणधर्मं इत्युच्यते—

3 cp. 2-2-1,4,5.

4 त्रिधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिरुद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति। विभागोऽपि तेन रूपेणोद्देश एव। —भाष्य, चन्द्रकांतभट्ट on वै. सू. 1-1-2

(तादितरव्यावृत्ति), the second being merely a step to the former. I know घट by distinguishing it from all other objects and then am able to carry on my worldly dealings with it.

In Sanskrit definition an attempt is made to set the finger on a particular attribute which is peculiar to the thing and is thus capable of marking it off from everything else. That is why it is called केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतुविशेष ‡ —that is, a peculiar circumstance not to be fcund anywhere else. If a तार्किक wants to define a cow he will define it by saying that it is a सास्नादिमत्— animal i. e. one which has the dew-lap. He knows that it is only the bovine class that has this distinguishing feature. This is the implication of the definition of लक्षण as असाधारणो धर्मः.

This is indeed a happy device to mark off the thing defined from all others. But a definition ought to be more ambitious. Not only must it distinguish the thing defined from everything else, but it must, side by side, give us an insight into the nature of the thing. To that extent, Sanskrit definitions are deficient because they never attempt to give us a glimpse of the essence or nature of the thing.

Three दोषs of लक्षण.

तर्कदीपिका gives the three drawbacks that are likely to mar the accuracy of the definition. They are अव्याप्ति, अतिव्याप्ति and असम्भव. If anybody were to define a cow as an animal with tawny colour the fault will be अव्याप्ति

‡ cp. पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भिद्यते । गन्धवत्त्वात् । यन्नेतराभिन्नं तन्न गन्धवत् ।

(partial pervasion); because, there are other cows besides, such as red, white, which will be left out if the definition were accepted. If I were to define it as 'an animal with horns' my definition will include animals like the bison and the buffalo that are also horned, the fault resulting being आतिव्याप्ति (over-pervasion). If I were to define a cow as an animal with unbifurcated hoofs the definition will suffer from the fault of असम्भव (improbability) because cows, as a rule, are animals with bifurcated hoofs. It should be seen that the same लक्षण may be अव्याप्त and अतिव्याप्त also. In the instance above, a tawny animal is अव्याप्त with regard red cows but अतिव्याप्त with regard to tawny horses etc. But an अव्याप्त or अतिव्याप्त लक्षण can never be असंभवि, because, in both, at least, a portion of the thing defined is referred to.

Definition of पृथिवी

Earth is the substance possessed of odour. According to the तार्किकs, द्रव्यs do not possess any qualities at the moment when they come into existence.[1] For, they say, if द्रव्य and गुण were to come into existence simultaneously there will be no difference between the two.

The Definition modified

According to this theory even an earthy thing will not have smell at the moment when it comes into existence. Much[2] less will there be smell if, according to the Buddhists, a द्रव्य perished as soon as it comes into

1 प्रथमं द्रव्यं निर्गुणं निष्क्रियं चैवोत्पद्यते पश्चात्तत्समवेता गुणक्रिया उत्पद्यन्ते । —न्या. को.

2 गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात्–त.दी.

existence. (उत्पन्नविनष्ट). So such things will be left out of the scope of the definition which, therefore, has to be interpreted, says the दीपिका,[1] as meaning that Earth possesses जाति, narrower than द्रव्यत्व capable of existing in the same abode as odour. Secondly, what about earthen products where good and bad smells counteract mutually resulting in no consciousness of smell? You do not admit a चित्रगन्ध to account for such cases as you do चित्ररूप. तर्कदीपिका rejects such a possibility by saying that, in any case, there ought to be perceptible one smell good or bad, and, therefore, the definition does apply to cases where good and bad smells are present.[2] And lastly, what about the presence of smell in water and absence of it in a stone? According to the definition water will be earth, an apparent absurdity, and the stone will be not-earthy which is improbable. तर्कदीपिका points out how such cases are not in conflict with the definition. If we get smell in water, it is due to the presence of earthy particles in it. If we do not get smell in a stone, that is because it is not present there in a high degree, says the मुक्तावली. If there were absolutely no smell, how do we get it from the ashes of a burnt stone?[3]

The word गन्धवती in the definition ought to be interpreted as गन्धसमवायिकारण. In तर्क, the समवायिकारण of गुण

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1 अत्राव्याप्तिकथनं च बौद्धमतमनुसृत्य । तन्मते तदुत्पत्तिक्षणे एव तन्नाशस्वीकारात् । —न्या. को.

2 ननु सुरभ्यसुरभ्य......चित्रगन्धानङ्गीकारात् । —त. दी.

3 न च पाषाणादौ गन्धाभावाद् गन्धवत्त्वमव्याप्तमिति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि गन्धसत्त्वादनुपलब्धिस्त्वनुत्कटत्वेनाप्युपपद्यते । कथमन्यथा तद्भस्मनि गन्ध उपलभ्यते । —मुक्तावली.

and कर्म is always the द्रव्य in which they abide. In the present instance, the समवायिकारण of गन्ध is पृथ्वी because the latter is the substratum of the former. The enlargement of the definition is due to the fact that गन्धवत्त्व can be an attribute of काल and दिक because the two are all-embracing. Nothing in the world is such as is not related to काल and दिक्. So गन्ध is also related to them, and गन्धवत्त्व can be as well predicated of them. But they are not the समवायिकारण or material cause of गन्ध as पृथिवी is. They are the साधारणनिमित्तकारण of गन्ध. Hence the elucidatory enlargement of the word गन्धवत्त्व

नित्या अनित्याच.

Earth is of two kinds permanent and impermanent. Permanent earth is the atoms of which all earthy products are made. Impermanent earth consists of the various products formed from atoms.

The division into नित्य and अनित्य is an euphuism to show how there is the permanent earthy element behind all earthy products. In plain words, the तार्किक wants to say that all earthy products are constituted of atoms which are permanent. The products are impermanent because they depend for their existence on the संयोग between the atoms. They, like घट, will last only as long as the संयोग between the atoms lasts and then disappear.

नित्या परमाणुरूपाः....

Atomic Theory

One of the most valuable contributions to Indian thought is the परमाणुवाद of the वैशेषिकs. It makes them intensely realistic. It's value is evinced by the fact that, till late, even

modern physics was assuming 'atom' as the last constitueut of matter into which all products in the world could be analysed and which could not be split up. It was only very lately that this theory has been replaced by the electron theory according to which even atoms can be split up into electrons the ultimate constituents of matter. (See Introduction.)

The atomic theory may be thus accounted for. Every material object, if it is earthy (पार्थिव), watery (औदक), luminous (तैजस), or aerial (वायवीय), is found to consist of parts. (आकाश, काल, दिक्, and आत्मा are अमूर्त and hence do not consist of parts. मनांसि being atomic are also partless.) These parts are again found to have been constituted of still smaller parts which, in their turn, are made up of parts smaller still. We could have gone on analysing the objects into their constituent parts till infinity, if this process of analysis *ad infinitum* had not plunged us into a logical absurdity. If this analysis were not to stop at a particular *terminus* every object big or small would be found to have been composed of infinite parts. Thus the मेरु* mountain will consist, according to this reasoning, of infinite parts and so a सर्षप (mustard seed) will be analysed into as many i. e. infinite parts. Thus the मेरु mountain and the mustard seed will be both equal in size because both consist of infinite component parts—an absurdity too patent. In brief, if I were not to put a limit to my analysis somewhere I shall not be able to say, as I do in my

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तेषां [अवयविनां] अवयवधाराया अनन्तत्वे मेरुसर्षपयोरपि साम्यप्रसङ्गः । अतःक्वचिद्विश्रामो वाच्यः —मुक्तावली.

daily usage, that a particular thing is greater or smaller than another, because the difference in size is determined by the greater or smaller number of the constituent parts. A mango is larger than the plum because the constituent parts of the former are more in number than those of the latter. But if the parts become *infinite* where then the difference between the sizes of the two?

So what is required is a *terminus* where I must stop my analysis. In other words, I must assume a standard unit further than which I am not going to analyse and in terms of which I can say that this this thing is big and that small. And this standard part is "the atom" of the वैशेषिक which thus is *supposed* to be indivisible. The assumption of the unit of atom explains why one thing is bigger than another. That which consists of more atoms is bigger, and that which consists of less is smaller.

The theory is to be developed thus. A material object that is perceptible is found to consist of parts. Those of parts smaller still. If we were to analyse in this way the smallest perceptible part will be the त्रसरेणु or त्र्यणुक which is of the size of the mote in the sun-beam, smaller than which no object is seen. This त्रसरेणु,‡ because it is perceptible, must consist of parts, which are called. द्व्यणुकs "diads" which are imperceptible and formed of two atoms each. These द्व्यणुकs, inasmuch as

‡ न च त्रसरेणावेव विश्रान्तिरस्तीति वाच्यं । त्रसरेणुः सावयवः चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वात् पटवत् इत्याद्यनुमानेन तदवयवसिद्धौ त्रसरेणोरवयवाः सावयवाः महदारम्भकत्वात् कपालवत् इति अनुमानेन तदवयवसिद्धेः
— मुक्तावली.

they give rise to the product (त्र्यणुक) possessed of magnitude, must be themselves constituted of parts smaller still and these are the atoms." (अणुs)*

त्र्यणुक [त्रि+अणु=द्यणुक]
द्यणुक [द्वि+अणु]
द्यणुकः—द्वौ अणू कारणे यस्य तत् ।
त्र्यणुकः—त्रिभिर्द्यणुकैर्यदुत्पद्यते तत् ।
त्रसरेणुः—त्रिभिः सहितो रेणुस्त्रसरेणुः ।

Why should we admit त्र्यणुक and अणु?

That त्र्यणुक or the mote in the sunbeam is not the ultimate constituent of matter follows from the fact that it is visible like a jar. Since it is visible it must have magnitude which presupposes constituent parts. Thus a घट is visible because it possesses magnitude which, in its turn, is due to the कपालs (potsherds) of which the घट is constituted. So त्र्यणुक also must have parts.

Can these parts be the अणुs or the final constituents of matter ? No, says the वैशेषिक. Because

* Cp. परमाणुस्वभावायाः सत्त्वे किं प्रमाणम् । अनुमानम् । अणुपरिमाणतारतम्यं क्वचिद्विश्रान्तं परिमाणतारतम्यत्वात् । महत्परिमाणतारतम्यवत् । यत्रेदं विश्रान्तं यतः परमाणुर्नास्ति स परमाणुः । अत एव नित्यो द्रव्यत्वे सति अनवयवत्वादाकाशवत् । अथायं सावयवो न तर्हि परमाणुः कार्यपरिमाणापेक्षया तदवयवपरिमाणस्य लोकेऽल्पीयस्त्वप्रतीतेः। यश्च तस्यावयवः स परमाणुर्भविष्यति । अथ सोऽपि न भवत्यवयवान्तरसद्भावादेवं तर्ह्यनवस्था । ततश्चावयविनामल्पतरतमादिभावो न स्यात् । सर्वेषामनन्तकारणजन्यत्वाविशेषेण परिमाणप्रकर्षाप्रकर्षहेतोः कारणसंख्याभूयस्त्वाभूयस्त्वयोरसम्भवात् । अस्ति तावदयं परिमाणभेदः। तस्मादणुपरिमाणं क्वचिन्निरतिशयमिति सिद्धो नित्यः परमाणुः ।

—न्यायकन्दली.

they (parts) give to a product (त्र्यणुक) possessing magnitude, they must be themselves constituted of other constituents. For potsherds are constituted of smaller constituents. What the वैशेषिक means is this. If the त्र्यणुक were constituted of अणुs it ought to be अणुतर; because he supposes महत्त्व and अणुत्व to be *opposite* dimensions. Thus as two महत् products conjoined result in producing a product which is महत्तर so *two* अणु products ought to result in an अणुतर product. But त्र्यणुक is perceptible and hence cannot be an अणुतर thing which must be much more supersensuous than an अणु thing which is admitted to be supersensuous. So the parts of the त्र्यणुक must not be अणुs but the द्व्यणुकs divisible into the smaller अणुs.

Why do they admit त्र्यणुक to consist of three द्व्यणुकs (=6अणुs) ?

The द्व्यणुकs being produced from अणुs are themselves अणु in size. If *two* द्व्यणुकs had formed the त्र्यणुक it would have been अणुतर. But since the number is *three*, they can well give rise to the त्र्यणुक which is महत्. Because the rule of the वैशेषिक system is that महत्त्व is produced by कारणमहत्त्व, कारणबहुत्व (not द्वित्व) or प्रचयविशेष. That is, the महत्त्व of a thing is produced either by the magnitude of the parts, or the plurality (not duality) of the parts if they do not possess magnitude, i. e. are अणु, or the peculiar way of arrangement as in a bale of cotton where greater or smaller pressure results in smaller or greater size of the bale.

Then why not say that the त्र्यणुक consists of three अणुs which would account for its magnitude? The answer to the question seems to lie in the possible idea in the mind of the वैशेषिक that it is more natural

to descend from 3 to 2 and then to 1 than to descend from 3 to 1 at once. Thus descent from the त्र्यणुक to द्व्यणुक and thence to the अणु seems more natural than from the त्र्यणुक straightway to the अणु. That is why the वैशेषिक admits an intermediate द्व्यणुक which he had to admit to be अणु and supersensuous because produced from two अणुs.[1]

Thus the admission of the द्व्यणुक was a matter of caprice and hence we find certain commentaries like the दिनकरी on the मुक्तावली[2] not admitting द्व्यणुक at all. There are others (नव्याः) who would stop the division at त्र्यणुक or त्रसरेणु itself.[3]

Tr. Again it is threefold owing to its division into the body, the senses and the object of sense. The body is what belongs to us and other (earthy) beings The sense is what perceives smell and is situated on the tip of the nose.

The objects of sense are clay, stones and similar other objects.

पुनस्त्रिविधा or **सा पुनस्त्रिविधाः**—

Both the readings are found in different sets

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1 Read शंकर's उपस्कार on वै. सू. 4.1.2.
न च त्रसरेणुरेवावधिः। तस्य चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वेन महत्त्वादनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वाच्च। महत्त्वस्य चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षत्वे कारणत्वमनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वामादायैव। अन्यथा महत्त्वमेव न स्यात् कस्य कारणत्वं भवेत् ये च त्रसरेणोरवयवा एव परमाणवः महद्द्रव्यारम्भकत्वेन तेषामपि सावयवत्वानुमानात्। तन्तुवत् कपालवच्च।

2 अत्रेदं चिन्त्यं त्रिभिः परमाणुभिरेव त्र्यणुकमस्तु। परमाणुभ्यामनारम्भस्तु सिद्धान्तिनां द्व्यणुकाभ्यामनारंभ इव...। --दिनकरी. p. 154

3 अत्र नव्याः। त्रसरेणोरवयवाः सावयवा इत्याद्यनुमानयोरुक्तयोरप्रयोजकत्वेन त्रुटावेव विश्रामः। ...... --दिनकरी. 155

of Mss. अन्नंभट्ट's reading, to judge from his तर्कदीपिका[1] must have been पुनस्त्रिविधा clearly hinting at another principle of division of earth in general.

This reading, whether अन्नंभट्ट used it or not, is in conflict with कणाद's वैशेषिक सूत्रs where the division into शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषय belongs to अनित्य पृथिवी.[2] He is closely followed by प्रशस्तपाद also कणाद's division makes the matter explicit. शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषयs are अनित्य because they are कार्यरूप being *formed* of atoms. Even supposing this division is of पृथिवी in general to what else can it refer if not to अनित्य पृथिवी?

So whether we admit this reading or that, the upshot is the same. सा पुनस्त्रिविधा makes explicit and clear what is implicit in पुनस्त्रिविधा.

शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् :—This division is plainly based upon the notion that the universe exists for us as an outcome of our merits and demerits. As a result of our merits and demerits, we must enjoy pleasure or suffer pain which is derived from our experience of external objects (विषय). Our souls cannot get this experience unless they are embodied (शरीर). Mere possession of the body will not enable us to experience the objects in the world, in the absence of senses (इन्द्रिय).

It is with the help of the sense-organs (इन्द्रिय) that the souls residing in the bodies (शरीर) can experience objects in the world (विषय).

[Note the definitions in the तर्कदीपिका:—शरीर-

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१ प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते ।

२ तत्पुनः पृथिव्यादि कार्यद्रव्यं त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकम् ।
वै. सू. 1. 5. 2, 1.

आत्मनो भोगायतनम् ; भोग=सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारः; इन्द्रिय=शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वम् i e. 1. which is the abode of the contact of mind i. e. joined to the mind when it cognises objects. 2. which is not the abode of any special qualities that are manifest excepting sound, i. e. which possesses the particular quality of the element (e. g. गन्ध of पृथिवी, रस् of अप्, रूप of तेजस्) of which it is made only in an unmanifest form, only the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय possessing it in a manifest form.]

The इन्द्रिय is only inferred never perceived by the senses. The पार्थिव इन्द्रिय is what enables us to apprehend गन्ध the special quality of पृथिवी. It is situated on the tip of the nose. Bodies of beings on earth are शरीरs. It should be clearly seen that every tangible object in the world is a self embodied, according to the तार्किकs.* That is why they class trees and creepers also with bodies. Again, it is to be noted that शरीर and विषय are relative terms. यज्ञदत्त's शरीर is a विषय to देवदत्त.

The following division of शरीर given by मुक्तावली is comprehensive.

शरीर

योनिज　　　　　　**अयोनिज**

जरायुज	अण्डज	स्वेदज	उद्भिज्ज
like men born from the womb.	like birds, snakes born from eggs.	like bugs born from perspiration.	Voluntarily shooting up like trees etc.

* न च वृक्षादेः शरीरत्वे किं मानमिति वाच्यम् । आध्यात्मिकवायुसम्बन्धस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । तत्रैव किं मानमिति चेत् । भग्नक्षतसंरोहणादिना (the tree grows when it is lopped and gets its incision filled when cut) तदुन्नयनात् ।　　—मुक्तावली

The तार्किकs are quite positive in their view that the शरीरs are made up of one element only. This is in open conflict with the view of the Upanishads some of which say that the bodies are made of three elements and others that they are made up of five elements Both कणाद[1] and गौतम[2] have given serious attention to this topic and have devoted some सूत्रs to establish that the bodies are made up of one element only.[3] (see Intoduction)
The qualities of पृथिवी are

(1) All the colours (2) Six Tastes. (3) Two smells (सुरभि and असुरभि). (4) अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्श.

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११ आपः

Tr. Water is the substance which possesses cool touch (as its special quality). It is of two kinds: permanent and impermanent. The permanent is of the form of atoms. The impermanent is of the form of products. Again it is of three kinds according to the division into (1) body (2) sense-organ and (3) object of the sense. The body (pertains to souls) in the world of Varuna. The sense organ is that with which taste is perceived. The object is the river, the ocean and other (watery objects).

Cool touch is a quality peculiar to water. तेजस् possesses hot touch. पृथिवी possesses touch neither

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1 प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणां संयोगस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वात्पञ्चात्मकत्वं न विद्यते। वै.सू 4.2 2. गुणान्तराप्रादुर्भावाच्च न त्र्यात्मकम्। वै. सू. 4. 2. 3.

2 पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः न्या. सू. 3 1. 28.

3 मुक्तावली:- न च क्लेदोष्मादिरुपलम्भादाप्यत्वादिकमपि स्यादिति वाच्यम्। तथा सति जलत्वपृथिवीत्वादिना संकरप्रसङ्गात। p. 158

hot nor cool, वायु-- possesses touch like that of पृथिवी. If anybody asks how is it that a slab of stone or wind sometimes[1] possesses touch and is yet earthy, the तार्किक aptly accounts for it, saying that there are watery particles present therein.[2] Again the solid form of snow and hail should not make us believe that they are earthy. Because, says the तार्किक, their solid form is merely a भ्रम[3].

The definition शीतस्पर्शवत्य: is to be interpreted with the same modification as गन्धवती in the definition of पृथिवी i. e. शीतस्पर्शवत्यः = शीतस्पर्शसमवायिकारणम् ।

शरीरं वरुणलोके:-- cp. दिनकरी on the मुक्तावली, तत्रच श्रुतिरेव प्रमाणम् । मुक्तावली specially says that the bodies in वरुणलोक are अयोनिज. दिनकरी supplements by saying that the limbs of the body may be पार्थिव.

The इन्द्रिय is what gives us taste of things we eat and drink and what is situated on the tip of the tongue-not the tongue itself which is perceived and belongs to the body (शरीर). Being इन्द्रिय it is supersensuous. Made of water, it possesses taste and othar qualities of water but in an unmanifest form (अनुद्भूत रूप).

Water possesses the following qualities:—

(1) White colour, (2) Sweet Taste, (3) Cool touch, (4) Viscidity (स्नेह), (5) Natural fluidity. (सांसिद्धिक द्रवत्व).

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1 शीतं शिलातलमित्यादौ जलसम्बन्धादेव शीतस्पर्शभानम् —त. दी.

2 वाय्वादौ कदाचिच्छीतस्पर्शोपलब्धिः औपाधिकी--वाक्यवृत्ति, तर्कसंग्रह

3 न च हिमकरकयोः कठिनत्वात्पार्थिवत्वमिति वाच्यम् ,... अदृष्टविशेषेण द्रवत्वप्रतिरोधात् करकायाः काठिन्यप्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तित्वात् ।

—मुक्तावली.

If the water of the Jumna is blue, it is due to the colour of the of bed the of river which is earthy. When we find some water sour that is due to the mixture of particles that are not watery. When we get cool touch from sandal paste it is due, says the तार्किक, to the watery element in sandal[1].

१२ तेजस्.

Tr.—Light is what possesses hot touch by intimate relation. It is of two kinds: (1) permanent and (2) impermanent. The permanent is of the form of atoms. The impermanent is of the form of products. Again, it is of three kinds, being divided into body, the sense-organ, and the object (of sense). The body is (what belongs to souls) in the solar world. The sense is that with which colour is perceived, the sight situated on the top of the black pupil. The object is fourfold. (1) Earthy, (2) Celestial, (3) Gastric or belonging to stomach and (4) Mineral. The Earthy consists of fire and other kindred (fiery) objects. The Celestial is what is fed by water, such as lightning. The Gastric is the cause of digestion of things eaten. The mineral is gold and similar bright metals.

The definition with वत् is to be interpreted like the definitions of पृथ्वी and आपः.

Hot touch is a quality peculiar to तेजः. The touch of पृथिवी and वायु is अनुष्णाशीत; that of अप्, शीत. आकाश, काल, दिक्, आत्मा and मनः have no touch at all, the first four because they are all-pervading, the

1 Cp. मुक्तावली (p. 168)

last because it is atomic. How is the moon proverbially cool in touch? The earthy touch has suppressed her own touch, replies the तार्किक. $

नित्या अनित्याच.

Cp. notes on the division of पृथिवी. शरीर of तेजस is अयोनिज says the मुक्तावली.

आदित्यलोके, वरुणलोके etc.— These are mere assumptions of the तार्किक to account for existence of bodies parallel to earthy ones. When you admit the body to be composed of one single element you must prove existence of bodies exclusively watery (अप्), lustrous, (तेजस) and aerial (वायु). As we do not come accross such bodies on earth, we can well imagine their existence in the respective worlds of वरुण, आदित्य and वायु, says the तार्किक.

The Vedantist view about the formation of the body does not plunge them into this absurdity. They say that no body is made up of any one element exclusively. It must be composed of all elements, (five or three) with one element in preponderance which gives its name to the product. Thus a so-called earthy body will consist of ½ earth, ⅛ air, ⅛ water, ⅛ light, and ⅛ ether. If there are watery products like river etc they also must be constituted according to this principle. This assumption of पञ्चीकरण or (त्रिवृत्करण) does not force them to assume bodies in वरुणलोक etc.

विषयश्चतुर्विधः--(1) भौम fire which we use daily; आदि includes other lustre such as that of the fire-fly or certain light-emitting fish.

$ स्वर्णचंद्रकिरणादौ तृणस्पर्शः पार्थिवादिस्पर्शेनाभिभूतः -वाक्यवृत्ति, तर्कसंग्रह

(2) दिव्य:--the lightning, the luminous nature of the rainbow etc. which (lustres) are fed by water. Whether सूर्य and other luminous bodies are subsumed. under this head is doubtful. Because they are not अबिन्धन. जिनवर्धनसूरि commenting on the सप्तपदार्थी says दिवि गगने भव: दिव्य: स च सूराविद्युदादि: ।

If we do not admit the Sun and other luminous bodies under दिव्य where are we to relegate them? Nowhere else. In view of this fact the definition by अन्नंभट्ट of दिव्य as अबिन्धन is too limited.

(3) औदर्य:-- The जठराग्नि which enables us to digest what we have eaten.

(4) आकरज:-The minerals like gold, silver which are bright are also supposed by the तार्किक to be तैजस. Controversy about these minerals dates as far as back कणाद§ who refers to their accidental fluidity, in 2.1.7.

Why is gold (as also other metals) regarded तैजस ?

To prove that सुवर्ण is तैजस (light) the तार्किकs argue thus:—‡.

(5) सुवर्ण is a द्रव्य because in it we have the qualities of yellow (पीत) colour and touch. Under which of the nine द्रव्यs can it be subsumed ?

It cannot be either वायु or आकाश or काल or दिक् or आत्मा or मनस् because all of these are without colour while सुवर्ण possesses colour.

Can it be पृथिवी then? No, says the तार्किक. For, he has set up a test to determine whether a thing is

§ वै. सू. 2. 1. 7 त्रपुसीसलोहरजतसुवर्णानामग्निसंयोगाद्द्रवत्वमद्भि:

‡ cp. अग्नेरपत्यं प्रथमं हिरण्यं । इत्यागम: - -दिनकरी. [सामान्यम् ।

पार्थिव or not. He has seen पार्थिव things like ghee melted and again restored to their solid form by the application of intense heat. If, on occasions, he has found that पार्थिव things like ghee could not regain their solid form even on the application of intense heat, he has examined the case and concluded that there is some counteracting agent like water present which comes in the way of the restoration of soldity. This phenomenon has enabled him to deduce that all earthy things being melted are restored to the solid form by the application of intense heat provided there is no counteracting agent like water present.

The तार्किक applies the test to सुवर्ण. He finds that molten सुवर्ण can, by no amount of intense heat, be restored back to its original solidity.* He is sure there is no प्रतिबन्धक to account for this phenomenon So it cannot be पार्थिव, he concludes.

Can it be अप् then ? No, says the तार्किक. अप् possesses fluidity that is natural (सांसिद्धिक) and not accidental (नैमित्तिक produced by some extraneous agency like heat). The fluidity of सुवर्ण is not natural but accidental being produced by the application of heat. Therefore सुवर्ण cannot be अप्.

Naturally सुवर्ण must come under तेजः, the only substance remaning with which, the तार्किक thinks, it has affinity in point of lustre.

ननु सुवर्णस्य तैजसत्वे किं मानमिति चेत् । न । सुवर्णं तैजसं असति प्रतिबन्धकेऽत्यन्तानलसंयोगेऽसत्यपि अनुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पृथिवी । –मुक्तावली Cp. तर्कदीपिका.

Then a question arises, if सुवर्ण is तेज: how is it that it does not possess the hot touch or the brilliant white colour that are supposed to be peculiar characteristics of तेज:. The तार्किक brushes aside this objection by saying that these peculiar qualities are there but are imperceptible because suppressed by the stronger qualities viz. (अनुष्णाशीत) touch and yellow colour of earth mixed therewith.[1]

Needless to say the argument is defective and typical of the way in which the तार्किकs lightly brush aside objections that demanded a close scrutiny. If the absence of the peculiar qualities is explained away by having recourse to the make—shift of the theory of suppression of qualities by another substance why should we not say that सुवर्ण is पृथिवी or any other substance, with some counteracting agent coming in the way of the manifestation of qualities ? Again, the very presumption that its fluidity cannot be destroyed has been radically shaken by modern physics which proves how any substance can be reduced to either of the three conditions, (1) solid (2) liquid or (3) gaseous.

But we must make allowance for the yet undeveloped experimental sciences in those early days and admit that the value of the argument lies not so much in the soundness of the conclusion as in its boldness of attempt to tackle a knotty problem with as much precision as could be commanded then. The तार्किकs could not think of that intense heat, as we can, now, which could reduce any substance to any of the three states.

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१ Cp. तर्कदीपिका.

The view of the neo-तार्किक s that सुवर्ण is पार्थिव is more accurate. ¶

The following are the विशेषगुण s of तेजस:—

(1) Hot touch (उष्णःस्पर्शः) (2) Bright white colour (शुक्ल भास्वर) (3) accidental fluidity (नैमित्तिक द्रवत्व)

As in the case of अप्, the इन्द्रिय, sight—not the eye—which is supersensuous possesses these qualities in an unmanifest form because it is also made up of तेजः.

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१३ वायु.

Tr.—Air is devoid of colour but possesses touch. It is of two kinds viz. (1) Permanent. and (2) Impermanent. The Permanent is in the form of atoms The Impermanent is in the form of products. Again it is threefold according to its division into the body, the sense—organ, and the object of sense. The body is (what pertains to souls) in the world of वायु. *The sense-organ is what enables us to apprehend touch, the sense of touch* (त्वक्) *extending over the entire body. The object is the wind that is the cause of the shaking of trees etc. Vital breath is air that permeates through the body. Though one, it receives names like* प्राण, अपान *and others owing to the various limiting adjuncts*

¶ नवीनास्तु सुवर्णं पार्थिवमेव पीतं सुवर्णं द्रुतमिति साक्षात्सम्बन्धेन द्रवत्वप्रतीतेर्भ्रमत्वायोगात् द्रुतं द्रुततरमिति प्रतीतेर्द्रवत्वस्याप्यत्यन्तोच्छेदात् पृथिवीत्वस्य पीतरूपसमवायिकारणत्वावच्छेदकत्वाद्रुपनाशे तादात्म्येन स्वर्णस्य विरोधित्वाच्च न पीतरूपनाश इति वदन्ति।

— दिनकरी on the मुक्तावली.

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्: —

आकाश, काल, दिक्, आत्मा, and मन:, are रूपरहित but they do not possess स्पर्श. पृथ्वी, अप्, तेज:, are स्पर्शवत् but they are not रूपरहित. So रूपरहितस्पर्शवान् is a correct definition of वायु. The वत् in the definition is to be interpreted like the वत् in the definition of पृथ्वी.

नित्याअनित्या च: —

Cp The division of पृथ्वी, अप्, तेज: and the notes thereon.

About वायवीय शरीर the मुक्तावली says, शरीरमयोनिजं पिशाचादीनाम्[1] It should be seen that it is not the skin that is the इन्द्रिय but the peculiar agency that enables us to apprehend touch. It is spread all over the body that is why we feel the touch in any part of the body.

विषयो....वायु:....वायु here means 'breezes' 'wind' शरीरान्त:संचारी....प्राण:-some[2] hold that प्राण is the fourth variety of अनित्यवायु; but अन्नंभट्ट, like many others,[3] includes it under विषय. He says that it is वायु inside the body and as such not substantially different from the वृक्षादिकम्पजनक वायु.

1 Commentators from प्रशस्तपाद have felt that the body must consist of some mixture at least of other elements; merely watery body or aerial body is not possible, according to them. Cp. पार्थिवावयवोपष्टम्भाच्चोपभोगसमर्थम्। —प्र. भाष्य. which is exactly repeated in the मुक्तावली.

2 Cp. प्रशस्तपाद, for instance, तत्र कार्यलक्षणश्चतुर्विध:शरीरमिन्द्रियं विषय: प्राण इति। (p. 144)
शिवादित्य (सप्तपदार्थी) also holds the same view.

3 Cp. मुक्तावली.

स च एकोऽप्युपाधिभेदात्:....संज्ञां लभते

What is meant is that (the 5 प्राणs). अपान, व्यान c. are only प्राण with different limiting adjuncts पाधि:). The limiting adjuncts are the different rts of the body through which the vital breath sses and receives different names accordingly.

The following verse gives the five different mes the प्राण receives as it passes through five fferent parts of the body.

हृदि प्राणः गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिमण्डले
उदानः कण्ठदेशे स्याद्व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः। ‡

वायु *perceived by direct perception or inferred?*

The तर्कदीपिका enters upon a discussion as regards the प्रमाण by which वायु is known. There are vo views on this question.

The old तार्किकs (प्राञ्चः) hold that वायु is known y inference only. According to them nothing can e known by direct perception (प्रत्यक्ष) that does not ossess manifest colour. (उद्भूतरूप). They thus reduce यक्ष to चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष. Though वायु possesses स्पर्श that by self is not capable of making it known by direct erception in the absence of रूप. Therefore the xistence of वायु is inferrible only, (अनुमानविषय) according to the old school.

The neo- तार्किकs (नवीनs) hold a view that is nore reasonable. They do not think that प्रत्यक्ष

‡ वेदान्तसार gives another system of प्राणs with different names, based on difference of functions (सुबोधिनी attributes the system to कापिलमत) केचित् तु नागकूर्मकृकलदेवदत्तधनञ्जयाख्याः पञ्चान्ये वायवः सन्तीति वदन्ति। तत्र नागः उद्गिरणकरः। कूर्मः उन्मीलनकरः। कृकलः क्षुत्करः। देवदत्तो जृम्भणकरः। धनञ्जयः पोषणकरः। —वे. सा. १३.

requires उद्भूतरूप to make the object perceptible. In other words, they do not limit the term प्रत्यक्ष to चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष. Even manifest touch or manifest smell or manifest taste or manifest sound is by itself able to make its substratum (आश्रय) प्रत्यक्षविषय, they say. Thus वायु because it possessses manifest touch is प्रत्यक्षविषय, according to this school.

अन्नंभट्ट following the old school holds that वायु is अनुमेय only.

Creation and destruction of the world:

तर्कदीपिका incidentally details out the process of creation and destruction of the world.

When God wills to create, action is produced in the atoms of (पृथ्वी, अप्, तेज: and वायु) two of which (atoms) combine to form a द्व्यणुक; three द्व्यणुकs a त्र्यणुक. Four त्र्यणुकs form a चतुरणु. And in this way the products are formed, small and big.

The Old and the New तार्किकs agree in their views so far as the process of creation goes. But they differ vitally in their views respecting the process of destructiou.

According to the old school ofthe तार्किकs(सम्प्रदाय), destruction in the case of all products excepting द्व्यणुकs follows upon the destruction of the constituent parts (समवायिकारणनाश=अवयवनाश). Thus let us suppose that a चतुरणुक is in the process of destruction. According to this view the त्र्यणुकs will be destroyed *first* and *then* the चतुरणुक. They thus admit that the creation and destruction proceed in the same order.

In the case of द्व्यणुक they could not say that its destruction is preceded by the destruction of its constituent parts (समवायिकारण), because the समवायिकारण of द्व्यणुकs is अणुs which are indestructible. Therefore they said that the destruction of द्व्यणुकs follows upon the destruction of their असमवायिकारण. (*viz* संयोग between the two अणुs.)

The weak point in this view lies in its assumption that creation and destruction proceed in the same order. To revert to the instance of चतुरणुक, if त्र्यणुकs are destroyed first, where can the चतुरणुक be in the interval between its destruction and that of the त्र्यणुकs ? If we take off the pillars can we suppose that the roof can stand even for a moment ?

To obviate this difficulty the neo-तार्किकs held that the products are destroyed by the destruction of the असमवायिकारण *viz.* संयोग between the अवयवs, in all cases. While the old school admitted असमवायि-कारणनाश only in the case of द्व्यणुकनाश, the new school admitted it in all cases of destruction. Thus if a चतुरणुक is to be destroyed, it will be destroyed by the destruction of the ***conjunction*** between the त्र्यणुकs which remain intact. They thus admit that the creation and destruction proceed in the opposite order. First चतुरणुक will be destroyed and then त्र्यणुक and so on. Needless to say, this view is more reasonable than the first.

अन्नंभट्ट does not clearly show which view he follows though his use of the terms इति सम्प्रदायः may be significant of his bias in the direction of the

old school which he faithfully follows in other respects. § (see Intro.)

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१४ आकाश.

Tr.— Ether is that substance which has sound for its special quality. And it is one all-pervading and eternal.

शब्दगुणम्ः— While defining पृथिवी, अप्, etc. the word गुण was not explicitly stated in the definition cp. गन्धवती not गन्धगुणवती. Why should the word गुण be inserted in the definition of आकाश? Some say that the word गुण has been introduced to refute the view of the भाट्टमीमांसकs who hold that शब्द is a द्रव्य. But this view had been already refuted when शब्द was admitted into the list of गुणs. So the explanation by others that the word गुण has been inserted to show that it is the exclusive quality of आकाश, not shared by any other द्रव्य, appears preferable.

The Existence of आकाश *proved.:*-- That sound is a quality is proved by the inference:--शब्दो गुणः अनित्यत्वे सति एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यजातीयत्वात् । रूपवत् ।

§ शंकर's refutation of the system gives rise to the view that the originators of the system attributed creation and destruction to the अदृष्ट and not to God. It is true, कणाद gives undue prominence to अदृष्ट in many cases. But whether he was inclined to eliminate God altogether is questionable, in view of the authority he claims for the Vedas and his adherence to the orthodox faith in inculcating आश्रमs, यज्ञs etc. At best, we could say he could-not bring about a happy compromise between अदृष्ट and ईश्वर. Sometimes the line of demarcation between अदृष्ट & ईश्वर is too faint.

(According to the तार्किकs, शब्द is अनित्य and श्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्य and hence must be a गुण like रूप which is अनित्य as residing in अनित्य objects and चक्षुरिन्द्रियग्राह्य).

As शब्द is a गुण it requires some द्रव्य as its आश्रय. This cannot be पृथ्वी or अप् or तेज: or वायु because first, their qualities are produced by similar qualities of their parts while शब्द or sound is not so produced. What is meant is this. Supposing we have a lump of clay five lbs. in weight, we find that its smell is an aggregate of the smell of the parts. Technically such qnalities are called कारणगुणपूर्वक, (produced by the qualities of the cause i. e. the parts). But sound is not कारणगुणपूर्वक. I cannot lay my finger on a portion of the full string of a lute and say that portion has given a *part* of the sound produced on the lute when I play on it. I cannot put my finger on a part of a drum and say this part has given this much portion of the total sound produced by the drum. In other words sound is अकारणगुणपूर्वक. Secondly, the qualities of पृथ्वी, अप्, तेज: and वायु, are never श्रोत्रग्राह्य while शब्द is श्रोत्रग्राह्य.

शब्द cannot be the quality of काल and दिक् which do not possess particular qualities (विशेषगुणs) while शब्द is a विशेषगुण.

It cannot be the quality of मन: because it is perceptible while मन: being atomic, its qualities must be supersensuous.

Neither can it be the quality of आत्मन् because शब्द is बहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्य (cognised by the outer senses) while the qualities of आत्मन् are only मनोग्राह्य (cognised by the mind).

This leads to the admission of a ninth द्रव्य as the substratum of शब्द[1].

तच्चैक विभु नित्यं च:— विभु is an all--pervading substance (सर्वमूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगि) incapable of action. विभुद्रव्यs are always नित्य. आकाश, काल, दिक्, and आत्मन् are विभु, while पृथ्वी, अप्, तेजः, वायु and मनः are मूर्त, corporeal and capable of action. एकः- usages like घटाकाश, मठाकाश need not make us believe that they are different आकाशs. For it is only the different limiting adjuncts घट, मठ etc. that are responsible for the usage, आकाश being one only.

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१५ काल.

Tr.—Time is the special instrumental cause of usages like 'This is past.' And it is one, all--pervading and eternal.

It is Time that makes us speak of things as past (अतीत) and present and future. (आदि = वर्तमान & अनागत) Time is the general cause (साधारणनिमित्तकारण) of all effects; because whatever thing comes into existence is limited by time as it is by space (दिक्) and the agency of ईश्वर which also are the साधारणनिमित्तकारणs of things coming into existence. Time is, however, the exclusive cause (हेतु = विशेषकारण) of usages like 'this is past' and 'that is present[2].'

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1 It should been seen that acc. to the neo.--तार्किकs, शब्द is ईश्वर's विशेषगुण Cp. दिनकरी—नव्यास्तु शब्दनिमित्तकारणत्वेन क्लृप्तस्येश्वरस्यैव शब्दसमवायिकारणत्वम् ।
Now, atmosphere is regarded as the medium conveying sound.

2 Note that the neo.-तार्किकs identified दिक् and काल with ईश्वर or जीव Cp. दिनकरीः—अत्र नव्या ईश्वरस्य दिक्कालरूपत्वं तत्तज्जीवस्य वा ।

एको विभुर्नित्यश्च:-See आकाश. When we hear of past time, present time etc. it is not the time that varies but the conjunction of the particular object with the एकविभुद्रव्य, काल.

१६ दिक्.

Tr.—Space is the special instrumental cause of usages like the west etc.

Like time space is the साधारणनिमित्तकारण of all things coming into existence, because everything is born in space. It is the विशेषकारण, however, of usages regarding the east, west etc.

एका, नित्या, विभ्वी च:-See आकाश and काल. When we hear of the पूर्वा दिक् and the उत्तरा दिक् we should not suppose that दिक्s are many; it is she connections of several things with one दिक् that cause the difference in the designation of quarters.$

दिक् and आकाश distinguished. (1) आकाश is a भूतद्रव्य, दिक् not so.(2) आकाश is समवायिकारण of शब्द which is a quality exclusively abiding in it; while दिक् is साधारणनिमित्तकारण and never the समवायिकारण of anything, and has no special quality.

१७ आत्मन्

Tr. Soul is the substance in which knowledge abides by intimate relation It is of two kinds: (1)

$ Cp. मुक्तावली — ननु यद्येकैव दिक् तदा प्राचीप्रतीच्यादिव्यवहार: कथमुपपद्यत इत्याह ।... यत्पुरुषस्योदयगिरिसन्निहिता या दिक् सा तत्पुरुषस्य प्राची । एवमुदयगिरिव्यवहिता या दिक् सा प्रतीची । सर्वेषामेव वर्षाणां मेरुरुत्तरत: स्थित इति नियमात् ।

the Highest soul and the Individual soul. Then the Highest soul is the ruler (ईश्वर), one only and destitute of pleasure, pain or similar feelings. The individual soul is different for every body, all-pervading and eternal.

ज्ञानाधिकरणम्-ज्ञानसमवायिकारणम् because ज्ञान abides in आत्मन् only. आत्मन् is अनुमेय only like आकाश, काल, मन: and the नित्य (i. e. अणु) portions of पृथ्वी, अप्, तेज: and वायु.

आत्मन् is divided into two classes (1) जीवात्मन् and (2) परमात्मन्. जीवात्मन्s are the souls of individual beings and are infinite in number. The परमात्मन् God is one only. Both are विभु, all-pervading. Every आत्मन् has मनस्. The qualities of the soul are perceived by the mind only.

The existence of जीवात्मन् *is proved thus in the* मुक्तावली.

वास्यादीनां छिदादिकरणानां कर्तारमन्तरेण फलानुपधानं दृष्टं एवं चक्षुरादीनां ज्ञानकारणानामपि फलोपधानं कर्तारमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते इत्यतिरिक्तः कर्ता कल्प्यते ।

If I find, in some place, an axe and a log of wood, I shall be quite logical if I were to infer therefrom that there must be some wood-cutter who makes use of the axe to lop off the wooden log. Similarly corresponding to the axe and the log we find the various senses (इंद्रियs) and their particular objects (e. g. the घ्राणेंद्रिय and the गन्ध of the पुष्प). So we shall be quite right in inferring some agent who makes use of these. This agent is the जीवात्मन्.

The तार्किकs, unlike the वेदान्तिन्s, whose basic doctrine is तत्त्वमसि, hold that the जीवात्मन्s are different from the परमात्मन्. ‡

‡ Cp. कणाद III 2. 19-20

Many erroneous notions exist as regards the nature of the जीवात्मन्. The तर्कदीपिका refers to and repudiates two. (1) Some hold the जीव to be identical with the body. This assumption will make the जीव as much liable to change as the body. Thus the जीव of देवदत्त the youth will be different from that of देवदत्त the old man which is absurd. Again, a wcunded soldier's Soul will be *less* than what it was before he got wounded. And the soul will perish as soon as the body perishes. All these consequences revolt against the immutability and indestructibility of the soul. (cp.गीता, अच्छेद्योऽयमदाह्योऽयम्)

Some hold that the senses (इन्द्रियाणि) are individual souls. Then the soul that sees will be different from the one that hears and so on. This will make a cognitiou, presupposing a single soul, of the type, 'I who saw, hear now,' impossible, the two souls being different according to this theory.

Neither should it be supposed that all इन्द्रियs are collectively the soul. For, if one इन्द्रिय were to be destroyed, the soul will be maimed to that extent. Milton's soul after he became blind would be different from what it was before.

मुक्तावली[2] shows how mind also cannot be the soul. Mind being अतीन्द्रिय, its qualities will be also अतीन्द्रिय. So, सुख, दुःख etc, the qualities of the soul will be अतीन्द्रिय, while we find that they are not so, being actually experienced.

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1 Cp. the विशेषाध्यारोपन्याय in the वेदान्तसार where no less than nine views are referred to.

2 मुक्तावली—मनसोऽणुत्वात् प्रत्यक्षे महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वात् मनसि ज्ञानसुखादि-सत्त्वे तत्प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । see मुक्तावली for other views.

The Inference to prove the existence of ईश्वर.

The तर्कदीपिका gives the following inference to prove the existence of ईश्वर.

क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यम् । कार्यत्वात् । घटवत् ।

As the earth etc. are products they presuppose some intelligent agent who produced them. And this agent is God who must be commanding omniscience and omnipotence to be responsible for this Universe.

Though both are आत्मन्s, the former is the ruler, the latter is the ruled, (2) the former is सर्वज्ञ, the latter किञ्चिज्ज्ञ (3) The former is not subject to अदृष्ट (धर्म and अधर्म) and is always मुक्त, the latter is so subject resulting in his bondage. (4) The former does not possess the qualities of सुख, दुःख, द्वेष the latter does. (सुख also pins the self to संसार).§

ईश्वर and जीवात्मन्

The size of आत्मन्. (whether जीवात्मन् or परमात्मन्)

An object can be either atomic (अणु) or of a medium size मध्यमपरिमाण or all-pervading. (विभु).

आत्मन् cannot be atomic. If it were atomic its qualities ज्ञान, सुख etc. would be अतीन्द्रिय (supersensuous). But they are not so, therefore, आत्मन् is not atomic.

Nor can it be of medium size. In that case it must be either of the size of the body or greater or smaller than it. If it is assumed to be of the size of the body soul will change as the body changes from youth to old age, a conclusion not desirable. If it is smaller than the body some experiences of the body will not be cognised by the soul which is never the case. If bigger, some experiences

§ Some hold that ईश्वर possesses शरीर, others not.

of the soul will be enjoyed outside the body which isthe भोगायतन and as such must be the the medium of all experiences.

Therefore, the only alternative left is to assume that आत्मन् is विभु, all-pervading.

बुद्धि, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा द्वेष, प्रयत्न, धर्म, अधर्म भावनासंस्कार are विशेषगुणs of जीवात्मन्; बुद्धि (नित्य), इच्छा, and प्रयत्न are the विशेषगुणs of परमात्मन्.

सुखदु:खादिरहितः—आदि includes धर्म, अधर्म etc.

For the discussion of the alleged Atheism of the वैशेषिकs and the नैयायिकs (see the Intro.)

१८ मनस्.

Tr. Mind is the means to the cognition of pleasure etc. Being assigned to every soul minds are infinite in number, atomic and permanent.

Mind, according to the तार्किकs, performs a double function. First, it is accessory to the बहिरिन्द्रियs or external senses like चक्षुः and श्रोत्र, the perceptions of which are transmitted by the mind to the soul. (cp. आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन). Secondly it is the exclusive organ which perceives सुख, दुःख, इच्छा etc, and is, therefore, defined as सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनम्. In the first case, मनः acts as a helper to the बहिरिन्द्रियs. In the second it acts as an independent इन्द्रिय with specific objects of its own.

Mind is atomic (परमाणुत्वं):—

The तर्कदीपिका sets out an argument to prove how मनः is atomic as against the मीमांसक view that it is all--pervading.

If the mind were all—pervading (विभु) it will never be in contact with the self which is also all—pervading. Because the rule is that two विभु things cannot be conjoined. And absence of contact with the soul will result in an absence of cognitions (ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसंगात्).

Even if we were to admit that two विभु things are conjoined, their conjunction will be eternal, never ending, because no action producing disjunction is possible in the case of the विभुद्रव्यs which are, as a rule, क्रियारहित. And if the supposed विभु mind were to be in conjunction with the विभु आत्मन्, there will be no end to their conjunction and consequently no end to cognitions. We shall then get cognitions even in deep sleep. Because the विभु mind, even after it enters the पुरीतत् vein as it is supposed to do in deep sleep, will have some part of it outside the पुरीतत्, and this part will be in conjunction with the विभु आत्मन् outside the पुरीतत and thus even in deep sleep there will be cognitions necessarily resulting from आत्ममन:संयोग. As this is against the very nature of सुषुप्ति in which cognitions are conspicuously absent (सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्। न किञ्चिद्वेदिषम्.।) मनस् cannot be admitted to be विभु. The तार्किक says that the atomic mind severs its conjunction with the self when it enters the पुरीतत् in which soul is conspicuous by its absence and thus deep sleep devoid of cognitions is induced.*

The argument is defective particularly in assuming that आत्मन् though विभु does not pervade

* In स्वप्नावस्था the mind is situated on the border of पुरीतत् and the outer portion.

the पुरीतत् also, as it ought to do because a विभुद्रव्य is joined to all corporeal objects. Some तार्किकs seek to remove this defect by saying that in पुरितत् also आत्मन् does pervade. But no perception is caused because पुरीतत् is devoid of त्वगिन्द्रिय,¶ say they.

Some general Remarks.

It is evident that since मनस् is not included under any of the four atomic भूतs (पृथ्वी, अप्, तेज: and वायु) the stuff of which it is made is, according to the तार्किकs, quite different from them as also from आकाश, काल, दिक् and आत्मा that are non-atomic or विभु. Minds being atomic must be नित्य, the rule being that अणुद्रव्यs are नित्य and thus the minds of the selves will not perish even in प्रलय. That is why the वासनाs of the previous existence persist in this existence also.

Every आत्मन् has a mind which will belong to it forever. On account of the different minds different souls get different cognitions at the same moment. As each आत्मन् possesses one mind, and as the आत्मन्s are अनंत, minds also are अनंत. (infinite in number).

१९ रूप.

Tr. Colour is the quality that is perceived by the eye only. It is of seven kinds, white, blue, yellow, red, green, tawny and variegated. It abides in Earth, Water and Light Then, seven varieties can abide in Earth; in Water abides colour that is non-brilliant and white. And the brilliant white colour abides in Light.

¶ सुषुप्तौ न किञ्चिदपि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । सुषुप्तिकाले पुरीतति त्वगिन्द्रियाभावेन तत्रस्थितमनसस्त्वक्संयोगासम्भवात् । –रामरुद्री cited in न्यायकोश.

चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्य—Because संख्या, संयोग, विभाग and पृथक्त्व are चक्षुर्ग्राह्य but not चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्य because they can be cognised by the त्वगिन्द्रिय also.

गुणः The जाति, रूपत्व also is चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्य, the rule being that जाति is cognised by the same इन्द्रिय as व्यक्ति. To exclude रूपत्वजाति the word गुण has been inserted. [The student should note that रूप is a गुण which is a different पदार्थ from रूपत्व which is सामान्य, a different पदार्थ.]

चित्ररूप:—One of the seven varieties of रूप is चित्ररूप, which means the variegated colour such as we find in the case of a variegated feather of a peacock or the striped skin of a zebra or a tiger. Whatever substance possesses colours more than one will be described as चित्ररूपिन् by the तार्किक.

The तर्कदीपिका develops the curiously subtle argument for accepting चित्ररूप which may be elucidated in the following way.

If I am able to perceive an object with my eye, I do so because the object possesses a manifest colour, (उद्भूतरूप), says the तार्किक. In other words, उद्भूतरूपवत्त्व is a necessary condition for the ocular perception of an object and the रूप pervades the whole of the abode (व्याप्यवृत्ति) and not a part only like संयोग. Thus if I see a white lotus it is because the lotus possesses white colour which persists throughout the lotus; if I see the red cloth it is because it possesses the red colour throughout. Similarly when I see a rainbow or a spotted deer I do so because each of them possesses a colour that pervades throughout. What colour can it be? I cannot say that it is रक्त or कपिश or any of the

six varieties because I find that रक्त or कपिश or any of the six does not pervade the whole of the adode (व्याप्यवृत्ति) as it ought to. So I must admit a colour which is व्याप्यवृत्ति and this is the चित्ररूप of the तार्किकs.[1]

There could have been another solution of the difficulty. I could have said that the rainbow consists of parts each possessing one colour(रूपवत्समवेत) But this would have been a complex way of explaining a thing which can be more simply explained by admitting चित्ररूप. It is simpler to say that इंद्रधनुः is perceptible because it possesses चित्ररूप than to say that it is perceptible because it is रूपवत्समवेत.[2]

All colours are found in पार्थिव objects.

Note the peculiar theory of the तार्किकs regarding the colour of water which is now supposed to be colourless. The तार्किकs hold that it is non-brilliant white. The तार्किकs believes that the रूप is bright white in तेजः.

वायु, आकाश, काल, दिक्, आत्मा and मनः, do not possess रूप at all.

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२० रस.

Tr. Taste is the quality that can be apprehended by the sense of taste. And it is of six kinds:—(1) sweet, (2) sour, (3) saline, (4) pungent (कटु), (5) astringent and (6) bitter (तिक्त). It abides in Earth

1 कणाद, as for as I know, does not refer to चित्ररूप. Even प्रशस्तपाद does not admit it. It is श्रीधर who refers to it first in his न्यायकन्दली: Cp. प्र. भा. न्या. क. p. 30.

2 The neo-तार्किकs (नव्यs) refuse to admit रूप as व्याप्यवृत्ति, thus doing away with the necessity of admitting चित्ररूप. Cp. मुक्तावली p. 449.

and Water. The six varieties are found in Earth. In Water only the sweet taste is found.

The word गुण: in the definition excludes रसत्वजाति cp. the definition of रूप.

Sweet taste is such as is found in a ripe mango, or, in a tame form in fresh water; sour taste is such as is found in sour grapes; saline is the taste of salt; pungent is found in substances like chilly; astringent taste is found in substances like the skin of the बाभळ (tree); bitter taste is found in quinine and kindred substances.

Note that चित्ररस is not admitted because we do not get such a taste. If we experience several tastes of the same substance we do so not simultaneously but one after the other‡.

२१ गन्ध.

Tr. Smell is the quality apprehended by the sense of smell. And it is of two kinds: (1) fragrant, and (2) non–fragrant. It abides in Earth exclusively.

For the propriety of the word गुण in the definition see under रूप and रस. चित्रगन्ध is not admitted, because in a substance where both सुरभि and असुरभि गन्धs are present one is bound to suppress the other and so we apprehend only सुरभि or असुरभि गन्ध. (cp. the दीपिका on पृथ्वी section). गन्ध is a quality peculiar to Earth alone. That is why Earth is defined as गन्धवती. If rose-water possesses smell, it is due to the presence of earthy particles therein.

‡ शिवादित्य admits चित्ररस in his सप्तपदार्थी.

२२ स्पर्श.

Tr. Touch is the quality that is apprehended only (मात्र) by the sense of touch. And it is of three kinds: (1) cool, (2) hot, and (3) temperate. It subsists in Earth, Water, Light and Air. Of these, in water the cool touch is found; in light, the hot one. The temperate touch is found in Earth and Air.

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्य:—The word मात्र excludes गुण like संख्या, संयोग, विभाग which are त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्य and also चक्षुर्ग्राह्य. I can *feel two* mangoes as much as I can see them. I can feel the संयोग of the table and the book and also see it.

शीतो जले:—If water is hot sometimes it is due to तेज:संयोग.

If in gold which is तेज: I do not feel the hot touch it is because the touch is suppressed by the touch of earth mixed with gold.

अनुष्णाशीत:—If we feel the शीतस्पर्श in the case of a slab of stone it is due जलसंयोग. If we feel the breeze from the Jumna to be cool it is also due to जलसंयोग.

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२३ नित्यत्व AND अनित्यत्व OF रूप, रस, गन्ध AND स्पर्श.

Tr. The four qualities viz. Colour, (2) taste (3) smell and (4) touch as abiding in Earth are impermanent being produced by the application of of heat (पाक). As abiding in the rest they are not produced by the application of heat and are per-

manent or impermanent. As abiding in permanent substances they are permanent and impermanent as abiding in impermanent substances.

What is meant is this.

रूप, रस, गन्ध, and स्पर्श are eternal as abiding in the atoms of अप्, तेजः, and वायु; and non-eternal as abiding in the products (कार्यरूप) of the atoms of these substances. To take the instance of तेजः, an atom of तेजः will *naturally* possess रूप; रस, गन्ध, and स्पर्श which are as imperishable as the atoms themselves. A product of तेजः will possess these qualities but the product being अनित्य the qualities abiding in it will be also अनित्य lasting only so long as the product lasts.

The case of पृथ्वी is different. The atoms of पृथ्वी do not *naturally* possess these qualities which are produced in them by the application of heat. (पाक = तेजःसंयोग) and hence अनित्य. When these qualities are अनित्य as abiding in पार्थिव atoms, needless to say they will be अनित्य as abiding in पार्थिव products.*

पीलुपाकवादिन्*s* *and* पिठरपाकवादिन्*s*. (See Intro.) Of the several points in which a वैशेषिक is supposed to differ from a नैयायिक this is one. In explaining the change of colour caused in a black jar when it is baked the two schools resort to two theories. The वैशेषिकs who are पीलुपाकवादिन्s say that by the पाक (तेजःसंयोग) the jar is dissolved into its constituent atoms (पीलु), which, then assume a red colour and are conjoined again into the red jar. Against

* कणाद वै. सू. 7. 1. 6. कारणगुणपूर्वकाः पृथिव्यां पाकजाः.

these, the नैयायिकs who are पिठरपाकवादिन्s hold that the whole jar (पिठर) changes its colour by the baking without being dissolved into atoms.

The attitude of the नैयायिकs is more reasonable because an acceptance of the view of the वैशेषिकs will not account for the *sameness* of the jar before and after baking. अन्नंभट्ट seems to hold the of view the वैशेषिकs.

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२४ संख्या.

Tr. Number is the peculiar cause of usages relating to oneness and the like. It subsists in all the nine substances ranging from one to the highest number (परार्ध). *Oneness is eternal and non-eternal. As abiding in eternal objects it is eternal and non-eternal as abiding in non-eternal objects. Duality and other numbers are impermanent in all instances.*

एकत्वादि...संख्या:—It is on account of number that we have recourse to usages such as 'This is one', 'They are two' and so on.

नवद्रव्यवृत्ति:-Note the word द्रव्य. As a quality संख्या can abide only in द्रव्यs. In एकं रूपं रसात् पृथक्, where, to all appearance, एकत्व and पृथक्त्व subsist in रूप and रस, both गुणs, the usage merely shows that एकत्व and रूपत्व abide in the same abode i. e. एकं रूपं shows एकत्ववत् रूपवत् द्रव्यम्. So, पृथक्त्व and रस abide in the same द्रव्य.

परार्ध:—The 10th multiple of the मध्य and the 100th of अन्त्य, 1000th of जलधि.

एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च etc.:—एकत्व in नित्य substances like a परमाणु, the आकाश or काल will be नित्य. In other

words, one cannot imagine the destruction of the एकत्व of *one* परमाणु of पृथ्वी, अप्, तेजस्: or वायु or of आकाश or of one आत्मन् or of one मनस् or of one काल or of one दिक्, because all these are imperishable.

But one can easily understand how अनित्य things i. e. products (कार्य) beginning with द्व्यणुक will cease to be एक as soon as they are destroyed. One bale of cotton will cease to be one as soon as it is loosened or destroyed. One book will cease to be one as soon as it is destroyed. In other words, their एकत्व is अनित्य.

द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव:—Here अन्नभट्ट follows a peculliar tenet of the वैशेषिकs wherein they differ from the नैयायिकs. The वैशेषिकs hold that numbers from two onwards are all *created* (जन्य) by अपेक्षाबुद्धि and hence अनित्य. अपेक्षाबुद्धि,‡ so far as संख्या is concerned, is the apprehension of the unities of objects more than one अनेकैकत्वबुद्धि:=अनेकेषां एकत्वानां बुद्धि:=अयमेकः अयमेक इत्याकारिका बुद्धि:). When we see, say, three jars standing we cognise them as ' this is one', 'this is one', 'this is one', and these cognitions collectively called अपेक्षाबुद्धि result in our cognising the totality of the objects, that is, their त्रित्व. According to the वैशेषिक, numbers, from two upwards are *produced* in the objects (ततो घटद्वये द्वित्वमुत्पद्यते) by अपेक्षाबुद्धि. According to the नैयायिकs अपेक्षाबुद्धि only enables us to cognise (ज्ञा) the numbers from two upwards which are therefore

‡ The term is of wider application and denotes a relative notion. Cp. how प्रशस्तपाद uses it in a wider sense with regard to the subjective nature of कालकृत and दिक्कृत परत्व and अपरत्व. Cp. again how मुक्तावली says अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशेन नाशस्तेषां (परत्वापरत्वानां कालदिक्कृतानां) निरूपित: ॥

not produced (जन्य) but only made known (ज्ञाप्य). Thus according to the नैयायिकs, numbers from द्वि upwards are as much नित्य as एक.

It must be admitted that the view of the वैशेषिकs is more reasonable than that of the नैयायिकs because numbers from duality onwards are not independent of unity and are subjective.

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२५ परिमाणम्

Tr. Dimension the special cause of the usages regarding measurement exists in the nine substances. And it is of four kinds: (1) atomic. (2) possessing magnitude (3) long and (4) short.

नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः—For all substances are either विभु or मूर्त. विभुत्व is महत्त्व in the highest degree (परममहत्परिमाण). मूर्त may be either अणुपरिमाण or अवान्तरमहत्परिमाण.

तच्च चतुर्विधम्: — Note that according to the तार्किकs, अणुत्व and महत्त्व are as much opposed to each other as Vice and Virtue or good and bad. In other words, they are not different degrees of the same dimension. That is why they suppose that two अणु products will be अणुतर as two vices will make a man more vicious. It is easy to see how two महत् things will make the product महत्तर.

महत्त्व:—or magnitude results from either (1) कारणमहत्त्व e. g. two large bales of cotton make a larger bale or (2) कारणबहुत्व e. g. three (and hence बहु) द्व्यणुकs which though अणु and supersensuous give rise to a त्र्यणुक which is महत् because perceptible or (3) प्रचयविशेष (particular arrangement) e. g. when a

bale of cotton appears bigger or smaller according to pressure.

अणु and परममहत्:—(विभु) things are अतीन्द्रिय. Only अवान्तरमहत् things can be इन्द्रियग्राह्य.

अणुमहद्दीर्घं ह्रस्वं चेति:-Note that the division is not scientific; because अणु and महत् refer to the cubical contents while दीर्घत्व and ह्रस्वत्व are linear in nature and as such included in the महत्परिमाण. Again, दीर्घत्व and ह्रस्वत्व are not different dimensions but different degrees of the same dimension.

परिमाण is permanent as abiding in नित्यद्रव्यs and impermanent in अनित्यद्रव्यs.

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२६ पृथक्त्व.

Tr. Individuality is the special cause of usages relating to non-identity.

पृथक्त्व is what enables us to say that देवदत्त is different from यज्ञदत्त.

पृथक्त्व e. g. देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तात् पृथक् is to be distinguished from अन्योन्याभाव e. g. देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तो न. The former gives a positive idea, the latter negative. While the latter rests with a mere denial, the former asserts in addition that it is something. We can say, द्रव्यं गुणो न, but we cannot say, द्रव्यं गुणात्पृथक्, because, द्रव्य and गुण are inseparably connected. But as we can say रामः लक्ष्मणो न we can also say, रामः लक्ष्मणात् पृथक्. Thus it is not always possible to predicate पृथक्त्व of a thing of which अन्योन्याभाव can be predicated, though the reverse is possible.

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२७ संयोग.

Tr. Conjunction the particular cause of usages relating to conjoined things abides in all substances.

संयोग can be eithe produced by action (कर्मज) or produced by another conjunction (संयोगज). When I touch a book with my hand, the संयोग is कर्मज. When there is हस्तपुस्तकसंयोग, there is काय (body) पुस्तकसंयोग which is thus संयोगज. कर्मजसंयोग may be again either अन्यतरकर्मज—e.g. वृक्षकपिसंयोग (कर्म being only on the part of कपि) or उभयकर्मज (e. g. मल्लसंयोग where action resides in both the wrestlers). संयोग is a गुण that abides only in a part ot the आश्रयद्रव्यs (Only a part of the tree comes in conjunction with a part of the body of the monkey) and hence is called अव्याप्यवृत्ति.

संयोग presupposes विभाग. Nothing can be संयुक्त which was not विभक्त; in other words, disjoined things only are conjoined. For difference between संयोग and समवाय, see समवाय. Section 8.

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२८ विभाग.

Tr. Disjunction, the quality that destroys conjunction, resides in all substances.

Just as संयोग presupposes विभाग, विभाग presupposes संयोग. In other words, there cannot be any disjunction unless the things were first conjoined. We cannot say that the horns of a bull are विभक्त because they were never संयुक्त. विभाग is to be distinguished from the कर्मन् which produces the विभाग, hence the word गुण has been inserted in the definition. विभाग

is not mere संयोगाभाव but something positive brought about by action.

The वैशेषिकs and अन्नंभट्ट admit विभाग of two kinds कर्मज and विभागज (कर्मणा हस्तपुस्तकविभागः, हस्तपुस्तकविभागात्काय-पुस्तकविभागः). The नैयायिकs who admit कर्मजविभाग refuse to admit the second variety on the score that the कर्मन् of the हस्त, to take up the instance, is the same as that of the body and hence what is called विभागज विभाग ultimately proves to be कर्मज only. The वैशेषिकs rightly say that the कर्म of the part cannot be the कर्म of the whole- the wheels in a watch may move but the watch does not move-and hence when there is कायपुस्तकविभाग it is due to विभाग only and not कर्मन् which abides only in a part of the body हस्त. When once you admit संयोगजसंयोग you must admit विभागजविभाग.

विभाग may be again अन्यतरकर्मज or उभयकर्मज. (वृक्षकपि-वियोगः and मल्लयोर्वियोगः—are instances of the two.)

Note that in the case of विभुद्रव्यs only अन्यतरकर्मज संयोग or विभाग is possible because विभु substances are incapable of कर्मन्.

२९ परत्वापरत्वे

Tr. Remoteness and Nearness are the special causes relating to being remote or near. They abide in the four substances beginning with earth and in the mind. They are of two kinds: those that are brought about by space and by time. The remoteness caused by space abides in one who stays at a distance. The nearness caused by space is found in one who stays near. The remoteness due to time is found in one who is senior (in age). The nearness due to time is found in one who is junior (in age).

पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिनीः –

कालकृतपरत्व or अपरत्व presupposes अनित्यत्व which is present in the कार्य forms (अनित्या कार्यरूपा) of पृथ्वी, अप्, तेज:, and वायु. देशकृत परत्व or अपरत्व presupposes मूर्तत्व (absenceof विभुत्व) which is present in पृथ्वी,अप्, तेज:, वायु (both परमाणुरूप and कार्यरूप) and मन: (being atomic).

कालकृतपरत्व or अपरत्व shows distance in time.

दिक्कृतपरत्व or ,, ,, ,, space.

परत्व and अपरत्व are subjective (अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य) that is why मुक्तावलीकार says that they are destroyed on the अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाश.

३० गुरुत्व

Tr. Gravity or Weight is the non-intimate cause of the fall in the initial stage. It abides in Earth and Water.

आद्यपतन etc. When the mango falls to the ground its fall is initiated by गुरुत्व but later continued by velocity (वेग). In other words, the first पतन is caused by गुरुत्व while the subsequent continuation of the पतन is due to वेग according to the तार्किकs. Modern physics holds that the subsequent पतन is also due to gravity. The definition clearly implies that by गुरुत्व the तार्किक meant gravity or weight. This is in conflict with the statement (see दीपिका section गुणs) लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वात् because even light bodies possess weight (so there गुरुत्व has to be taken in a different sense i. e. that of heaviness).

For understanding असमवायिकारण, see the section on causation.

३१ द्रवत्व

Tr. Fluidity, the non-intimate cause of the flow

in the initial stage abides in Earth, Water and Light. It is of two kinds; natural and artificial. The natural fluidity is found in water; the artificial in Earth and Light. The fluidity in earthy substances like ghee is produced by contact with fire. It abides in luminous substances like Gold.

आद्यस्यन्दन cp. आद्यपतन in the definition of गुरुत्व. The act of flowing in the first instance is due to द्रवत्व but is continued in the subsequent stages, by वेग, according to the तार्किकs.

Water alone possesses natural fluidity. In the case of पार्थिव products like घृत, and तैजस products like सुवर्ण, the fluidity is artificial being produced by the application of heat (तेज:संयोगजन्य). If water in the form of snow and sleet is solid, it is due to an उपाधि [हिमकरकयोरौपाधिकद्रव्यत्वनिरोधात्सूर्यकिरणभूमिसंयोगादिनोपाधिनिवृत्तिमात्रम् । न तु द्रवत्वोत्पत्तिः -.वाक्यवृत्ति.]

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३२ स्नेह.

Tr Viscidity the quality which is the special cause of agglutination of powder etc abides only in water.

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुः —When particles of dust or flour are held together by water, it is due to the quality of स्नेह present therein. If milk or oil or another liquid can effect the same thing, the तार्किक accounts for it by saying that this स्नेह is due to the presence of watery particles in the liquid. (दुग्धादौ तु तदन्तर्गतजलभागस्यैव स्नेह उपलभ्यते.—) Could we not assign पिण्डीकरण (agglutination) to द्रवत्व ? No, says the तार्किक, for molten gold though possessed of द्रवत्व, cannot effect it. स्नेह is a quality peculiar to water.

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३३ शब्द

Tr. Sound, the quality which is apprehended by the sense of hearing abides only in Ether. It is of two kinds: (1) inarticulate and (2) articulate. The inarticulate is such as is found in the case of drum etc The articulate takes forms like the Sanskrit Language.

आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः-- शब्द is a गुण peculiar to आकाश alone. Note the different threefold division given in the तर्कदीपिका. The words in the दीपिका, भेर्याकाशमारभ्य श्रोत्रपर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः are important as throwing light on the तार्किक idea regarding the transmission of sound. If one hears the sound of a trumpet blown at a distance it is due to the sound at the origin producing another sound and so forth till the last sound so produced reaches the ear. The श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय being nothing but आकाश is incapable of motion. There are two views regarding the way in which sound is transmitted. Some hold that the series of sounds travels only in one direction like the waves of the ocean (वीचितरङ्गन्याय). Others hold that the series radiates in all directions like the filaments of a कदम्ब flower (कदम्बगोलक or कदम्बमुकुलन्याय) that shoot forth in every direction. Considering that the same sound is heard on all sides, the second theory appears more reasonable.

The तार्किकs hold शब्द to be अनित्य against the view of the प्रभाकरs who regard it as नित्य. The भाट्टमीमांसकs hold शब्द to be a द्रव्य and not a गुण.

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३४ बुद्धि

Tr. Cognition is knowledge which is the source of

all dealings. It is of two kinds: (1) Remembrance and (2) Experience.

व्यवहारहेतुः— Some render व्यवहार by 'utterance of words' saying that there are some dealings like walking in sleep which are not बुद्धिपूर्वक. But the same objection might be raised against the ' utterance of words' which also are spoken in sleep without any बुद्धि preceding them. For all practical purposes ' dealings' is a good rendering; because we see that our everyday transactions are a result of cognitions.

बुद्धि does not mean ' mind ' which is an independent substance; noı does it mean the process of cognition, understanding. It means the result of cognition; apprehension. Thus when I smell a flower, the गन्धप्रतीति is the बुद्धि.

स्मृति *and* अनुभव.

Tr. Remembrance is knowledge produced only by impression. Experience is knowledge other than remembrance.

संस्कारः— स्मृति must be always preceded by अनुभव which leaves an impression on the mind called भावना. भावनासंस्कार is the sole cause of स्मृति. When I see a beautiful picture (अनुभव) an impression भावना is left on my mind which is responsible for my remembering the picture afterwards.

संस्कारमात्रजन्यः—The word मात्र is inserted in the definition to exclude प्रत्यभिज्ञा (सोऽयं देवदत्तः) in which one recognises the object before him to be the same that he had apprehended before. In स्मृति and प्रत्यभिज्ञा, the भावनासंस्कर does operate. But while in

प्रत्यभिज्ञा it is the sole (मात्र) operating cause, in प्रत्यभिज्ञा the संस्कार as well as the actual presence of the object are necessary. When I *remember* देवदत्त, he is not present before me; when. I *recognise* देवदत्त to be the same whom I saw before देवदत्त must be present before me. In other words in स्मृति there is तत्ता only; in प्रत्यभिज्ञा there are तत्ता and इदन्ता both.


तद्भिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवः The definition based on exclusion shows how difficult it is to define अनुभव in any precise terms based on its attributes.

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३५ अनुभव, यथार्थ *and* अयथार्थ.

Tr. It is of two kinds: (1) right and (2) wrong. Right experience is that in which an object is cognised as possessing those attributes (तत्प्रकारकः) *which it does possess; e. g. the cognition, 'this is silver', with regard to silver. This is also called* प्रमा. *Wrong experience is that in which an object is cognised as possessing those attributes which it does not possess. e. g. the cognition of silver in the mother-o'-pearl.*

तद्वति तत्प्रकारकः अनुभवः-प्रकार is what distinguishes cognition of one object from that of another. In the cognition of घट, घटत्व is the प्रकार which distinguishes घटज्ञान from other ज्ञानs like पटज्ञान. So तद्वति तत्प्रकारक means, to take the instance of घट, घटत्ववति (घटे) घटत्वप्रकारकः अनुभवः; which, in plain words, means that in यथार्थानुभव we cognise an object as it really is. In अयथार्थानुभव, on the other hand, the object is cognised as being what it is not. When a blind man is scared by a garland mistaken for a snake, there is अयथार्थानुभव.



३६ यथार्थानुभव.

Tr. Right apprehension is of four kinds: (1) Direct knowledge, (2) Inferred knowledge, (3) Knowledge by comparison and (4) Verbal knowledge. The instruments of these are also of four kinds, viz. (1) Direct perception (2) Inference (3) Comparison and (4) Word.

प्रत्यक्षज्ञान:—is बहिरिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्ष like घटप्रत्यक्ष where घट is cognised by the eye or अन्तरिन्द्रिय (अन्तःकरण) प्रत्यक्ष like सुखदुःखप्रत्यक्ष where सुख or दुःख are cognised by the mind.

अनुमितिज्ञान:—where, for instance, one infers the पर्वत to be वह्निमान् on seeing that it is धूमवान्.

उपमितिज्ञान:—where, for instance, an ignorant man to whom a 'buffalo' was described, recognises an animal in the forest to be a buffalo, thus connecting the term with its appropriate object.

शाब्दज्ञान:—where, for instance, we understand that we are to do a certain thing, because the शिष्टs have say that we must do it. With reference to right apprehension the student should master the difference between the following terms:—

प्रमातृ:—The recipient of the knowledge.

प्रमाणः—The means to knowledge.

प्रमेयः—The object of knowledge.

प्रमितिः—The knowledge resulting from प्रमाण.

प्रमातृ	प्रमेय	प्रमाण	प्रमिति
प्रत्यक्षीकर्तृ	प्रत्यक्षवस्तु	प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण	प्रत्यक्षज्ञान
अनुमातृ	अनुमेयवस्तु	अनुमान	अनुमिति
उपमातृ	उपमेयवस्तु	उपमान	उपमिति
शब्दज्ञातृ	शब्दज्ञेयवस्तु	शब्द	शब्दज्ञान

३७ करण.

Tr. Instrument is a cause that is peculiar (to the effect in question).

अन्नंभट्ट defines करण because he has referred to the करणs, in the earlier section, of the four kinds of right apprehension.

करण is the cause which is peculiar to the effect in question. Thus प्रत्यक्ष is the only instrument for getting प्रत्यक्षज्ञान, अनुमान is the peculiar instrument for getting अनुमिति and so on.

What is meant by करण or असाधारणकारण? If we take the instance of the lopping of a log of wood with an axe, the axe is the असाधारणकारण, according to the definition. So long as the axe is not there, there cannot be any lopping. Consequently असाधारण्य consists in being indispensable in the production of the effect. Well might one ask, is not the log as indispensable as the axe or more so? No doubt the log is indispensable for the छिदिक्रिया but it is not व्यापारवत् as the करण ought to be. It is the व्यापारवत् असाधारणकारण that is the करण. The axe possesses the व्यापार necessary for the lopping of the log of wood;

the log of wood does not possess the व्यापार. In short, करण is the instrument and not the object with regard to which the instrument is to work. But is not the wood–cutter व्यापारवत्? He is, but only secondarily. The व्यापार for the cutting of the wood abides primarily in the axe, and only secondarily in the wood-cutter. Take away the axe, and what can the wood-cutter do? The wood-cutter can be substituted by another person who *shall* have to take the help of the axe. In view of this explanation it will be clear how अन्नंभट्ट's definition ought to be modified by adding the word व्यापारवत्.

Two views regarding करण:—The ancients and the moderns are divided on the question of the nature of करण. According to the ancients (who define करण as व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं) करण is the instrument possessing the व्यापार. (व्यापारवत). According to the moderns (who define करण as फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नंकारण) करण is the व्यापार itself immediately followed by the effect. It should be seen that the attitude of the moderns is consistent throughout regarding the nature of the करण. The ancients, on the other hand, are inconsistent in defining करण as व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं, and saying in the same breath that लिङ्गज्ञान or व्याप्तिज्ञान which is a गुण and as such व्यापाररहित (and not मनस्) is करण. अन्नंभट्ट who follows the ancients in his definitions is open to the same charge of inconsistency so far as the question of the करणs of अनुमिति and उपमिति is concerned. It will be seen that करण is to be subsumed under the निमित्तकारण of the तार्किक.

38 THE THEORY OF CAUSATION.

Cause is what invariably (नियत) precedes the effect.

The word नियत excludes things which may

precede the cause, sometimes but not always thus proving that they are not necessary for producing the effect and are, therefore, not causes. The ass of the potter may sometimes precede the manufacture of the pot but its agency may be dispensed away with in many cases. Thus it is not नियत and hence cannot be कारण of the pot.

पूर्ववर्ति:-- The cause must precede the effect If नियतवर्ति alone was used the effect also will be embraced by the definition because it is invariably present. (cp. the दीपिका)

Now, there are so may things which are नियतपूर्ववर्ति but not कारणs तन्तुरूप is नियतपूर्ववर्ति of पट. The कुलालजनक is नियतपूर्ववर्ति of the घट, but if these were accepted as कारणs, many things near or remote connected with the कार्य by an invariable antecedence will have to be accepted as कारणs which is not desirable. Hence the दीपिका adds the limiting clause अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति to the definition. The clause means "provided the causal capacity is not exhausted (अनन्यथासिद्ध) in producing something else." So the complete definition of कारण is

अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति नियतपूर्ववर्ति कारणम्.

The दीपिका gives three cases of अन्यथासिद्धि which though not exhaustive, are yet indicative of the general principle that everything that invariably precedes is not the cause. That the cases are by no means exhaustive is borne out by the fact that the मुक्तावली raises the number to five.

The दीपिका gives the following cases:—

येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम्
which excludes cases like तन्तुरूप from being regarded the cause of पट. (तन्तुना सहैव तन्तुरूपस्य पटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमव

गम्यते (अतः) पटं प्रति तन्तुरूपमन्यथासिद्धम्). Because तन्तुs precede पट, तन्तुरूप must precede पट. Note that according to the तार्किक the causal capacity of तन्तुरूप is exhausted (अन्यथासिद्ध) in producing पटरूप, hence it is not अनन्यथासिद्ध so far as पट is concerned.

२. अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञाते एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् which excludes cases like the potter's father from being regarded the cause of घट.

[कुलालं (घटकारं) प्रति (तस्य पितुः) पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञाते एव कुलालजनकस्य घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते (अतः)घटं प्रति कुलालजनकः अन्यथासिद्धः] The कुलालजनक precedes the कुलाल and must hence be naturally earlier than the घट. And since he is the cause of कुलाल he is अन्यथासिद्ध so far as घट is concerned.

3. अन्यत्र क्लृप्तनियतपूर्ववर्तिन एव कार्यसम्भवे तत्सहभूतमन्यथासिद्धम् this excludes cases like रूपप्रागभाव being regarded the cause of गन्ध. [अपाकजस्थले क्लृप्त (शक्त) नियतपूर्ववर्तिनः गन्धप्रागभावादेव गन्धकार्यसम्भवे पाकजस्थले गन्धप्रागभावसहभूतः रूपप्रागभावः अन्यथासिद्धः.] Just imagine a jar after it is baked when it comes to have गन्ध and रूप. Speaking only about गन्ध, what is it due to? Before the jar was baked there was गन्धप्रागभाव as well as रूपप्रागभाव i e. both गन्ध & रूप were absent. Was it गन्धप्रागभाव or रूपप्रागभाव that was responsible for गन्ध? The reply is, गन्धप्रागभाव alone is responsible, for elsewhere (अपाकजस्थले), we have found that गन्धप्रागभाव is by itself an adequate (क्लृप्त) cause to produce गन्ध. (Note that the तार्किकs regard प्रागभाव of a thing as one of its causes.)

Thus these cases of अन्यथासिद्धि prove that (1) a thing in समवाय relation with the cause (2) the antecedent of the cause and (3) a thing coexisting with the cause are not to be regarded as causes.

३९ कार्य

Tr. The effect is the counter-entity of antecedent negation.

प्रतियोगिन् is, as we have seen before, the thing of which the अभाव is predicated. प्रागभाव is the non-existence of a thing before it is produced. So प्रागभावप्रतियोगि means a thing which was not existent before but later comes into existence.

This definition of कार्य is based on the peculiar view about causation which the तार्किकs hold and which has made them very realistic. The तार्किकs hold that the effect (कार्य) is not at all existent before it appears. The effect comes into existence quite anew, they say. That is why they are called असत्कार्यवादिन्s and are in conflict with other schools like the सांख्य, योग, and the वेदान्त that assert that the effect does exist in the cause. In other words, while the तार्किकs say that कारण and कार्य are distinct the वेदान्तिन्s and kindred schools say they are not (Cp. वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्—छान्दोग्य.)

This view that the कार्य did not exist at all before production makes the तार्किक open to the charge that it amounts to saying that कार्य came out of nothing, a view simil r to the Buddhists If the effect did not exist at all and sprang anew, why is it that out of earth we get earthen things only and not golden ones and out of gold only golden things and not earthy ones, both being equally असत्? The तार्किकs refute this objection by taking the help of the lame theory of समवाय. The effect is linked with the cause by समवाय, they say. That is why while preparing a gold earring one goes in for gold alone and not earth and for earth alone while preparing

an earthen jar. घट is connected by समवाय with मृत्तिका and not with सुवर्ण. That is why particular causes produce particular effects.

शंकराचार्य, at one stroke, demolishes the fabric of the theory of असत्कार्यवाद by asking where could समवाय which is a सम्बन्ध reside when one of the सम्बन्धिन्s viz. the कार्य was not at all existent and the तार्किक is non-plussed.

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40 Three Kinds of Causes

Tr. Causes are of three kinds: 1. Intimate cause. 2. Non-intimate cause and 3. Instrumental cause.

समवायिकारण

Tr. Intimate cause is that in intimate connection with which the effect is produced. e. g. the threads are (the intimate cause) of the cloth and the cloth of its own colour.

समवायिकारण also called उपादानकारण can be predicated of only three out of the seven पदार्थs. Only अनित्य द्रव्यs, गुण and कर्मन् can have a समवायिकारण. सामान्य, विशेष and समवाय, and अत्यन्ताभाव being नित्य can have no कारण at all. प्रागभाव has no beginning and hence no कारण. प्रध्वंसाभाव andअन्योन्याभाव are अनित्य but their cause cannot be समवायिकारण because अभाव being negative cannot enter into समवाय relation with anything. Therefore, we can assert a समवायिकारण of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् only.

The समवायिकारण which thus can be predicated of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् will be found to be द्रव्य only.

कपाल is the समवायिकारण of घट. उत्पल is the समवायि-

कारण of the नीलरूप. चक्र is समवायिकारण of the भ्रमणकर्मन् abiding in it.

These are the समवायिकारणs because the respective कार्यs are in समवायसम्बन्ध (समवत) with them.

When we thus understand that समवायिकारण can be asserted of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् only, we can easily point out the समवायिकारण of any द्रव्य, गुण or कर्मन्. If I want to point out the समवायिकारण of a द्रव्य, I shall place my finger on the अवयवs or constituent parts of which it is made. If I want to point out the समवायिकारण of a गुण or a कर्मन्, I shall point to the abode *viz.* the द्रव्य in which they abide. Consequently in all instances the समवायिकारण will be a द्रव्य. In other words, समवायिकारण is the अवयव, in the pair अवयव-अवयविन् and गुणिन् and क्रियावान् in the pairs गुण-गुणिन् and क्रिया-क्रियावान् respectively.

असमवायिकारण.

Tr. Non-intimate cause is the cause which is connected with one and the same object by intimate connection, along with the effect or cause of the latter. e. g. The conjunction of threads is the non-intimate cause of the piece of cloth, and the colour of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the colour of the piece of cloth.

असमवायिकारण:— If it is easy to detect the समवायिकारण. of a कार्य, it is not so easy to detect the असमवायिकारण. Really speaking, असमवायिकारण is a very misleading name given to a cause which is closely knit to the समवायिकारण and which *plus* the समवायिकारण amount to the effect. असमवायि is thus to be taken to mean समवायीतर, and not समवायिविरुद्ध as it is likely to be interpreted. कपाल is the समवायिकारण of घट. But

घट is not mere कपालs but something more. कपालs plus their संयोग is घट. So कपालसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of घट. Similarly तन्तुसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of पट.

To take the असमवायिकारण of a गुण, नीलरूप has उत्पल for the समवायिकारण. But mere उत्पल (द्रव्य) consisting of petals does not account for the total रूप (गुण) of the उत्पल. It is उत्पल and the दलरूप that amounts to the नीलरूप as abiding in the उत्पल. Thus, दलरूप (colour of petals) is the असमवायिकारण of the उत्पलरूप. Similarly तन्तुरूप is the असमवायिकारण of पटरूप.

To take the असमवायिकारण of a क्रिया or कर्मन्, the भ्रमण of the wheel has the wheel as the समवायिकारण. But mere wheel does not account for the क्रिया. The wheel must be moved by the hand of the mechanic before it moves In other words, यांत्रिकहस्तचक्रसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of the भ्रमण of the चक्र.

From the above illustrations it must have become clear that we can speak of the असमवायिकारण of such an effect only, of which we can predicate a समवायिकारण. In other words, there cannot be any असमवायिकारण of an effect, if there is no समवायिकारण. And similarly, when one speaks of the समवायिकारण of a thing we can be sure that the thing must also have an असमवायिकारण.

As समवायिकारण is possible to be predicated of only द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्, we can speak of the असमवायिकारण of these पदार्थs only.

It should be seen that the असमवायिकारण of a द्रव्य is always the संयोग of its अवयविन्s (constituent parts); that of a कर्म is always the संयोग of the substratum of the कर्म (कर्माधार) with another object like the mechanic's hand; that of a गुण is another similar गुण (तन्तुरूप, असमवायिकारण of पटरूप) or another dissimilar

गुण [बहुत्वसंख्या (गुण), the असमवायिकारण of परिमाण (गुण) in त्र्यणुक] or क्रिया (कपिक्रिया the असमवायिकारण of कपिवृक्षसंयोग).

The असमवायिकारण, therefore, stands close to the समवायिकारण and is hence described as समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्न. Thus प्रत्यासत्ति proximity will be found to be of two kinds कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासत्ति and कारणैकार्थप्रत्यासत्ति, also called लघ्वी and महती प्रत्यासत्ति respectively

When the तर्कसंग्रह defines असमवायिकारण as कार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति कारणमसमवायिकारणम्. it refers to कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासत्ति. तन्तुसंयोग is असमवायिकारण of this variety. Because it is (तन्तूनां) पटात्मककार्येण सह एकस्मिंस्तन्त्वात्मके कारणे समवेत i. e. संयोग being a गुण is समवेत with the तन्तुs with which is समवेत also the पट there effect because तन्तु is अवयव, and पट, अवयविन्. When again, the तर्कसंग्रह defines असमवायिकारण as कारणेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति कारणं it refers to कारणैकार्थप्रत्यासत्ति. तन्तुरूप is of this variety. Because, तन्तुरूप is कारणेन पटेन सह एकस्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेत i. e. it is connected by समवाय with the same तन्तु with which is connected its cause पट by the same relation (i. e. समवाय). हस्तचक्रसंयोग is कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासन्न. Because the संयोग abides in चक्र by समवाय, in which the भ्रमण, its कार्य also abides by समवाय (Dissolve कार्येण or कारणेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे प्रत्यासत्ति;)

Thus the असमवायिकारण of a द्रव्य or कर्म will always be कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासन्न. That of गुण may be कारणैकार्थप्रत्यासन्न as in the above instance or कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासन्न (cp. पाकजगन्ध has तेजःसंयोग for its असमवायिकारण which is कार्यकार्थप्रत्यासन्न).

From what has been said above, one can find out the असमवायिकारण by setting his finger on the cause which plus the समवायिकारण are embodied in the effect.

निमित्तकारण

Tr. Different from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the shuttle or loom of the piece of cloth.

Whatever cause cannot come under समवायि or असमवायि, is निमित्तकारण. Thus the agent, instrument and such other causes will come under the broad class of निमित्तकारण. Time, space, God's will, Destiny and antecedent negation are the साधारण निमित्तकारणs because they operate while each and everything in the world is produced.

निमित्तकारण can be predicated of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म and also of प्रध्वंसाभाव and अन्योन्याभाव. Thus when a घट is destroyed the घटप्रध्वंसाभाव has for its निमित्तकारण the several things operating to destroy the घट. Similarly when I say राम is not लक्ष्मण, the अन्योन्याभाव is produced by the उत्पत्ति of राम and लक्ष्मण which, therefore, is the निमित्तकारण of the अन्योन्याभाव.

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४१ करण.

Tr. Therefore of these three varieties of causes that alone which is the special cause is the करण.

As we have seen before the idea of करण, whether according to the old school or new (i. e. whether the instrument or व्यापार) makes it come under निमित्तकारण only.

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४२ प्रत्यक्ष.

Tr. Of them (तत्र=प्रमाणचतुष्टयमध्ये) perception is the peculiar cause of Direct knowledge. Direct knowledge is knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and the objects. It is of two kinds: indeterminate and

determinate. Indeterminate knowledge is knowledge of a thing without apprehending its attributes; e. g. 'This is something.' Determinate knowledge is knowledge of a thing with an apprehension of its attributes e. g. This is a Brahmin, this (man) is black.

Having given the four broad divisions of यथार्थानुभव or प्रमा *viz.* (प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमिति, उपमिति and शाब्द), अन्नंभट्ट describes them in order.

In the case of प्रत्यक्ष, the करण and कार्य are both given the same name. Thus while the process which gives us direct knowledge is called प्रत्यक्ष, the result *viz.* the direct knowledge is also called प्रत्यक्ष. In the case of the other varieties of knowledge *viz.* अनुमिति, उपमिति and शाब्दज्ञान, the करण and कार्य are named differently: अनुमान is the करण, अनुमिति the कार्य; उपमान the करण, उपमिति, the कार्य; शब्द the करण, शाब्दज्ञान the कार्य.

इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् Note that अनुमिति, उपमिति and शाब्दज्ञान are also इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य. Thus before I infer पर्वतो वह्निमान् there must be चक्षुर्धूमसन्निकर्ष. Similarly, when I get the उपमिति गवयशब्दवाच्योऽयं, there must be चक्षुर्गवयसन्निकर्ष; Again, when I get शाब्दज्ञान, संध्यामुपासीत, there must be श्रोत्रशब्दसंनिकर्ष. How then are we to differentiate प्रत्यक्ष from all these ? The reply is that while प्रत्यक्ष is इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजन्य exclusively, other varieties of knowledge are as much dependent on इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष as on other mental processes.

सविकल्पक *and* **निर्विकल्पक** Indeterminate knowledge is the stage that precedes determinate knowledge. When I get a cognition e. g. (घटं जनामि) this cognition must have been preceded by another when I cognised the घट only as something existing इदं किमपि. In other words, in the stage of निर्विकल्पक I

only cognise the सत्ता of the thing, while, in the सविकल्पक stage, (घटं जानामि) I become more definite and connect the सत्ताज्ञान with some attributes (प्रकार) घटत्व etc. which I know already but which I had not connected with the thing in question in the निर्विकल्पक stage. It should be seen that in साविकल्पक what takes place is merely the *co-ordination* of the सत्ताज्ञान of the निर्विकल्पक stage with the ज्ञान of the जाति, व्यक्ति, गुण or क्रिया which I had had already as a result of my past experience but which I had not connected with the सत्ताज्ञान in the निर्विकल्पक stage. For if I did not know what घटत्व or शुक्लत्व is I could not have said, शुक्लोऽयं, घटोऽयं, etc.

Thus साविकल्पकज्ञान is the sum-total of निर्विकल्पकज्ञान plus the जातिव्यक्त्यादिज्ञान which I possessed already.

As प्रत्यक्ष is इंद्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य, precisely speaking, निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान alone is प्रत्यक्ष, सविकल्पक being something more than प्रत्यक्ष. But, for all practical purposes, it is better to admit सविकल्पक as प्रत्यक्ष also, because on it are based all our experiences in life. It should be seen that the Buddhists admitted निर्विकल्पक alone to be real.

This explains the definitions, निष्प्रकारकज्ञान and सप्रकारकज्ञान in the text. In किमपीदं, the ज्ञान is without any attributes (प्रकार=ज्ञानविशेषण); in घटोऽय, the ज्ञान is विशिष्ट by the प्रकार, घटत्व. The detailed definitions विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धानवगाहिज्ञानं & विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धावगाहिज्ञान in the दीपिका mean the same thing. In निर्विकल्पक, no reference is made (अनवगाहि) to the *connection* of the thing (विशेष्य) (इदं किमपि) with its attri bute (विशेषण) (घटत्व) though both are there, *viz.* सत्ताज्ञान and the घटत्वादि ज्ञान of past experience. In सविकल्पक, there is reference (अवगाहि) to this connection of विशेषण and विशेष्य.)

विकल्प Note that the विकल्प or determinateness consists in apprehending, either जाति like गोत्व; or गुण like शुक्ल, नील; or क्रिया like चलन; or व्यक्ति (also called द्रव्य) like देवदत्त, डित्थ. Sometimes we may cognise only some of these; sometimes all. गौः शुक्लश्चलो डित्थः (डित्थः the name of the bull) summarise the विकल्पs.

The तार्किकs hold that निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष is inferred only. The inference stated in the दीपिका amounts to this. Every qualified cognition must be preceded by the cognition of the attributes. Before I cognise the दण्डित्व of a man, I must know the दण्ड.

This knowledge of दण्ड must be अविशिष्ट lest we shall be confronted with अनवस्था iu our search for the विशेषण of each preceding ज्ञान. And this proves the stage of निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष

Note that ईश्वर's ज्ञान is always सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष.

इंद्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष:--Thus there will be प्रत्यक्ष of the sight (चाक्षुष), of the sense of hearing (श्रोत्रिय),of the sense of taste (रासन), of the sense of touch (स्पार्शन), of the sense of smell (घ्राणज) and of the mind (मानस).

संनिकर्ष

Tr. The contact of the senses with their objects which is the cause of direct knowledge can be of six kinds, viz. (1) conjunction, (2) the intimate relation with the things conjoined, (3) the intimate relation with what is intimately related with the things conjoined, (4) intimate relation, (5) intimate relation with the intimately related, (6) and the relation of the attribute and the thing qualified.

The author now proceeds to describe the varieties of contact of the senses with their objects which are six in number.

४३ SIX KINDS OF सन्निकर्ष.

(1)

Tr. Conjunction is the contact when, with the eye, the direct perception of a jar is produced.

Here the sight directly gets joined to the object घट, the theory being that the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय travels to its object and returns with an image thereof.

The theory of perception: The दीपिका gives the process of direct perception. All our experiences are the outcome of our धर्म and अधर्म. So, in order that the soul should suffer pain or enjoy pleasure, to be derived from direct perception, it comes in contact with the mind which in its turn is connected with the sense, the latter getting again in contact with the object. The resultant experience whether pleasant or otherwise is the outcome of our धर्म or अधर्म (merit or demerit).

As अनुमति, उपमिति and शाब्दज्ञान are all based on प्रत्यक्ष, more or less it follows that the pleasure or pain to be derived from them is equally the result of our past merit or demerit.

(2.)

Tr. Intimate relation with thing conjoined is the contact in producing the direct perception of the colour of the jar which is in conjuuction with the sight.

घटरूप is समवेत in घट (गुण—गुणिन्) which is संयुक्त with the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय.

(3)

Tr. In the direct perception of the generality 'colourness' (रूपत्व) the contact is the intimate relation with what is intimately related with the thing conjoined.

रूपत्व is समवेत with रूप (जाति—व्यक्ति), which, in its turn, is समवेत with घट (गुण—गुणिन्) which is चक्षुःसंयुक्त.

(4)

Tr. Intimate relation is the contact when we get a direct perception of sound with the sense of hearing. For, the sense of hearing is ether.

Abiding in the cavity of the ear sound is the special quality of ether and there is intimate relation between the quality and its abode.

The तार्किकs hold that श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय is nothing but कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्न आकाश, ether limited by the cavity of the ear. So शब्द is the गुण of श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय as well. Hence the समवाय between श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय and शब्द.

(5)

Tr. In the direct perception of the generality of sound the contact is in intimate relation with the thing intimately related. Because the generality of sound is connected by intimate relation with sound which is in intimate relation with the sense of hearing.

Note the rule of the नैयायिकs that the जाति of a thing is perceived by the same sense by which the thing itself is perceived. Thus रूप being perceived by the eye, रूपत्व also will be perceived by the sight. शब्द being perceived by the ear, शब्दत्व also will be perceived by the organ of hearing.

Tr. The contact in the direct perception of negation is the relation of the attribute and substratum of attribute. For, in the cognition 'there is no jar on the ground' the ground in contact with the sight is qualified by the attribute of the negation of the jar.

The मीमांसकs hold that अभाव is perceived by an independent means of proof (प्रमाण) called अनुपलब्धि.

(cp. the तर्कदीपिका). Against these the तार्किकs hold that negation is perceived by प्रत्यक्ष. They say that अभाव is perceived by the same sense that perceives the counterentity. Thus घटाभाव is perceived by the same sense *viz.* चक्षुरिन्द्रिय that perceives the घट. The cognition of अभाव is as much a प्रत्यक्ष as the घटप्रत्यक्ष.

In this प्रत्यक्ष of अभाव, the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय is संयुक्त with the भूतल which is the विशेष्य of the विशेषण घटाभाव thereon. Thus this सन्निकर्ष amounts to विशेषण-विशेष्यभाव which differs from the विशेषण-विशेष्यभाव in instances like नीलमुत्पलम् where there is समवाय between नीलरूप and उत्पल while there is no such additional relation (अतिरिक्त: संबंध:) between अभाव and its आश्रय (विशेषण-विशेष्यस्वरूपमेव).

Tr. Thus Direct Perception is knowledge produced by the contact of the senses with their respective objects The peculiar cause thereof is the organ of sense. Therefore it results that the sense is the means of direct perception.

Note that इन्द्रिय is the करण and इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष, व्यापार of प्रत्यक्ष according to the old तार्किकs whom अन्नंभट्ट follows. According to the नव्या:, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष will be the करण of प्रत्यक्षज्ञान. It should be noted that घ्राणेन्द्रिय, रसनेन्द्रिय, and श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय can apprehend the respective गुणs, their सामान्यs and their अभावs.

चक्षुरिन्द्रिय:- can apprehend द्रव्यs in addition to its respective गुण i e. रूप, सामान्य of the गुण and also its अभाव.

त्वगिन्द्रिय can apprehend द्रव्य in addition to its respective गुण, its सामान्य and अभाव, according to the neo—तार्किकs, who do not think उद्भूतरूपवत्त्व is necessary for चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष. According to the old तार्किकs, त्वगिन्द्रिय can apprehend only its गुण, the सामान्य thereof and its अभाव. मनस् can apprehend only its गुणs their सामान्य and

its अभाव according to the वैशेषिकs. According to the नैयायिकs it can apprehend the द्रव्य, आत्मन् also.

Thus, there results the following scheme:—

चक्षुः	perceives	रूप — रूपत्व — रूपाभाव — द्रव्य
त्वक्	,,	स्पर्श — स्पर्शत्व — स्पर्शाभाव — द्रव्य (acc. to some)
घ्राण	,,	गन्ध — गन्धत्व — गन्धाभाव
रसनेन्द्रिय	,,	रस — रसत्व — रसाभाव
श्रोत्र	,,	शब्द — शब्दत्व — शब्दाभाव
मनस्	,,	सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, प्रयत्न, भावना their सामान्य and अभाव } आत्मन् acc. to some

कर्म can be perceived by the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय and त्वगिन्द्रिय according to some.


विशेषs are अतीन्द्रिय.

समवाय is अतीन्द्रिय according to the वैशेषिक. According to the नैयायिकs it is प्रत्यक्षविषय and perceived by the sense that perceives the समवायिन्s.



अनुमान

Important Terms alphabetically arranged and illustrated with reference to the stock instance पर्वतो वह्निमान्। धूमात्।



अनुमानः—The process that leads us to infer fire from smoke.

अनुमितिः—The result of अनुमान *viz* पर्वतो वह्निमान्.

अन्वयव्याप्तिः-Positive concomitance, यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकेव्याप्तिः--Positive and negative concomitance Positive यत्र यत्र धूमःस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः negative यत्र यत्र वह्न्यभावः तत्र धूमाभावः

उदाहरणः— See परार्थानुमान.

उपनयः— ,, ,,

केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमानः— अनुमान which is based on व्याप्ति that can be negative only, e. g. पृथ्वी इतरभेदवती। गन्धवत्त्वात्

केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतुः— हेतु in a केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान e. g. गन्धवत्त्व in the above instance.

केवलान्वयि अनुमानः— अनुमान which is based on व्याप्ति that can be positive only e. g. पर्वतः अभिधेयः। प्रमेयत्वात्। यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्राभिधेयत्वम्। यथा घटे।

केवलान्वयि हेतुः—हेतु in a केवलन्वयि अनुमान e g. प्रमेयत्व in the above instance.

न्यायः— see परार्थानुमान.

पक्षः—the subject of inference; पर्वत in the instance पर्वतो वह्निमान्। धूमवत्त्वात्

पक्षधर्मताः— The presence of the हेतु on the पक्ष; presence of smoke on the mountain.

परामर्श or लिङ्गपरामर्श;:— The knowledge that the हेतु which is generally and invariably present with the साध्य is present in the पक्ष.

परार्थानुमान:—Inference formally put. The formal syllogism called न्याय, consists of five parts.

प्रतिज्ञा हेतु, उदाहरण, उपनय, निगमन.

पर्वतो वह्निमान् ···· प्रतिज्ञा

धूमवत्त्वात् ···· हेतु

यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र वह्निः यथा महानसे — उदाहरण

अयं तथा — उपनय

तस्मात्तथा — निगमन

लिङ्ग:— The same as साधन or हेतु. धूम is the लिङ्ग in

पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमवत्त्वात् ।

लिङ्गपरामर्श:— See परामर्श.

विपक्ष:—An instance in which the साध्य or thing to be proved is absent. महाह्रद (a great lake) is a विपक्ष if वह्निमत्त्व is the साध्य because fire is absent from a lake.

व्यापक & व्याप्य:—are relative terms. Literally व्यापक means that which pervades i. e. is more extensive than the व्याप्य, that which is pervaded, the less extensive. Thus वह्नि is the व्यापक of धूम the व्याप्य, because वह्नि is found not only where धूम is present but in many more cases.

व्याप्ति:— Invariable concomitance. There is व्याप्ति between धूम and वह्नि because we find वह्नि wherever there is धूम. It is of three kinds: केवलान्वयि, केवलव्यतिरेकि and अन्वयव्यतिरेकि, for which see above.

व्याप्य:—See व्यापक.

सपक्ष:—A similar instance; that in which the साध्य

is present as in the पक्ष. Thus महानस, the kitchen is the सपक्ष of the अनुमान, पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात्, because there is वह्नि in the महानस.

साधन:—The same as लिङ्ग or हेतु, the indicatory mark present in the पक्ष which leads to the अनुमिति. धूमवत्त्व is the साधन (sometimes roughly said to be धूम.)

साध्य:—The thing proved. वह्निमत्त्व in the instance is साध्य. Sometimes we roughly say वह्नि is the साध्य

स्वार्थानुमान:—The inference in which the process is merely implied but not formally expressed as in परार्थानुमान. When I infer fire on the mountain because there is smoke thereon, thus going through the process of व्याप्तिज्ञान and लिङ्गपरामर्श but only implicitly, it is स्वार्थानुमान.

हेतु:—The same as साधन or लिङ्ग though, to be accurate, it is the second member of the formal syllogism.

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४४ अनुमान

Tr. Inference is the cause of inferred knowledge. Inferred knowledge is knowledge produced by scrutinisation (परामर्श)

It should be noted that अनुमान is the process that leads to अनुमिति. In the stock instance of inferred knowledge, the mountain is fiery because smoky, the conclusion that the mountain is fiery is the अनुमिति and the process consisting of पक्षधर्मता and व्याप्ति is the अनुमान.

The student should see that अनुमिति differs from प्रत्यक्ष in giving us the knowledge of a thing that is not in direct contact with our senses. In the

instance of fire on the mountain our senses do not come in contact with the fire at all, as they do in direct perception. In the whole process of inference, I see smoke on the mountain, and to that extent, my senses come in contact with an object.

Inferred knowledge depends upon two things. First, I must see the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called पक्षधर्मता. Secondly, it is necessary that from my past experience I must have gathered that whereever there is smoke there is fire. This is technically called व्याप्ति. I bring my past experrence to bear upon the present case of the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called परामर्श And this results in the final judgment that the mountain is fiery

Tr. Scrutinisation consists in the knowledge that the case under consideration possesses the indicatory mark characterised by invariable concomitance. e. g. this mountain possesses smoke that is invariably associated with fire.

The author now proceeds to define परामर्श which gives us अनुमिति. As said above, inferred knowledge results from the co--ordination of two distinct congitions. The thing on the basis of the presence of which I am going to form the judgment must be present in the particular instance (पक्षधर्मता). The smoke must be present on the mountain on which I am going to infer the existence of fire. Again, I must have a knowledge of the invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between smoke and fire which I must have derived from my past experience. Both these result in what is known as परामर्श.

Tr. And the cognition produced by it that the mountain is fiery is inferred knowledge.

The definition is simple in the light of the above explanation.

Tr. Invariable concomitance consists in the certainty of association that wherever there is smoke there is fire.

This association is either positive (केवलान्वयि) or negative (केवलव्यतिरेकि) or both (अन्वयव्यतिरेकि) according as we can give a similar instance to support the argument on hand, or a dissimilar instance or both. To take the instance of the smoky mountain, we can state the invariable concomitance in either of the two ways.

We can say wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen (यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः यथा महानसे) or, negatively, wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake. (यत्र यत्र वह्न्यभावस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभावः यथा महाह्रदे.) This sort of concomitance is called अन्वयव्यतिरेकि positive and negative concomitance because we can substantiate it with two kinds of instances similar (the kitchen) and dissimilar (the lake).

But it is not possible always to give instances of both kinds. Sometimes we can adduce a similar instances only; sometimes there will be no similar instances but only dissimilar ones which are equally effective in proving the case on hand. If we can adduce a similar instance only the concomitance is called केवलान्वयि व्याप्ति (positive concomitance). To take an instance:—The jar is nameable because it is cognisable, (घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात)—we can state the concomitance only positively. Because there is nothing in the world that is not nameable and hence a dissimilar instance we cannot come across. Thus we can say,

Whatever is cognisable is nameable like a piece of cloth (यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्र अभिधेयत्वं यथा पटे।)

But for want of a dissimilar instance we cannot, say, whatever is not nameable is not cognisable, there being nothing that is not nameable.

If we can adduce a dissimilar instance only, the concomitance can be negative only. Thus in the syllogism,

Earth differs from other substances, because it possesses smell (पृथ्वी इतरभेदवती । गन्धवत्त्वात् । यत्र यत्र इतर भेदाभाव: न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलम् ॥)
we cannot adduce a similar instance. Because any instance that could be called similar will be included in the class of earth and as such cannot be cited in support of the argument. To be clear, if I were to say, whatever has smell differs from other substances like a flower, I shall be arguing in a circle. Because flower being earthy is included in the case under consideratton and as such cannot support it.

In such cases we have to depend upon negative instances (विपक्ष) supporting negative concomitance. Thus in the inference under consideration, I have to give the concomitance only negatively,

Whatever does not differ from substances other than earth does not possess smell like water [यत्र इतरभेदवत् तत्र गन्धवदपि, यथा जलम्]. This is negative concomitance. It should be seen that definitions because they touch upon the *whole of* the thing defined, can be supported by dissimilar instances and negative concomitance, and are hence described as केवलव्यतिरेकि हेतु.

The student must have thus seen that, accord-

ing to the possibilty or otherwise of adducing a similar of dissimilar instance, one can make use of positive or negative concomitance in the formation of a syllogism. This positive or negative concomitance determines the name of the indicatory mark also. Thus, in the instances given above,

Smoke is an indicatory mark that is both positive and negative (अन्वयव्यतिरेकि) because with regard to it both kinds of concomitance can be given.

In the second instance cognisability is an indicatory mark that is positive only, (केवलान्वयि) for with regard to it only positive concomitance can be given.

In the third instance, smell is a negative indicatory mark, (केवलव्यतिरेकि) because with regard to it only a negative concomitance can be given.

Finally, the whole inference becomes positive or negative or positive-negative according as the indicatory mark is positive or negative or positive-negative.

Tr. पक्षधर्मता *consists in the presence of the less extensive on the mountain etc.*

पक्षधर्मता has been explained above.

पक्ष is the particular thing about which we make the inference. In the stock instance of smoke and fire, the mountain is the पक्ष on which धूम the व्याप्य abides. Note that before anything can be a पक्ष it must satisfy either of the two conditions:—

Either I must be curious (संदिहान:=doubtful) to infer something about the mountain or though I myself am not so curious to know the thing

myself I must be inclined to convey it to others (सिषाधयिषा √साध् to prove) The former is the पक्ष in a स्वार्थानुमान an inference for oneslf; the latter is a पक्ष in an inference for others (परार्थानुमान).

The terms व्याप्य and व्यापक are important. व्याप्य the less extensive is the indicatory mark also variously called लिङ्ग or हेतु or साधन. The indicatory mark receives this name because its extension is less than that of the thing proved which therefore comes to be called the more extensive (व्यापक). Smoke is found in a lesser number of instances than fire. In a red-hot iron ball there is fire but there is no smoke. Thus smoke comes to be called the व्याप्य the less extensive and fire व्यापक the more extensive.

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४५ Two kinds of अनुमान.

Tr. Inference is of two kinds:—that effected for oneself, and secondly, that effected for others.

The student should not suppose that the two varieties are quite independent. The first lies at the base of the second. The first refers to the process of inference without any regard for formal statement. The second is merely the first put *in a definite form.*, to convey the inference that I have *informally* made to another. When I infer fire on the mountain, I do informally go through the whole process which is formally laidout when I want to convince others of its truth. The inference for others (परार्थानुमान) is nothing but the five-membered syllogism (न्याय) of गौतम.

Tr. Inference for oneself is the cause of inferred knowledge for oneself. To wit, having realised by

repeated observation, in the case of the great kitchen and similar other places, the invariable concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire, when one goes to the mountain and doubts if there is fire thereon he happens to see smoke on it and remembers the invariable concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Then arises a consciousness " This mountain possesses smoke that is invariably associated with fire." This itself is called the scrutinisation of the indicatory mark. From this, one gets the inferred knowledge, " the mountain is fiery. " This is what is known as inference for oneself.

Note the four stages in an inference for oneself. (1) पक्षधर्मता (2) व्याप्तिस्मरण (3) परामर्श (4) अनुमिति.

Tr. When, on the other hand, having himself inferred fire on the mountain one uses the six-membered argument to convince another, that is an inference intended for others. e. g. पर्वतो वह्निमान धूमात्। यो यो धूमवान् स स वाह्निमान्। यथा महानसः। तथा चायम्। तस्मात्तथा॥

Tr. By the indicatory mark that is conveyed in this way the other party also is convinced of the existence of fire.

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४६ न्याय and its five members.

Tr. The members of the syllogism five in number, are Assertion, (प्रतिज्ञा) *Reason,* (हेतु), *Illustration* (उदाहरण), *Application,* (उपनय), *Conclusion,* (निगमन)

पर्वतो वह्निमान् is प्रतिज्ञा

धूमवत्त्वात् is हेतु

यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः यथा महानसे is उदाहरण

अयं च तथा — उपनय

तस्मात्तथा .... निगमन.

The student should master the above form as also the one given below to be able to put into logical form an argument based on positive or negative or positive-negative concomitance. It should be seen that the use of either of these varieties of concomitance depends upon the possibility of adducing an instance in support of it.

पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भिद्यते। प्रतिज्ञा

गन्धवत्त्वात्। हेतु

यन्नेतरेभ्यो भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलं। उदाहरण

इयं न तथा। उपनय

तस्मात् न तथा। निगमन.

The members of the न्याय or syllogism only formally embody what is informally present in a स्वार्थानुमान. A desire or expectancy is created by the first member which is satisfied by the subsequent members.

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४७ करण of अनुमान.

Tr. *The scrutinization of the indicatory mark is the special cause in an inference intended for oneself and that intended for others. Therefore scrutinization is the inference.*

It should be seen that the special cause of an inference as given by अन्नंभट्ट is according to the new तार्किक view, and is in conflict with the definition of करण given before. For परामर्श is itself the व्यापार, and not the व्यापारवत्.

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४८ लिङ्ग.

Tr *The indicatory mark is threefold:— (1) Positive-negative, (2) Positive, and (3) Negative. Positive-negative indicatory mark is one about which a positive and and negative concomitance can be pred-*

icated. ' Wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen, ' is positive concomitance. Wherever there is no fire there is no smoke as in a great lake" is negative concomitance. Positive indicatory mark is one about which only a positive concomitance can be predicated. e. g. The jar is nameable because it is cognisable like a piece of cloth. In this instance there is no negative concomitance between cognisability and nameability Because everything is cognisable and nameable. The negative indicatory mark is one about which only a negative concomitance can be postulated. e. g. Earth differs from other (substances), on account of possessing. smell. Whatever does not differ from other substances does not possess smell, like water. This is not so Therefore it is not like them (i. e. smell-less.) In this case there is no positive instance to illustrate the positive concomitance that whatever possesses smell differs from other substances, because the entire Earth is the subject of the argument.

See notes on Concomitance.

४९ पक्ष.

Tr. The पक्ष *is a thing the presence of the* साध्य *(thing to be proved) on which is doubtful; e. g. the mountain when the possessiom of the smoke is the reason*

cp. notes on पक्षधर्मता

५० सपक्ष.

A similar instance is one which is ascertained to possess the thing to be proved; e. g. a great kitchen, in the case just cited.

Note that in a similar instance the similarity is determined by the presence of the साध्य (thing to

be proved). Thus a fiery place (not a smoky one) is to be regarded as similar instance, in the instance of the fiery mountain.

५१ विपक्ष.

Tr. *A dissimilar instance is one from which the absence of the thing to be proved is ascertained; e. g. the great lake in the case on hand.*

An instance without fire will come under this class. It is an observation of the similar and dissmilar instances that enables us to understand the concomitance positively and negatively.

५२–५७ हेत्वाभास.

The word हेत्वाभास can be explained in two ways:—

(१) हेतुवदाभासन्त इति हेत्वाभासाः (न्यायबोधिनी) which are हेतुs in appearance ouly and defectve.

(२) हेतोः आभासः defects in the हेतु or fallacies हेतुदोषः.

When the तर्कदीपिका defines हेत्वाभास as अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानाविषय the ' object of right knowledge preventing अनुमिति '--which is the same as the दोषs in the हेतु,--it evidently takes हेत्वाभास in the second sense. Whether we take this meaning or that the ultimate outcome is the same. Because, according to the first interpretation, we have to deal with fallacious हेतुs which is virtually the same as dealing with the fault in the हेतु, which is the meaning, according to the second derivation.

An easier method to understand a " हेत्वाभास " is to recognise that it consists in either of the five requisites of a valid हेतु. in general, being absent. The five requisites of a valid हेतु are (1) पक्षधर्मत्व

(२) सपक्षे सत्त्व (३) विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तत्व (४) अबाधितविषयत्व (५) असत्प्रतिपक्षत्व.

(1) Violation of पक्षधर्मत्व.

[आश्रयासिद्ध and स्वरूपासिद्ध. p. 32.]

पक्षधर्मत्व If we want to infer fire *on the mountain* the हेतु, smoke, must be present on the mountain which is the subject.

Violation of this requisite may take place in two ways: (1) There may be no पक्ष e. g. the mountain at all (2) or, the हेतु e. g. smoke may be absent from the पक्ष. Accordingly a violation of पक्षधर्मत्व will result in two हेत्वाभासs. (1) that in which the पक्ष does not exist at all; and (2) in which the हेतु is absent from the पक्ष. The first is the आश्रयासिद्ध out of the three varieties of असिद्ध.

The stock instance is गगनारविन्दं सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात् सरोजारविन्दवत्. गगनारविन्द a sky-lotus is an अविद्यमान thing as much अविद्यमान as a शशविषाण, or a castle in the air. So, to infer anything about it, is futile. This is the आश्रयासिद्ध हेत्वाभास i. e. one in which the assumption of the पक्ष (आश्रय of the हेतु) itself is hypothetical, baseless.

It is very easy to detect this fallacy, because what exists and what does not exist are matters known, as a rule, by every man of the world. Supposing I infer anything about a hare's horn the fallacy in my reasoning will be too patent. Again, if I were to infer anything about the idols (मूर्ति) of Islam, the हेत्वाभास will be आश्रयासिद्ध, because, everybody knows Islam does not admit idol-worship. If we were to infer anything about the dark complexion of a Londoner or the white complexion of a negro in Africa-not in the U. S. A.--or the

generosity of a typical Aberdonian we shall commit the हेत्वाभास of आश्रयासिद्ध, because all these cases (पक्षs) do not exist at all.

Some say that another variety of आश्रयासिद्ध is possible. If I infer something which is already known and hence requires no inference, my हेतु is आश्रयासिद्ध. Thus if I were to infer that I have body because I am a man, my inference will suffer from this drawback. Here the आश्रय *viz.* 'I' does exist but is not 'पक्ष' in the logical sense because there is no (सिषाधयिषा) or desire (or necessity) to prove the thing inferred. Sanskrit न्याय requires that there must be at least a desire to prove something about a thing, before it can be called पक्ष. The fallacy resulting from the absence of the हेतु from the पक्ष is स्वरूपासिद्ध, second variety of असिद्ध.

The stock instance is शब्दो गुण: । चाक्षुषत्वात् । Everybody knows that शब्द is not चाक्षुष (cognised by the eye) but श्रोत्रिय (heard by the ear). Thus चाक्षुषत्व does not at all abide in शब्द. The हेतु, therefore, is स्वरूपासिद्ध. non-existent on the पक्ष.

This fallacy is much obvious and can be easily detected. Thus if I were to say that the cannibals are enlightened because educated I commit this fallacy. Because education is conspicuous by its absence in cannibals. Again, if I were to say, that कणाद is a नैयायिक because he admits four प्रमाणs, I shall be committing this fallacy because कणाद has stated the प्रमाणs to be two. This will show how one can easily detect this fallacy.

2 Violation of सपक्षे सत्त्व

[असाधारण अनैकान्तिक p. 30]

The second requisite of a valid हेतु is that it

should be present in the सपक्ष instances i.e. instances where the साध्य exists. Thus when I want to infer fire on the mountain on the basis of the smoke, I must be sure that smoke is present in those cases only where there is fire. Thus I have seen smoke coming out of the kitchen and I know there is fire therein. This strengthens my conviction that there must be fire on the mountain also, because I see smoke thereon.

In केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान, it is true, the requirement of सपक्षे सत्त्व is not fulfilled. But still it is valid. Because there is no सपक्ष at all By its very nature केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान leaves no scope for सपक्ष and still possesses the power to prove the particular thing. Thus in

पृथिवी इतरभेदवती। गन्धवत्त्वात्। यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत्। यथा जलं। नचेयं तथा। तस्मान्न तथा।

पृथ्वीतरभेद is not found in anything else but पृथ्वी which is the पक्ष. So there is is no similar instance and hence the हेतु is not faulty at all, if it is not found in the सपक्ष which does not exist.

But the absence of सपक्षे सत्त्व invalidates an अनुमिति in cases where the हेतु is present only in the पक्ष though there are सपक्ष instances. Thus in an अनुमान of the kind, शब्दोऽनित्यः। शब्दत्वात्, शब्दत्व is present only in the पक्ष, शब्द; but is not present in any of the सपक्ष instances though there are so many-all अनित्य things constituting the सपक्ष. This results in the हेत्वाभास called असाधारण which is defined as *the one that is absent both from similar* (सपक्ष) *and dissimilar* (विपक्ष) *iustances.* Of course the defect consists only in its being absent from the similar instances (सपक्ष); its absence from the विपक्ष is no defect; because every valid हेतु is required to be absent

from| the विपक्ष. The विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति is given in the definition only to show its exclusive nature.

This fallacy is not generally difficult to detect. It is exactly the fault known as arguing in a circle. If I say that the Aberdonians are stingy because they are Aberdonians I commit this fallacy. Sometimes it may be a little more subtle, because the हेतु though exclusively abiding in the पक्ष could be made out to be so with some difficulty. Thus in an अनुमान of the type 'war is inhuman because there one army butchers another,' the हेतु is the exclusive description of war and hence we commit the fallacy of असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु,

(3) Violation of विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति
[साधारण अनैकान्तिक p. 30]

To return to our instance of the fiery mountain, our inference that it is fiery because smoky is as much strengthened by our observation of smoke in similar instances (सपक्ष) like kitchen as by our certain knowledge that it is absent from dissimilar instances (विपक्ष) i. e. instances in which fire, to take our instance, is absent. Thus my conviction that the mountain is fiery is as much strengthened by my observing smoke in a kitchen with fire as by my failure to observe it in a lake without fire. Therefore, if any हेतु be found in the विपक्ष also, evidently my inference ceases to be valid. I begin to suspect that though the thing inferred may be true, its opposite may also be true, because I find the same हेतु present in a dissimilar instance, i. e. in an instance with the opposite or negation of the साध्य. This fallacy is styled साधारणानैकान्तिक because the हेतु is साधारण to सपक्ष and विपक्ष also.

Thus to take the stock instance, पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात् (because it is cognisable), we know that

the हेतु, प्रमेयत्व is present in instances where fire is present (सपक्ष) as well as instances from which it is absent (विपक्ष). Thus a lake is as much प्रमेय as a महानस. प्रमेयत्व belongs to each and everything that can be the object of a cognition. Thus being present in the विपक्ष also, this is not conclusive.

The student should study this fallacy very carefully because the majority of fallacious arguments suffer from it. It is not so obvious as the others and demands some wide knowledge for its apprehension.

In our daily life, we indulge in fallacies that are mostly reducible to this because of our limited knowledge. Thus if I were to say to my learned friend that some x. y. z. is a great social reformer because, like Ranade, he is a Judge of the Bombay High Court, I commit this fallacy. Because my learned friend knows that many a judge has sat on the judge's chair without caring a jot for the social uplift of his countrymen. So the हेतु *viz.* being a judge is defective because it is found in the विपक्ष also *viz.* those cases where a judge was not a social reformer.

Again, if I were to say that x. y. z. is a great educationist, because, like Sir Ashutosh Mukerjee, he is a member of the University Senate, I again commit the same fallacy A man with knowledge of things educational knows too well how there are some who do not know the A. B. C. of education take their seats on the Senate; in other words, he knows that the हेतु is present in the विपक्ष also.

Again, if I were to say that x. y z. cannot be intelligent because he belongs to the depressed classes, I commit the same fallacy. Because, new

it is known by all, how intelligence is not the special privilege of a few. One knows how brilliant people are not wanting in the depressed classes So being present in the विपक्ष also this हेतु is साधारण अनैकान्तिक.

(4) Violation of सपक्षे सत्त्व and विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तत्व both [विरुद्ध p. 31]

The violation of these two requisites results into the fallacy called विरुद्ध. It is needless to point to the importance of both in a valid अनुमान because it is already made clear above.

The stock instance is शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वात् । Everybody knows that whatever is कृत or done is अनित्य, because there was a time when it did not exist. So, कृतकत्व will go to prove अनित्यत्व of शब्द and not its नित्यत्व. In other words, the हेतु is present in the विपक्ष also from where it ought to be absent. Again, the हेतु is absent from all सपक्ष instances, because nothing in the world which is नित्य coexists with कृतकत्व. That is what is meant by defining विरुद्ध as साध्याभावव्याप्य ***which coexists invariably with the negation of the thing that is to be proved.***

This fallacy is also easy to detect. For it arises from specifying a हेतु which will exactly prove the opposite. If I were to infer that my friend will be an athlete because he drinks kettles of tea or smokes scores of cigarettes the same fallacy will occur. Such instances will show how one can easily detect this fallacy.

(5) Violation of असत्प्रतिपक्षत्व [सत्प्रतिपक्ष p. 31]

Sometimes the सपक्षे सत्त्व and विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तत्व may be unascertained in the case of a हेतु but there may be an opposite argument of ***stronger force*** which

destroys the first argument. Such fallacies are called सत्प्रतिपक्ष 'to which there is a rival'.

The stock instance is शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात्। शब्दत्ववत्। (The जाति शब्दत्व is नित्य and perceived by the same sense as the व्यक्ति, individual शब्द). The rival argument is शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात्। घटवत्। Here श्रावणत्व is a सत्प्रतिपक्ष हेतु, because the *more appealing* हेतु *viz.* कृतकत्व disproves नित्यत्व. We know how शब्द is कृत which necessarily proves अनित्यत्व. We are not so conclusive as regards श्रावणत्व, which may or may not prove नित्यत्व.

We have to interpret the fallacy only in this way. We have to take the second argument as the stronger of the two and more valid. Otherwise if we take both the arguments as inconclusive, there remains no difference between सत्प्रतिपक्ष and अनैकान्तिक. Thus while in सत्प्रतिपक्ष we are conscious of a definite हेतु which proves the opposite of the साध्य and thus makes it invalid, in अनैकान्तिक the साध्य may be right but yet inconclusive. Thus पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात् may be right or wrong; it is inconclusive. While in शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात्, the साध्य नित्यत्व is invalid[1]. This is what is meant by साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं यस्य वर्तते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः *where there is a different* हेतु *to prove the negation of the first.*

From this it will be clear that in सत्प्रतिपक्ष, the second argument must be stronger than the first. The contention of some that in सत्प्रतिपक्ष, both the arguments are of equal force is therefore untrue. After we admit that the second argument is stronger, naturally we have to admit that in सत्प्रतिपक्ष,

1 Cp. नैयायिकास्तु शब्दोऽनित्य इत्याहुः —न्यायकोश. अनित्यश्चायं कारणतः। —वै. सू. 2-2-28.

the opposite argument must be based on अनुमान only to distinguish it from बाधित where also a stronger conclusion disproves the first but it must be taken to be derived from means of proof other than अनुमान lest बाधित will be the same as सत्प्रतिपक्ष.

How to distinguish the fallacy from विरोध ? While in विरोध the हेतु given proves the opposite of what it is supposed to prove (कृतकत्व proves अनित्यत्व and not नित्यत्व as stated in the अनुमान) in सत्प्रतिपक्ष, the हेतु does not prove the opposite necessarily. It is only inconclusive. In विरोध, the साध्य may be true or false. In सत्प्रतिपक्ष, it is false.

To be able to detect the fallacy one must be able to know a more conclusive argument proving the opposite and thus setting at naught the argument given. Thus, if I say, the earth is steady because we do not tumble as we walk on its surface, I commit this fallacy because the stronger inference that as a planet of a lesser magnitude than the Sun it ought to move disproves my first conclusion. Similarly, if I say, 'Education is bad because it taxes the brain,' I commit the same fallacy because everybody knows the argument that education is good because it imparts culture.

(6) Violation of अबाधितविषयत्व [बाधित p. 33]

If the साध्य proved by a सत्प्रतिपक्षहेतु is disproved by another हेतु in a more valid अनुमान, the साध्य cf a बाधितहेतु is disproved by any other प्रमाण but अनुमान. Thus a stronger अनुमान invalidates the साध्य in the first while a stronger अनुमानेतरप्रमाण invalidates the साध्य in the second. That is why बाधित has been defined as '*one the absence of the* साध्य *of which is determined by a different means of proof*'

In the stock instance अग्निः अनुष्णः द्रव्यत्वात् we

find that the अनुष्णत्व of अग्नि is disproved by the stronger प्रमाण of प्रत्यक्ष according to which it is hot. Not that प्रत्यक्ष is stronger than अनुमान in all cases because being प्रमाणs both stand on the same level. Here we say that it is stronger because it agrees with experience and is more reliable while the अनुमान, अग्निः अनुष्णः &c does not. [अत्र अनुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यतइति बाधितत्वम्]

Really speaking सत्प्रतिपक्ष and बाधित are similar in nature and instances of one may be as well instances of the other. The only difference is in the way in which the fallacious हेतुs are repudiated. If we take the help of a stronger अनुमान, the fallacious हेतु is सत्प्रतिपक्ष; if of a stronger प्रमाण other than अनुमान it is बाधित. Thus instances adduced to illustrate सत्प्रतिपक्ष hold good in the case of बाधित, only with the difference that in the latter the stronger प्रमाण should not be अनुमान but some other. If I disprove the erroneous साध्य 'that पृथ्वी is steady by having recourse the वाक्यs of आप्तs like Newton the हेतु becomes बाधित.

(7) Violation of विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्ति (owing to an उपाधि)

[सोपाधिक. P. 32]

We have already seen while discussing साधारणानैकान्तिक how the fallacy arises on account of the हेतु being present in the विपक्ष. There the हेतु was such as was not in an invariable concomitance with the साध्य owing to its being found with the साध्य as well as its अभाव. The idea that is prominent in the साधारणानैकान्तिक is that the हेतु is too wide to prove the साध्य. In the fallacy that we are discussing at present, no doubt the हेतु is found both with the साध्य and its अभाव, the व्याप्ति being thus violated

but what is felt more prominently is the fact that the हेतु could be valid and prove the साध्य if only we were to limit its scope by an उपाधि.

The stock instance is पर्वतो धूमवान् । वह्निमत्त्वात्. We see how वह्निमत्त्व is present also in instances like the red-hot ball of iron (तप्तायोगोल) where वह्नि is present but धूम is not present. Thus विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति is vitiated in such हेतुs. But further, we are conscious of the very close association of वह्नि and धूम. And we feel the हेतु is not too wide. It could prove the साध्य reasonably if we were to limit its scope just a little by stating that वह्नि must be आर्द्रेन्धनसंयुक्त (joined with or fed by wet fuel). In other words, we say that the अनुमान, पर्वतो धूमवान् । आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे वह्निमत्त्वात् is as valid as any other. And the अनुमान, पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात् is fallacious only in so far as the हेतु is a little wider than it ought to be, on account of the उपाधि (आर्द्रेन्धन-संयोग). [वह्निमत्त्व is definitely wider than आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे वह्निमत्त्व because the former is unconditioned, the latter conditioned.]

In the instance of साधारणानैकान्तिक, पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात् we feel that the हेतु is too wide and no reasonable condition (उपाधि) limiting its scope could make it a valid हेतु as in the above fallacy.

In short, in व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध we are conscious that an उपाधि (or) condition) will set the हेतु aright while in साधारणानैकान्तिक such consciousness is not present.

It must be confessed that the distinction between the two figures is subtle and may be said to be subjective also. What I feel to be an instance of साधारणानैकान्तिक may be taken for one of व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध by another with equal justice and cogency. That is why some logicians have taken both the fallacies to be identical. But as it stands, if I can set my

finger on an उपाधि (condition) in the case of a हेतु I shall be justified in taking the हेतु to be व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध otherwise called सोपाधिक. If no such उपाधि could be caught hold of, the हेतु could be reasonably styled साधारणानैकान्तिक.

This could be shown by taking one of the instances adduced to illustrate साधारणानैकान्तिक. To revert to the instance of Sir Ashutosh, if I say that the हेतु 'being member of the Senate,' if it were to be valid, ought to be conditioned by ' provided there is a wide experience of the methods of study and tuition ' the हेतु becomes व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध One must admit that any member on the Senate who has a wide experience of the methods of study and tuition is an eductionist like Sir Ashutosh. It is a valid argument; and the argument in question is invalid because unconditioned as it ought to be.

Thus to judge whether a हेतु is व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध or साधारणानैकान्तिक one must see whether there is an उपाधि to limit its scope or not.

What is an उपाधि:—From the above discussion the nature of an उपाधि must have become clear. It is an adventitious circumstance, a condition which ought to be present before a certain हेतु which is too wide could be valid.

उपाधि is defined by the तर्कसंग्रह as: साध्याव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक: उपाधि: i. e उपाधि is that which being wider than the साध्य is not wider than the साधन. आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is व्यापक of the साध्य viz. धूम (in पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात्) i. e. we find आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग wherever there is धूम. But it is not the व्यापक of the साधन-वह्नि in the instance-because we cannot say wherever there is वह्नि there is आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग because वह्नि exists in many cases where आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग

is not present. In short, an उपाधि is invariably associated with the साध्य, but not so with the साधन. In other words, it is a condition which if tacked to the हेतु will make it conclusive and capable of rightly proving the thing in question. Thus आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे वह्निमत्त्व is a valid हेतु to prove धूमवत्त्व.

साध्यव्यापक is explained as साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं. That is साध्यव्यापक which cannot be the counterentity of the absolute negation coexisting with the साध्य. [साध्येन समानाधिकरणः यः अत्यन्ताभावः तस्य प्रतियोगित्वम्]. Thus आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is not the प्रतियोगिन् (*viz.* घट, पट the) of the अभाव, (घटाभाव, पटाभाव etc.) coexisting with the साध्य, धूमवत्त्व. With धूम exist अभावs of everything that is not धूम e. g. पटाभाव, घटाभाव the counterentities of which are पट, घट etc This is an euphuistic way of saying that आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is invariably associated with धूमवत्त्व.

साधनाव्यापकत्व is explained as साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् [साधनवत्=साध्यसमानाधिकरण.]

i. e. साधनाव्यापक is what is counterentity of the absolute negation coexisting with the साधन. Thus just as घट, पट etc. are the प्रतियोगिन्s of the absolute negations coexisting with वह्नि the साधन, आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is also the प्रतियोगिन् of the अभाव which coexists with वह्नि. In other words, वह्नि may exist in the absence of आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग.

घट, पट etc. are साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिन् but they are not साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिन् while आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is so. Hence आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is the उपाधि in the instance under consideration.

(8) **सपक्षाभाव & विपक्षाभाव** [**अनुपसंहारिन्** p. 31.]

We have seen how similar instances and dissimilar instances help us to be definite as reg-

ards the 'capacity of the हेतु to prove the साध्य.' Naturally enough when there is no सपक्ष nor विपक्ष we feel diffident about the validity of the हेतु to do so. It is such हेतु that forms the province of the अनुप-संहारि हेत्वाभास.

When we say that in this variety of हेत्वाभास, there is no सपक्ष nor विपक्ष naturally we imply that in this हेत्वाभास the पक्ष is the *totality of things*. Every object in the world must be the subject of the inference to bring about the absence of the सपक्ष and विपक्ष. This is the implication of the definition अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहित: *which has neither a positive instance nor a negative instance to prove its validity.*

The stock instance is सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वात. Here as every-thing is included in the पक्ष (सर्वं) there is neither a similar nor a dissimilar instance to prove the validity of the inference.

This fallacy is easy to detect. If everything in the world is the subject of the inference the fallacy is अनुपसंहारिन्.

It should be seen that in असाधारण, there are सपक्ष and विपक्ष both, though the हेतुs are absent from them.

हेत्वाभासs (*9 in all*)

- सव्यभिचार or अनैकान्तिक
  - 1 साधारण
  - 2 असाधारण
  - 3 अनुपसंहारिन्
- 4 विरुद्ध
- 5 सत्प्रतिपक्ष
- असिद्ध
  - 6 आश्रयासिद्ध
  - 7 स्वरूपासिद्ध
  - 8 व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध
- 9 बाधित

How to differentiate the हेत्वाभासs?

1 If पक्षधर्मत्व is violated for want of the पक्ष itself it is आश्रयासिद्ध.

2 If पक्षधर्मत्व is ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, हेतु in the पक्ष it is स्वरूपासिद्ध

3 If only सपक्षे सत्त्व is violated it is असाधारण अनैकान्तिक.

4&5 If only विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तत्व is violated it is साधारण अनैकान्तिक or व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध if we feel the presence of an उपाधि.

6 If both सपक्षेसत्त्व and विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तत्व, are violated though there are सपक्ष and विपक्ष, it is विरुद्ध.

7 If सत्प्रतिपक्षत्व is violated it is असत्प्रतिपक्ष.

8 If अबाधितविषयत्व is violated it is बाधित.

9 If सपक्ष and विपक्ष do not exist at all it is अनुपसंहारिन्.

It should be seen that an instance of one fallacy can, sometimes, be that of another too. It depends upon one's knowledge to detect the fallacy. Thus an inference of the type: the earth is steady because we are steady may be an instance of बाधित or सत्प्रतिपक्ष according as we advance a stronger अनुमानेतरप्रमाण or अनुमान.

This holds good in the case of other fallacies also. The student is required only to justify his view-point of fallacy. Two students may detect different fallacies in the same argument and be yet both of them right.

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५८ उपमिति

Tr. ***That which is the special cause of knowledge by comparison is comparison. Knowledge by comparison consists in the cognition of the relation of the name and the named. Its special cause is the knowledge of similarity. The remembrance of the***

sense of the words meant for protracted application is the intermediate operation.

The process that leads to an उपमिति has been well described in a different reading. Its purport is: A person who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word गवय (a wild ox) is told by a forester that a गवय is an animal that bears close resemblance to a bull. As later the man happens to go to a forest he comes across an animal that bears a close resemblance to an ox but is not identical with it. At once he remembers the words of the forester and comes to the conclusion that the animal before him must be the गवय (the wild ox.)

Thus उपमिति is only the realisation of the connection of a name with the object denoted by it (संज्ञा-संज्ञिसंबंध). It depends upon similarity between two objects and is hence called उपमिति. The words of the forester, who is very much acquainted with matters relating to forest, in the instance, only perform the function of apprising the ignorant person of the similarity between the bull and the गवय.

These are the constituents of this process:— (1) Ignorance of the sense of a word; (2) Knowledge that the object resembles a particular thing, derived from a reliable authority; (3) Direct perception of an object that bears such a resemblance; (4) The remembrance of the words of that authority; and (5) The knowledge that the particular object is called by that name.

अतिदेशवाक्य technically means words that convey their sense by protraction. In 'गवय is like a bull,' the sense is *protracted* to the particular animal

on the basis of similarity. The interpretation of the words as " authoritative direction " given by some does not take note of the technical significance attached to the word and must be hence discarded.

Note that the करण in this case is in conflict with the definition of करण given by the author before. For सादृश्यज्ञान being a quality (ज्ञान a गुण) cannot be the abode of any activity as it is required to be by the definition (व्यापारवत् असाधारण कारण.)

सादृश्यज्ञानं करणं अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्यापार :— what is meant is that the सादृश्य produces the व्यापार of the remembrance of the words of the authority with a protracted sense

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५९-६३ शाब्दज्ञान.

Tr. Word is the sentence of an authoritative person. An authoritative person is one who speaks facts. Sentence consists of a group of words. e. g. 'Bring the cow.' A word is what possesses power to convey sense. Power is a convention (संकेत) *set up by the desire of God that from a particular word a particutar sense is to be undrstood.*

शक्तं पदं:—Note the view if the तार्किकs that in a sentence each word contributes to the general sense of the sentence and is thus equal in importance to other words in the sentence. In other words, they do not give prominence to one word in a sentence over others. According to the मीमांसकs the verb is the most important member of the sentence, all other words merely conditioning its sense (cp, the दीपिका.)

ईश्वरेच्छासंकेत:—The modern तार्किकs say that it

does not depend on the desire of God to assign sense to a word. It is man who names things at his freewill, they say.

Note that शक्ति is only one of the powers of the word. It is also called अभिधा. The तार्किकs admit two kinds of power:—Power of primary significance (अभिधा) and (2) power of implication (लक्षणा). The third power admitted by the grammarians and rhetoricians is power of suggestion, (व्यञ्जना) which the तार्किकs include under the first two.

Tr. Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the cause of the apprehension of the meaning a sentence. Expectancy consists in the failure of a word to convey a coherent sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility consists in the sense being not irreconcileable. Juxtaposition consists in the utterance of the words in close succession.

What is meant is this. (1) In a sentence the words must be mutually dependent. The absence of one word from the sentence must leave it incomplete. (आकांक्षा) (2) The sense yielded by the constituent words of the sentence must agree with facts in our experience. (योग्यता) (3) The words, when they are uttered, must give us a connected notion, and must be hence uttered without any great interval passing between the utterance of one word and another (संनिधि.)

Tr. A sentence formed without expectancy etc. must be unauthoritative. e. g. words like, 'a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant', are not authoritative, for want of expectancy; a sentence like 'One should sprinkle with fire' is not authoritative for want of compatibility. Of the words "Bring the cow" each uttered

after a long interval is not authoritative in the absence of juxtaposition.

The author here gives illustration of the necessity of the three requisites of a valid sentence.

Tr. Sentence is of two kinds:—Vedic and worldly. Every Vedic sentence is authoritative because it is spoken by God. As regards the worldly sentence that which is spoken by persons of authority is authoritative. The rest (of worldly sentences) are unauthoritative.

Vedic sentences:--The Vedas, the Brahmanas and the Upanishads come under this class. Worldy sentences:—The Smriti literature (including the Sutras) written by the sages as also the words of other authoritative persons come under this class. Note that the smritis command authority because they are based on the Vedas. If there is a conflict between the two, Veda will be held more authoritative.

ईश्वरोक्तः —Note that the तार्किकs regard the Veda as spoken by God and thus having a beginning, impermanent; the मिमांसकs regard it as permanent, without a beginning or an end. All sound is impermanent, according to the तार्किकs.

Tr. Verbal knowledge is knowledge of the sense of a sentence. Its special cause is Word.

The remarks made on the conflict between the author's definition of करण and his assumption of गुण as करण hold good in the present case also. [शब्द is a गुण].

Verbal authority is to be distinguished from the direct perception of words. In the former one gets at the sense of the words. In the latter only

one hears the sound. Note that कणाद includes उपमिति and शाब्दज्ञान under अनुमान. (वै. सू. १.२.३,१५) The दीपिका says that all the प्रमाणs such as अर्थापत्ति, ऐतिह्य come under the form given in the text.

६४ अयथार्थानुभव.

Tr. Erroneous knowledge is of three kinds. (1) Doubt, (2) Perversion and *(3) Argument by reductio* ad *absurdum method.*

संशय.

Tr. Doubt consists in an apprehension that refers to the attribution to oneand the same substance of many conflicting attributes. e. g. "Is this a pillar or a man"?

When one in darkness doubts whether a particular object is a pillar or a person, he attributes to the same substance the conflictig attributes of being a pillar and a man. Such knowledge is erroneous for in it one does not get *definitely* correct knowledge.

The दीपिका includes dream under the head of Perversion (mental).

विपर्यय.

Tr. Perversion is false knowledge. e.g. the apprehension 'This is silver' in the case of a mother-o'-pearl.

In doubt there is reference to two extremities and hence it is indefinite. In perversion the person is definite but wrong. The instance of doubt will cease to be so as soon as the man mistakes the pillar for the person or *vice versa*. So long as he vascillates between two extremes he is in doubt; as soon as he definitely takes a thing for what it is not he perverts.

तर्क.

Tr. Method of reductio ad absurdum consists in making the opponent accept the more extensive when he accepts the less extensive.

What is meant is this. If my opponent does not admit, say, that the mountain is fiery even when he sees and admits that it is smoky, I shall convince him by arguing negatively. If there is no fire on the mountain, I shall say, there will be no smoke also. But as both of us see the smoke, we must admit that there is fire on the mountain. Thus this method is useful in convincing the opponent of the invariable concomitance between two things which he is not prepared to admit.

In this method I force the opponent to accept the more extensive viz. absence of smoke if he accepts the less extensive, viz. the absence of fire. (the more extensive is the साध्य; the less extensive is the साधन; Smoke is present in many more instances than fire e. g. there is fire in the red-hot iron-ball but there is no smoke there.) This method is subsumed under erroneous knowledge because therein we suppose, to take the instance, that there is no smoke and fire when both are there. At any rate, "here the error is conscious and purposeful and as such differs from the ordinary error. शिवादित्य includes तर्क under doubt.

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६५ स्मृति.

Tr. Remembrance is also twofold; right and wrong. Right remembrance is what is produced by right opprehension. Wrong remembrance is one that is caused by wrong apprehension.

If the original apprehension was erroneo the remembrance also will be erroneous. If it correct the remembrance also will be correct.

६६–६९ सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष.

Tr. Pleasure is what is felt to be agreeable by all.

As it is very difficult to come across pleasur that is agreeable to all the definition has bee modified in the दीपिका so as to include the feeling c pleasure of each and every individual. We fin that the pleasure of one is the pain of another, i our daily experience. If the difinition in the tex were accepted, such pleasures will be left out of it scope. To include them the definition has beer modified in the दीपिका so as to make pleasure a subjective feeling. As modified the definitior सुख means whatever results in the cognition " I am happy. "

Tr. Whatever is felt to be disagreeable is pain Desire is longing. Aversion is hatred.

७० प्रयत्न.

Tr. Effort is volition.

Note that what is meant by प्रयत्न is not the physical act which is कर्मन् but the mental effort that precedes such an act.

७१–७२ धर्म, अधर्म.

Tr. Merit is what results from (the performance of) actions that have been prescribed (by the Vedas.) Demerit is what results from (the performance of) actions that are forbidden.

विहितकर्मन्s Such as सन्ध्योपासन, यज्ञविधान.
निषिद्धकर्मन् ,, ,, श्येन, a rite to kill the enemy.

७३-७४ *The* गुणs *of* आत्मन्.

Tr. The eight beginning with cognition are the special qualities of the Self. As abiding in God, cognition, desire and effort are permanent; and they are impermanent as abiding in the individual self.

Note that God does not possess सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष, धर्म, अधर्म.

७५ संस्कार.

Tr. Impression is threefold:-(1) Velocity, (2) Mental impression and (3) Elasticity. Velocity abides in the four substances beginning with earth (i. e. water, light and air) and in the mind.

Ether, time, space and self are all-pervading and hence do not possess velocity.

Tr. Mental impression produced by experience is the cause of remembrance and abides only in the self

See the section on स्मृति.

Tr. Elasticity is the impression that restores to its original form an object whose form was changed. It exists in earthy substances like a mat.

७६ कर्म.

Tr. Acion is of the naiure of motion. An upward toss is the cause of conjunction with the upward region. A downward throw is the cause of conjunction

with the lower region. Contraction is the cause of contact near the body. Expansion is cause of contact away from the body. Every other action is called action in general; It abides in the four substances beginning with earth and the mind.

See section 5. Note that the all-pervading substances are incapable of action.

७७ सामान्य.

Tr. Generality is permanent, one and persists in many. It abides in substance, quality, and action. It is of two kinds. (1) the higher and (2) the lower. The higher is Existence. The lower is generality of substance etc.

एकं:—see section 6. The stanza **व्यक्तेरभेद:** etc. gives the reason why **सामान्य**s and **समवाय**s cannot be many.

नित्य:—If generality were assumed to be impermanent sometimes the individual of a particular class will be found without its class feaures which is absurd.

७८ विशेष.

Tr. Particularities abide in eternal substances and distinguish them.

See section 7.

७९ समवाय.

Tr. Intimate relation is permanent relation abiding in things inseparably connected. Inseparably connected things are those of which one as long as it does not perish exists only resting on the other. They

are the following pairs:—(1) the part and the whole; (2) The quality and its substratum; (3) The action and its substratum; (4) The class and the individual of the class; and (5) Particularity and eternal substance.

See section 8.

८० अभाव.

प्रागभाव AND प्रध्वंसाभाव

Tr. Antecedent nonexistence is without a beginning but has an end. It exists prior to the production of the effect. Consequent nonexistence has a beginning but no end. It exists after the effect comes into existence.

Note that both प्रागभाव and प्रध्वंसाभाव presuppose the production of the effect and are thus related to the problem of causation. There is प्रागभाव of घट before it comes into existence. As soon as it comes into existence the प्रागभाव disappears. That is why it is said to to be without a beginning and with an end. The end of the antecedent nonexistence is brought about by the appearance of the effect.

Consequent non-existence is produced as soon as the घट is destroyed, and lasts for all time to come. Thus it has a beginning but no end. The घटध्वंस is therefore the निमित्तकारण of the production of प्रध्वंसाभाव.

Tr. Absolute non-existence is one which lasts through the three times and which has a counterentity characterised by contact. e. g. there is no jar on the ground.

There are two views regarding absolute non-existence. According to the वैशेषिकs it refers to things that do not exist at all, like the colour of the wind. The absence of jar on the ground is not absolute according to this view, because it is disturbed by the appearance of the jar on the ground while the absence of a hare's horn or colour of the wind is never disturbed. So, instances of nonexistence of the type भूतले घटो नास्ति are relegated by them to a different class of nonexistence called temporary. (सामयिकाभाव) The नैयायिकs, on the other hand, say that both these cases come under the same class of absolute non-existence, and they do not admit a separate variety to account for cases like the absence of the jar on the ground. They argue that even if the jar be brought in it only temporarily *obscures* the absence of the jar which is there for all time. The view of the वैशेषिकs is more reasonable because they do not admit instances like the absence of the jar from the ground to be of absolute nonexistence as they are not (see दीपिका). The case of the nonexistence of the hare's horn is quite different from that of the absence of the jar from the ground. अन्नंभट्ट here leaves the वैशेषिक school with which he has identfied himself and includes सामयिकाभाव under अत्यन्ताभाव. It should be seen that the argument of some that it is not possible to predicate the nonexistence of a thing which does not exist does not find support at the hands of the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs.

संसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताक differentiates absolute non-existence from reciprocal non-existence. In the former, the counterentity "is characterised by

contact (संसर्ग), in the latter, it is characterised by relation of identity(तादात्म्य) In other words, in the former we deny contact, in the latter we deny identity. In saying there is no hare's horn on earth we deny contact between the two; in saying यज्ञदत्त is not देवदत्त we deny identity between the two.

Tr. Reciprocal non-existence is one that has its counterentity characterised by the relation af identity; e. g. the jar is not the piece of cloth.

See notes on the previous section and those on Section 9.

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८१ उपसंहार.

Tr. As all things can be duly subsumed under the seven categories given it follows that there are only seven categories.

The author shows in the दीपिका how the sixteen heads of गौतम's सूत्रs as also शक्ति, स्वत्व etc. can be subsumed under the seven categories. See section 2.

Tr. अन्नंभट्ट *the learned composed the* तर्कसंग्रह *for initiating the beginners in the tenets of (the* वैशेषिक-शास्त्र *of)* कणाद *and the* न्याय *(of* गौतम).

Our author is of the syncretist school, and as such gives us a compendium comprising of the tenets from both the नैयायिक and वैशेषिक schools. (See Introduction.)

